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WHAT FUTURE for the STATE?



Rogers Brubaker • Vincent Cable • Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr.
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Vivien A. Schmidt • Susan Strange • Masaru Tamamoto

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What Future for the State?

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

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Preface to the Issue "What Future for the State?"

As we move rapidly and relentlessly to the end of the twentieth century, there are compelling reasons for wishing to analyze a period that must figure as one of the most tumultuous in recorded history. While some may wish to reflect only on the more barbaric features of an age that made killing and maiming almost commonplace, involving tens of millions of men, women, and children, testimony to a cruel indifference to the value of human life that can never be exonerated or explained by reference to the passions and interests generated by twentieth-century revolution and war, others may choose to look in another direction, preferring to dwell on what they see as the distinctive accomplishments of a time when European empires disintegrated and democracy made steady advances.

For those whose eyes are principally on technological achievements, imagining all that the "information superhighway" will soon bring, acknowledging but rendering almost secondary the invention of new and more powerful weapons of mass destruction that wrought such havoc in the world, it is the science and technology that created wholly new life possibilities for hundreds of millions that provides the excuse for exultation. The satisfaction and

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pride felt about human inventions that transformed existing institutions and practices, in medicine, communications, and transport, to cite only three of the more obvious areas, are but a small part of a larger achievement thought to be significant. The century witnessed, after very great travail, a remarkable growth in popular government, defined as government through the ballot box. Whether the contemporary democracies are in fact as stable as some wish to believe—whether their politics are less sordid and corrupt than what was common in earlier periods—is generally considered a lower-order issue by those who insist only on the virtues and promise of a market economy that has now assumed universal dimensions. Unprecedented levels of international trade and exchange, married to what appear to be unparalleled technological innovations, fueled by levels of consumer demand never previously known, are thought to carry a potential for growth and prosperity transcending any the world has ever recorded.

While there is no particular virtue in refuting Polyannas, or in reminding those who have never thought to consult the historical record that comparable optimism existed in many places just before the outbreak of World War I, based interestingly on many of the same kinds of irrefutable evidences of growth, there may be additional reasons at this fin de siècle to be cautious and less triumphalist. If prophecy has not been the conspicuous gift of this century, there is little reason to believe that this record of persistent failure is about to be reversed. One is not being Cassandra—predicting new and fresh disasters—when one acknowledges that almost no one alive in 1914 prophesied correctly the likely course and outcome of the war that broke out that August. Few who expected the war to be over by Christmas imagined that the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian monarchies and empires were all at risk, that each was destined for early destruction, that none would survive the decade. Lest it be thought that those who survived the Nazi onslaught three decades later showed greater prescience, it would be difficult to prove this by consulting opinion in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam at the moment of Allied victory.

That no one correctly estimated the "price of victory," not so much in pounds, rubles, francs, and dollars as in spiritual and intellectual losses, was only a small part of a larger failure. World

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War II stirred emotions, created expectations, and witnessed failures of a kind that could not be permanently concealed, papered over. Few among the Europeans who returned to their imperial possessions, liberated at last from their Japanese or German occupations, recognized how vulnerable their own control over those empires had become, not so much because of the threat of Communist propaganda or outright Soviet aggression, but because of the power of local sentiment. All were rapidly lost to nationalisms that refused to accept the legitimacy of white European control, even when superficially hidden. Europe was not fated to maintain its dominance over subject races in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean.

While some marveled at the capacity of Joseph Stalin to conceal the deep wounds inflicted on his own tortured society by four years of war, greatly exceeding in ferocity anything experienced between 1914 and 1917 that led to the revolutions of that year, some argued as if the hard-won Soviet victories had canceled out all the earlier suffering, making the communist regime invulnerable. Soviet military and foreign policy, under Stalin, but also under certain of his successors, suggested that missile, land, air, and naval capability were sufficient to keep the satellite states in order, with only very occasional eruptions, making others no less respectful of Soviet power. That all such accomplishments scarcely compensated for an agriculture that remained backward and an industry that was uncompetitive with what the West soon produced, was said by many sotto voce, but few were bold enough to suggest that the communist regime might prove to be as vulnerable as the czarist, and considerably less long-lived. Indeed, few inside the Kremlin, even in the last failing years of Brezhnev—and fewer outside—recognized how weak that seemingly invincible communist regime, with its awesome thermonuclear arsenal, had become.

What Eric Hobsbawm has dubbed "The Short Twentieth Century," which for him began in 1914 and ended in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union, has continued to confound statesmen and scholars, perpetually surprised by the unanticipated, generally seeking to conceal what they said or wrote even in their more guarded moments, knowing how little it would do to enhance their reputations as prescient observers of a complex world scene. To publish an issue of *Dædalus* with the provocative title "What Future for the State?" must therefore be thought a high-risk venture. Few who

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attempted comparable studies in the past would be prepared to stand by their conclusions, rendered obsolete by events. Why, then, attempt this again? For two reasons, principally. First, because there is so much confusion today, and not only in the city on the Potomac, as to what the post-1989 political universe is, what its problems and promise are, that the temptation to try again, however tentatively, is overwhelming. Second, to put the matter somewhat grandiloquently, the very failures of those "apprentices" who imagined themselves "master builders" provides the incentive to look again at the whole century, at what occurred before and after 1914, to make the present seem something other than virgin land occupied by pioneers, confronting problems incomparably more complex than any previously encountered. Such propositions are factually wrong; they are intellectually flaccid, repeating clichés that deserve to be retired.

To say this is not to presume any superiority to those who have tried to understand the twentieth century, who for one reason or other failed in significant ways to do so. If it is difficult to know what issues merit attention in this last, troubled decade of the century, and what needs to be said or done about them, it was no less difficult to do these things in the very first decade. While some, particularly astute, recognized the significance of Japan's unexpected military victory over Russia in 1905, and pondered the import of the Russian Revolution of that year, few were able to put such admittedly major international events into a calculus that took account also of developments in other parts of the world. Few who found significance in the Persian Revolution of 1906 and the Turkish Revolution of 1908 were interested also in the Chinese Revolution of 1911, let alone events at that moment giving birth to the Indian Congress movement, not to speak of the little-noted civil disturbances taking place in Vietnam. To acknowledge that those who sat in the chancelleries and foreign offices of the great European powers in 1914 were unable to take all this in, understanding how such events might influence a Europe about to embark on its own civil war, is not simply to decry their intelligence. Nor is it very useful to mock their successors in 1945, who were scarcely more prescient.

This needs to be said today, if only because there is such universal agreement that the "giants" of an earlier time have all but aban-

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doned the political stage, with more conventional and ordinary mortals having taken over, thought to be incapable of mastering the complex issues that confront them at home and abroad. A *Dædalus* issue entitled "What Future for the State?" must concern itself with questions that relate to the powers sovereign states are still able legitimately to claim, what multinational corporations and international organizations are doing to change the ways in which democratic states operate, how, indeed, democracy fares at a time when nationalism is again recognized to be a potent force. It must, for obvious reasons, concern itself with how some of the defeated states in World War II are faring, why, for example, Japan, today living under a constitution framed by the occupying power, the United States, devised in the aftermath of the catastrophe created by Hiroshima, the fire-bombing of Tokyo and other of Japan's cities, still accepts to live under restraints imposed at the time, whether indeed it has accepted the democratic social and political values that Americans imagined they were bringing to a defeated, fearful, and humbled military state.

In Europe, the post-Maastricht European Union is confronted with dilemmas created not only by its recent expansion to include a number of rich and stable states, thought to be a great asset to the Union, but also by the political and fiscal disorder of at least one of its original members, Italy, not to speak of others whose political and social problems cannot be attributed solely to a world economic recession. In a Union that embraces such various entities as Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Germany, it is not only the all-too-obvious foot-dragging of Great Britain, governed by Tories chastened by the imagined prospect of a Europe "dominated" by the Germans, that creates problems for those who sit in Brussels. While the issue of the further expansion of the Union must figure in all discussions of the future of Europe, expected to include at some indeterminate date the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and possibly others, these are not the questions that preoccupy those who have written for this issue of *Dædalus*. Essays that carry titles like "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," "The Defective State," and "The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State" are not the standard fare of the mass media. Each, in its own way, is intended to provoke reflection, and indeed to generate controversy. Their

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arguments will not be universally accepted, but they must be taken into account by those who wish to understand the political rhetoric that is increasingly common today, that serves politicians in vulnerable places, that calls out for analysis.

The study of nationalism, which had almost gone out of fashion in the decades immediately after World War II, is today an intellectual "growth industry," and not only because of events in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. An essay that takes into account the plight of national minorities, on which the old League of Nations expended so much effort, but also the so-called "nationalizing state," that insists on making nationality a major component of its domestic and foreign policies, that inquires also into the actions and arguments of those who live abroad who identify with the new nation-states and their politics, is not one more news media diatribe about the terrible things happening in the world because of the revival of a monstrous force called nationalism.

So, also, when a social anthropologist looks at states, refusing to accept the idea that political ideologies alone determine how states act, why they act as they do, when he examines what in fact happens in villages—many survive—it becomes possible to write an essay entitled "Subverting Strong States: The Dialectics of Social Engineering in Hungary and Turkey," a consideration of the limits of social engineering even in states that imagine themselves to be strong, but are in fact unable to enforce their plans on recalcitrant subjects. To find similarities between Communist Hungary and Kemalist Turkey, to suggest that the portrayals of the former Communist world, no less than those of the democratic West, may be highly suspect, of dubious merit, is to ask unconventional questions about societies and states that we pretend to know and understand.

Because the twentieth-century state, like its predecessors, has chosen to make defense (and the prosecution of successful war) a major responsibility, it becomes important to consider how democracy has affected the state's capacity to wage war, to justify armed conflict, and indeed to accept all of its attendant inevitable tragedies. If the concept of "national security" seemed fairly explicit before 1991, the disappearance of the Soviet Union has created a fundamental ambiguity as to what such a concept can mean in the absence of an obvious enemy. To see how the world wars of this century, the first no less than the second, affected the belligerent

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states—the victors no less than the vanquished—how indeed it created the impulse for social and political reforms never previously achieved, all the while creating a state of infinitely greater power and resources, is a tale not often told. Even less commonly discussed today is the question of what must be done to make certain that atomic weapons are never used, and why this cannot rely simply on bilateral agreements that nuclear powers negotiate between themselves. The experience of war in this century has made defense issues very different from what they appeared to be when the "lights went out all over Europe in 1914," or when the mushroom cloud ascended over a destroyed Hiroshima.

In these circumstances, there is an advantage in opening the issue with an essay on Japan, living today, despite the extraordinary economic advances of the last decades, in the shadow of a lost war. As Masaru Tamamoto makes explicit, the Americans, by destroying the old Japanese imperial state and occupying the country for seven years, created conditions that allowed for the establishment of a demilitarized democracy where liberty, citizenship, and politics took on wholly new meanings. The Japanese people, compelled to live with a constitution not of their own making, and understanding only partially many of its New World nuances, in effect exchanged something of their former independence for novel concepts of individual liberty. That they accepted this "bargain," sealed with the promise of an American security umbrella, may be explained by their experience in the last months of the war when it seemed that the wholesale destruction of the Japanese nation might be in prospect. It was this "fear of imminent death" that made American tutelage seem reasonable and legitimate; it also explains the passion the Japanese felt about the need to preserve the peace. War was the ultimate horror, the thing to be avoided.

When, decades later, the dangers of war diminished, the new "democratic contract" came to be equated not only with peace but with equality, guaranteed by a competent national bureaucracy. For a time, interest in politics subsided. The "community" in the workplace became the new "village," and it provided the greatly coveted security. With the coming of the worldwide economic recession, however, there was new interest in politics, and with it a new concern with the state. Whether the Japanese will continue to accept a political order redolent of the moment of its defeat, whether

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its new-found economic strength will not soon translate into a set of political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives very different from those common to a time when the dangers of the Cold War were real, when American authority and power was denominated in currencies no longer traded, are questions implicit in this essay, so very different in its fundamental argument from the conventional accounts of "Japan, Incorporated."

Vincent Cable, looking at a broader canvass, asks whether we have not witnessed an incontestable loss of authority for all states, and whether this is not the consequence of the major technological changes of recent years. Unlike so many who dwell on that purported loss of sovereignty, who make it appear that domestic social and political forces are today reduced to almost inconsequential entities, Cable is uncertain that this accurately describes the contemporary situation. Globalization, which so many take to be a new phenomenon, is, for Cable, the condition that existed in the world even before 1914. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that the principal accomplishment of the post-World War II era may have been not the introduction of globalization but its restoration "to a level close to that which existed in 1913." Not many of today's economic and political mavericks would accept that idea, and even fewer would be prepared to acknowledge that many of their arguments and remedies were common in the time of Adam Smith, and were in fact familiar to the seventeenth century. This is not to say that the late twentieth century is simply the seventeenth- or the eighteenth-century writ large.

Cable, looking at all that has changed in transportation and telecommunications, understanding how many more goods and services are now "tradable" and therefore open to competition, recognizes that international finance is now a very different enterprise from what it recently was, capital having become highly mobile. It is in the trading of currencies and marketable securities, much more than in manufactured goods, that our age so little resembles others. This, inevitably, has affected what states are able to do in respect to monetary policy, but it does not imply that their authority has become negligible. So, also, with the power of transnational corporations; they have become more important, incontestably, but not in the ways sometimes imagined. Cable, considering the movements of people, reflects on the kinds of immigra-

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tion controls that states have imposed, thwarting otherwise globalizing tendencies. That the private sector is today the chief agency encouraging globalization is acknowledged, but this does not imply an atrophying of state interest or authority. Indeed, the internal political reactions to the globalization process are the ones that merit study, that preoccupy Cable in his remarks on the politics of identity, on the new kinds of nationalism that are appearing.

Susan Strange, in a companion essay that strikes a quite different note, insists that the forms of competition between states have changed fundamentally, and that their relations today are very different from what they once were. If, as she argues, the state's authority over the economy and society are transformed, how much of traditional Western social science, which for so long took for granted the centrality of the state, remains valid? Has not much of it been rendered obsolescent? Alexis de Tocqueville, visiting America in the 1830s, believed that the new democracy, so different from any that existed in Europe, called for a new kind of political science; Susan Strange, gazing at the novel international world of the 1990s, asks an even larger question—is a new social science not called for? If today's competition for market shares in the world economy does not resemble the struggle for territory once recognized to be important for wealth-creation, creating many of the incentives and justifications for both aggression and war, if rivalry for access to and control of natural resources is no longer consequential, then there is a need to reconceptualize what states do, how their activities ought to be investigated. Strange states her own position concisely and forcefully when she writes: "...industrial policy and trade policy are becoming more important than defense and foreign policy."

Commercial allies, she argues, are being looked for much more assiduously than military allies. However important states may continue to be collectively, individually they have become "hollow," with greatly reduced authority. In the new world economy, where science and technology count for so much, the international production and distribution systems are vital to the prosperity of any enterprise. Structural changes make older forms of economic isolation impossible. In these circumstances, it is not only the study of the state that requires revamping but the whole study of international relations. If the problems of war and peace are no longer the principal ones, if the earlier state no longer exists, the questions

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worth considering are necessarily new. For Strange, they relate essentially to how much "anarchy" the world system can tolerate. In her terms, when do "political chaos, economic stagnation, recurrent famine, endemic disease, internecine warfare in certain parts of the world threaten others"? Who, indeed, can be entrusted with authority in this new world system? These questions, Strange says, are the ones intellectuals must address, difficult though they may be, and destructive as they are of any number of prevailing intellectual orthodoxies.

Vivien Schmidt, recognizing that there is indeed a new and more liberalized world economic order, asks what the likely consequences of that order may prove to be for the nation-state. More specifically, her concern is with the effects of these changes on global democracy. That more liberal trade policies, economic deregulation, and the privatizing of enterprises must operate to diminish the power of the state, Schmidt takes for granted. This, however, does not lead her to believe that all states will be affected equally, that they will all react to the new conditions in the same ways. While some have exaggerated the power of the multinational corporations, there can be no serious questioning of the proposition that business power has grown substantially, along with the power of supranational organizations, contributing inevitably to a diminished power of individual states. Governmental autonomy, in many of its more traditional forms, has been compromised. What merits attention, however, are the policies states have adopted in response to these challenges. What has happened in the European Union (EU), for example, may hold lessons for what will one day happen in NAFTA and in other regional bodies. If, as many argue, the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit," the member states have pursued very different strategies in seeking to cope with the new conditions created by integration.

If business has gained at the expense of other powerful constituted bodies, not the least being labor, as represented by once powerful trade unions, this has, of course, affected domestic politics. If, also, there is undeniable disenchantment with the policies both of national governments and the supranational agreements into which they have entered, this, in Schmidt's view, carries the potential for further disruption. Examining conditions in the smaller European countries, but also in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy, she

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shows how very differently each has accommodated to the requirements of European integration. Interested also in how Japan and the United States have responded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other such international agreements, given the controls they impose, Schmidt poses the question that is central for her: will citizens in these several societies feel locked out from the major decisions being made, will they resent what they perceive to be their nonparticipation, and will this not adversely affect their views about what their governments have done, what the international organizations are doing? Democracy could very well turn out to be the loser even as business sees its own authority increased.

The concern with how domestic politics are being affected by new globalizing tendencies leads very naturally to what has become one of the mass media's major post-1989 developments: the growth of nationalism. Rogers Brubaker's interest is not only to study the national question in post-Soviet Eurasia; his aim is a larger one, to consider what happens when cultural/linguistic and political boundaries do not coincide. This condition, very apparent in the former Soviet Union where twenty-five million Russians—once the most privileged nationality group in that state—are now living outside the borders of Russia, and are in varying ways and degrees disadvantaged, is, of course, not unique to that unhappy people. Millions today live in states whose nationality is not theirs, whose nationalist policies they feel unable to embrace. Their "ethnofraternal ties" are often with others, domiciled abroad. While such circumstances do not everywhere create violent and open conflict, where they do, the stakes can become very high. Brubaker, unwilling to accept the traditional concept of "national minority," finding it much too static, seeks to explain why a group may wish to emphasize its minority status, seeing the advantage of doing so, and how this creates a new dynamic for action. For him, the "nationalizing state" is not the same thing as the "nation-state." In seeking to go beyond old theories of nationalism, Brubaker introduces yet another conceptual category, that of the "external national homeland," where different groups fight "over *whether* and *how* a state should be a homeland for its ethnic conationals in other states."

Employing this "triadic nexus"—which gives a dynamic concreteness to the concept of national minority, nationalizing state,

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and external national homeland—Brubaker considers the breakup of Yugoslavia, dwelling on the Croatian and Slovenian independence movements, and not choosing to treat the Bosnian imbroglio. His account, by virtue of its theoretical framework, tells a tale very different from that commonly given by the mass media. Their wish, to present the conflict as essentially "dyadic," a struggle between the Croatian (or Slovenian) quest for autonomy and the Serbian determination to maintain its old control, does not begin to describe the true situation. For Brubaker, the Croatian drive was not simply secessionist, a wish to be separated from the old Serb domination; the effort needs to be seen as a struggle to create a Croatian state for a Croatian nation. Inevitably, Croat émigrés became involved; so, also, did Croatian Serbs, who had no wish to be separated from their fellow Serbs in Serbia. The Serbian efforts to retain control, in Brubaker's view, were "not orchestrated from Belgrade," though "homeland politics" were, of course, crucial to the claims made by the Serbs to have a legitimate concern with the fate of their fellow-Serbs outside Serbia. None of what happened was in any sense preordained. It might all have worked out differently; there was nothing "inevitable" about the situation that today envelops the former Yugoslavia.

Chris Hann's concern, in a somewhat different vein, is to question other common judgments about how states in today's world act, how successful they are when they seek to devise policies intended to make fundamental reforms. Looking at states in the West, and reflecting on the disenchantment with political leaders so common today, where so many are despised or ignored, Hann asks whether this is not conclusive evidence that the state is indeed "hollow," in the way suggested by Susan Strange. Hann is not wholly convinced that it is. Even where socialism has been politically repudiated, as it appears to have been in Margaret Thatcher's Britain, Hann cites statistics to show the continuing support for state funding of health, education, and social benefits programs. The commonly accepted view of the strong twentieth-century state, so frequently totalitarian, being in the end resisted and overwhelmed by the forces of "civil society," is not wholly convincing to Hann who sees such portrayals as mythical oversimplifications. In his own subversive way, he expresses fundamental reservations about the "totalitarian stereotypes," questioning the conventional analy-

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ses so frequently made by historical sociologists and political scientists. It is more than professional pride, based on his credentials as a social anthropologist, that leads him to ask why such different states as Communist Hungary and multiparty Turkey—both thought to be "strong" states—were so unsuccessful in implementing policies on matters they deemed very consequential.

If Hann is correct in his view that "we have demonized the states of the Orient and of communist Eastern Europe in order to highlight by contrast the virtues of our own Western systems of government," then a very different kind of social and cultural analysis has to be made of all of them. That Communist Hungary did not succeed in its decades-long policy of seeking to destroy the country's *tanyas*—the farm buildings isolated from the towns and villages—is significant. So, also, is the fact that Turkey's Democratic Party, which assumed power in 1950 in the country's first multiparty elections, was unable to create a viable and commercially profitable tea industry, capable of competing in world markets. This condition did not change when the Motherland Party took over in 1983. It was not the weakness of the state that explains the failure, but the resistances that the policy provoked. In Hann's view, such resistance may be more effective "than is possible in the Western democracies, where the sources of power are too thoroughly disguised and the reach of state administration is so much greater." Neither in his view of Western-style modernity nor in his depiction of Communist Hungary or Kemalist Turkey does Hann describe conditions as they are traditionally defined by Western political scientists and sociologists.

If this is a plea for thinking about the contemporary world and its state system in a new way, so Geoff Eley, in his essay on "War and the Twentieth-Century State," seeks to do this in yet another idiom. In asking about how modern states prepare for war, what "total war" does to change states, not least those that can claim to be democratic, Eley is providing analysis of a kind not commonly practiced. Unlike others, whose concern is with "weak states" and "strong states," with whether or not the state is in fact losing some of its authority to multinational corporations or international organizations, Eley dwells on the ways in which the public and private spheres have been blurred in this century, and how the instruments of the state are entering into the recesses of society, seeking to

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regulate and politicize areas of living once thought to be free of outside control. Whether the issue is family life, procreation, sexuality, or other things once perceived to be private matters, the state is today involved in ways that would have been inconceivable earlier in the century. It is not only that state budgets to regulate and control such matters are much larger than they used to be, or that there is a vastly expanded state bureaucracy to concern itself with such matters, but that all these interventions have become politically sensitive. This is particularly true in a time when many in democratic societies think they are justified in believing that politics are corrupt, that political life is sordid. Traditional forms of political organization, which once served to curb such large expansions of authority, holding individuals accountable for their acts, seem no longer to be operating. Impersonal and arbitrary power are much in evidence. How did all this come about?

Foucault and Gramsci offer partial explanations, but Eley's major insight is to show how the advent of democracy—scarcely known anywhere in the world before 1914—is linked to new concepts of social rights. These concepts, implicit in the ready acceptance today of the need for a welfare state, but also in new definitions given to citizenship and personhood, owe a great deal to the kinds of attention given such matters in a mass-mediated public sphere, which have so fundamentally altered the nature of public dialogue. Eley, looking at "total war" as it developed in 1914–1918, and in 1939–1945, is less concerned with the more purely military aspects of twentieth-century conflict than with the novel demands all the belligerent states felt called upon to make of their citizens. In return for sacrifice, citizens were promised rewards, social and political, which would follow the coming of peace. For those who were defeated in World War I, as for the new states created as a consequence, their new constitutions, all republican, gave the promise of democratic rule. Many were sadly disillusioned by the failure of these novel institutions. In his treatment of the interwar period—particularly the years of the world economic depression—but even more in his analysis of World War II, a profoundly culture-breaking and culture-making experience, democracy took on wholly new dimensions. All manner of new social goods were promised. It is not only in post-1989 Eastern Europe that these hopes, once thought to have a chance of early realization,

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have been disappointed. For Eley, it is imperative that we study the changing relations between the state and contemporary society and culture. They are vital to any understanding of the evolution of national political institutions.

Stephen Del Rosso's concern is largely with the United States, with how the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union transformed the problems of national security, and why the more recent efforts to devise rationales for continued engagement and effort have been both fumbling and lame. The "conceptual disarray" characteristic of the years since 1989, in Del Rosso's view, is intimately linked to a failure to understand the changing nature of the state in a world that has been fundamentally altered. Reviewing the recent scholarly literature of American political science, which Susan Strange, Chris Hann, and Geoff Eley for other reasons choose to criticize, Del Rosso shows how much effort has been made to move away from a "state-centric" emphasis to one that is more deliberately concerned with global issues. Environmental and population questions, which began to be addressed in new ways in the 1960s, were never able to displace an earlier emphasis on military weapons and arms control as the prime subjects of those who appropriated for themselves the title of "national security experts." Security threats, extended to include climate change, soil erosion, food shortages, deforestation, and the like, were never able to command the attention or to grip the imagination of men and women in the way that the mushroom cloud over Hiroshima and the threat of nuclear war did.

After 1989, there was new talk of "World Security" and "Common Security," even of "Ultimate Security," and while it was easy to mock such hyperbolic rhetoric, Del Rosso is not greatly offended by it, seeing it as a failed effort that aimed too high, that sought to fill the "conceptual vacuum" created by the end of the Cold War. Whatever the accomplishments of these scholars, and Del Rosso is anxious to give them their due, they did not create a new theory of the state that could serve to explain either its activities or its potential in the latter part of the twentieth century in the way that others had previously done. While Paul Freund, a former president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, would sometimes deplore the "world shortage of sages"—the most important shortage of the century—Del Rosso is not simply arguing that the world

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lacks its Jean Bodins and Max Webers. His theme is a more subtle one—we cannot hope to have a new idea of "security" so long as we do not have a theory of the state that takes account of contemporary conditions.

Daniel Deudney, in his essay "Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the *Real*-State," adds yet further problems to an agenda that some may think is already too heavy. Deudney, believing that the disappearance of the Soviet Union has not caused the problem of nuclear weapons to disappear, and not only because some rogue state may one day be able to develop a nuclear capability that will threaten others, or because the weapons stockpile of the former Soviet Union is not adequately secured, asks whether the older ideas of "deterrence," developed in the Cold War years, are adequate for the world situation today. Reviewing the recommendations of the so-called "Realists," from the most conservative to the most radical, Deudney worries that the "current near consensus among international relations theorists that the state has weathered the nuclear revolution could turn out to be as far off the mark as the widely held view," proclaimed as late as 1986, that US-Soviet rivalry was an "effectively permanent feature of world politics." If states are to remain "real," in the classic sense of that term, able to master violence, internally and internationally, they must be able to cope with the threat posed by nuclear weapons. In Deudney's view, nuclear weapons pose a unique threat to the modern world; they have caused states to fall back into a "state of nature"; as a consequence, only some new sort of "world sovereign" can be trusted to control the potential danger of war of all against all.

The state, in this analysis, is indeed "hollow and fragile," made so by the events of the last half century. As Deudney argues, the "spectrum of violence" has changed very dramatically in this period; annihilation is easy in today's world; conquest is very difficult. Given the power of nuclear weapons, security in the modern world is produced by the "paralysis of states rather than from the exercise of state power." This is new, as is the power created by what Deudney calls the "Kalishnikov revolution." It is not elaborate and powerful international institutions to prevent interstate violence that is most urgently required. The need is for the territorial states to continue, "augmented by an institution for the comprehensive containment of nuclear capability." Deudney calls for a new type of

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"republic," not a world state, but an instrument that seeks "to constrain, bind, and paralyze both the instruments of violence and the actors that might employ them."

If this issue ends on what some may think to be a utopian note, its distinctive contribution may be its insistence, both implicit and explicit, that it is not the widely-acknowledged incompetence of democratic politicians that create our problems so much as the absence of thought and understanding about the nature of the late twentieth-century state, democratic society, and mass culture. All three have to be related in ways that few scholars and even fewer statesmen are prepared to imagine or contemplate. The "crises" of today are not the ones the mass media principally pay attention to. Their "crises," however real or ephemeral, may determine what happens in national elections; they are not likely to determine how the twenty-first century evolves. Indeed, it may be the contemporary absence of inventiveness, in ideas no less than in institutions, that best defines the condition that needs to concern men and women in this fin de siècle.

Some final thoughts may be in order. In the autumn of 1979, *Dædalus* published an issue entitled "The State." In my Preface to that issue I drew attention "to those fields of inquiry that lie fallow in our time, never achieving the level of scholarly treatment they deserve." I went on to say: "Perhaps this is merely because of a reluctance to treat subjects that are peculiarly sensitive; perhaps it is owing to a more fundamental incapacity to cope with the too great complexities of a specific matter or the inadequacy of the prevailing paradigms to explain new phenomena. In any case, the results are always the same—the subject receives substantially less attention than its intrinsic importance would deserve." If such words could be penned a decade before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the collapse of communism in Europe, they no longer describe the intellectual situation that exists today. The interest in the state and the international system has taken many new turns, and no one can doubt that the subject has become a lively one. The hazard, and it is a very real one, is that the present "triumphalism" of the West, which allows some to imagine not only that "the Soviet Union is in the dustbin of history," but also that "its global reach is only a memory" will create a generation as incapable of prepar-

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ing for the future as the one that existed at the start of this tragic century.

Men like Václav Havel are right when they speak of the "post-Communist nightmare," when they think back to how very fragile so many of the new democracies created on the morrow of World War I proved to be. There is no reason to believe that the regime changes that have occurred since 1989 in that corner of the world have in fact established governments that will be able to satisfy popular demand. Those who speak of "rogue states"—Libya yesterday, Iraq today, and one can only imagine which of the several candidates for that very dubious distinction it is likely to be tomorrow—are also addressing a very real problem, however hyperbolic their language may be. So, also, those who speak of the growing hazards posed by Islamic fundamentalism—a theme that has been figuring very conspicuously in the last decade and is likely to become even more common in the next—are focusing on very real issues that cannot be ignored. All such conditions and any number of others, including those common to the very poor states of the world, the ones so casually dismissed as "basket cases," cannot fail to interest all who have any concern with the international system, with how instability in any one state, however small and seemingly unimportant, can disturb the so-called "world order," creating dangerous resonances elsewhere.

These are real facts of international life that cannot be ignored, and it is right to dwell on them. The memory of the 1920s and 1930s, of the failures of the democracies to cope with the rising threat posed by totalitarian societies, particularly Nazi Germany, have not been obliterated by the end of the "cold war" and the unexpected dissolution of the Soviet Union. Yet, in this world where it is so common to dwell on the weaknesses of the infant states, those recently created or recreated, it is vital to think also of the condition of those constitutional states that are well established, whose political, intellectual, and social roots extend back to a period before World War I. It is easy to mock their governments, to see their very real inadequacies in coping with both domestic discontents and international turmoil. It was the late Hedley Bull, who wrote in the Fall 1979 issue of *Dædalus* on "The State," whose words need to be recalled. Bull said:

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> . . .those who say that what we have to do is get "beyond the states-system" forget that war, economic injustice, and ecological mismanagement have deeper causes than those embodied in any particular form of universal political organization. The states-system we have today is indeed associated with violent conflict and insecurity, with economic and social inequality and misery on a vast scale, and with failures of every kind to live in harmony with our environment. But this is no reason to assume that a world government, a neo-medieval order of overlapping sovereignties and jurisdictions, a system of isolated or semi-isolated communities, or any other alternative global order we might imagine would not be associated with these things also. Violence, economic injustice, and disharmony between men and nature have a longer history than the modern states-system. The causes that lead to them will be operative, and our need to work against them imperative, whatever the political structure of the world.[1]

This issue appears in the year of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. The discontent with that organization, not only for its purported failures in Yugoslavia but also for what many think to be its inadequacies in various of its peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere, is today fueling discussions in the United States, in Congress, but also in the media, which some fear can only bode ill for the future of that World War II institution. At a time when many wish to discuss what the ideal membership of the Security Council might be, what the United States ought to be willing to pay to keep the peace, more fundamental questions are ignored. So much has changed since 1945 that only a candid discussion of the United Nations, of the culture of that institution as it has evolved in the last fifty years, can in fact address the real issue of our day, what the "democracies" of the world have come to be, whether many of them incorporate "true civility" and "civic commitment," what citizenship in a late twentieth-century democracy can mean. These were matters that the late George Armstrong Kelly discussed in the Fall 1979 issue of *Dædalus*. They need to be discussed again.

The years after 1945 proved to be generative, of both ideas and institutions. It is not at all obvious that the years since 1989 have been equally fertile in either respect. Only a very basic commitment to the study of the major institutions of our day, both domestic and international, can yield the kind of learning that the mass media are

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incapable of providing, that harried statesmen can no longer be relied on to give. It is not an accident that so many of the authors in this issue of *Dædalus* urge the intellectuals of all states to rethink their subjects, to acknowledge that the problem is not only what the state system may be in the twenty-first century but what it is at this very moment.

A great debt is owed The Pew Charitable Trusts, which provided the financial support that made this issue possible. This study ought to be read in conjunction with the Summer 1993 issue, "Reconstructing Nations and States," to which The Pew Charitable Trusts also contributed. It is a comment on both the complexity and liveliness of the subject that not all of the essays prepared for this issue have been accommodated in this single volume. Additional essays will be published in the Summer 1995 issue. Needless to say, the views expressed are those of the individual authors, and are not necessarily those of the Trusts.

S.R.G.

ENDNOTE

[1]Hedley Bull, "The State's Positive Role in World Affairs," *Dædalus* 108 (4) (Fall 1979): 114.

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Masaru Tamamoto

Reflections on Japan's Postwar State

A DOMINANT YET AMORPHOUS STATE

ASKING A JAPANESE TO DEFINE THE STATE is akin to asking what is his religion. These are the questions of a foreigner and are likely to elicit confused responses. How do you explain to those who believe in a singular divinity that the vast majority of the Japanese are animists with an emphasis on ancestor worship, that it is no apostasy to be blessed by Shinto priests as children, wedded by Christian ministers, and laid to rest by Buddhist monks? As for the state, it is widely understood to be an entity which the Japanese once possessed but lost with the defeat in World War II, and the wisdom of its recovery remains uncertain. In a sense, the postwar Japanese state—which saturates society with myriad regulations and commands considerable powers, and which falls into the category of the strong state in political science classification—barely exists in the Japanese consciousness.

While an explication of the structure and manner of Japan's postwar state can be made with relative ease, it is difficult to elucidate the image of the state held by the Japanese themselves. Lacking solid conceptual form, it is a bewildering and tangled image. "The Japanese recognize the state as if it were Santa Claus, an elusive provider of gifts," laments Michitaro Tanaka, a political philosopher concerned with the paucity of theoretical efforts to understand the postwar state.[1] For much of the postwar era, a

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pervasive antistate ideology inhibited even the use of the word state, *kokka,* in mainstream political discourse. Yasuhiro Nakasone, who served as prime minister from 1982 to 1987, once complained that as far as the Japanese are concerned there is no state.[2] Prime Minister Nakasone heralded the task of bringing the postwar era to a "final accounting," and that included the rehabilitation of the state in the Japanese mind. He was partly successful. *Kokka* was resurrected as a legitimate entry in the political lexicon; some commentators began to acknowledge that Japan is a semistate.

A matrix of attitudes and suppositions, often unarticulated to the Japanese themselves, gives rise to the state's amorphous identity. It is a distinctly postwar phenomenon. Until the day Japan surrendered unconditionally at the end of World War II, the state had possessed a clear and powerful identity. The subsequent reforms implemented by the American military occupation (1945–1952) destroyed the imperial state (1868–1945). The experience of defeat and occupation imparted upon Japanese life certain definitions of liberty, democracy, citizenship, and politics whose relationships constitute and obscure the postwar state.

THE AMERICAN DESIGN

The American occupiers arrived to demilitarize and democratize Japan; they were determined to break Japan's militaristic and authoritarian state. Toward these goals, the occupiers, driven by a liberal creed that democracies are peaceful and do not start wars, wrote a new constitution for the Japanese in 1946. ARTICLE 9 of the constitution "forever renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." ARTICLES 1 and 4 reduced the emperor to "a symbol of the state and unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power," and stipulated that the emperor "shall not have powers related to government." In this way, the occupiers destroyed the imperial state.

To borrow James Madison's words from *Federalist No. 53*, "The important distinction so well understood in America between a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government, and alterable by

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the government seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country."[3] The American occupiers were intent on making this distinction clear to the Japanese. By fiat of the occupier, imperial subjects were transformed into democratic citizens. The imperial constitution of 1889, presented to the country as a gift of the emperor, had been an affirmation of the prerogative of rulers and the duties of subjects. In contrast, the American-authored constitution, whose preamble begins, "We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives," establishes the rights of citizens. At the heart of the constitutional blueprint for a revolutionary transformation of Japan was the idea of popular sovereignty. For the Japanese bound by the new constitution, the realization of the idea of popular sovereignty became the requisite for constructing a new conception of the state.

This proved to be a daunting prospect, as witnessed in the parliamentary debate to ratify the new constitution. Japanese lawmakers were not disposed to defy the authority of the occupiers, but they had difficulty grasping the constitution's meaning. The debate in parliament concluded that while sovereignty resided in the people, the person of the emperor was also one of the people.[4] The early confusion notwithstanding, the emperor remains banished from political life, and to this day not a single word of the constitution has been amended. Japan today is generally acknowledged to be a democratic state, but the concept of the state as the highest form of association, in which popular sovereignty resides—America's intention for Japan—is still a project in the making.

The republican ideology the occupiers sought to impose posits an association of citizens who are imbued with a concern for the general good. But the concept of citizenship and the attendant sense of voluntariness which are essential to the republican formulation of the state are not, or at least are not yet, Japanese. The constitution embodies ideas that the Japanese have yet to fully understand. Whereas constitutions normally serve to confer legitimacy upon existing orders, the Japanese document establishes a set of goals to be discovered and realized.

Article 24, which guarantees equality of the sexes, illustrates this point. At the time of the constitutional promulgation, Japanese society was still largely agrarian and bound by traditional ways. The idea that the sexes are equal struck the vast majority of Japa-

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nese, both men and women, as simply untrue. Much has changed since then, and more can be done toward realizing this constitutional goal. For the realization of this and other rights of the people, the constitution has served to legitimize a process, albeit an often clumsy one.

Assume legitimacy, and power flows from it. The constitution has had legitimacy, to the extent that it has not been amended. But there have been enough doubts expressed about its legitimacy to diminish its power. A series of public opinion polls shows a pattern of ambivalence.[5] In 1952, the year the occupation ended, 47 percent of Japanese citizens favored a constitutional amendment, 17 percent did not. For the next twenty-nine years, those for and against amending the constitution were divided into roughly equal parts, each side registering the support of between 20 and 35 percent of the respondents. In other words, in any given year, between 30 and 60 percent responded that they did not know whether or not they supported the constitution. It was only in 1981 that those in support of the constitution significantly outweighed those against, but they still did not constitute a majority (44 percent versus 28 percent). Since then, support for the constitution has grown, and in 1993, for the first time, those favoring amendment marginally broke the majority mark.

In the Weberian construction, both power and legitimacy are confirmed because there is authority. And authority—its root being author—is associated with text, writ, and warrant. The circumscribed nature of the power and legitimacy of the Japanese constitution is a result of its peculiar authorship. While most Japanese have come to see in the abstract the value of the constitutional ideals, many remain unconvinced that the ideals fit existing Japanese life. Herein lies one reason for the amorphous nature of the postwar Japanese state; the possibility of exercising the power of the basic document of the state is limited because enough people doubt its authority and legitimacy.

Since the early 1960s, there has been no serious effort to clarify the status and nature of the constitution. To the limited extent that it has become a political issue in recent decades, practically all cases have concerned ARTICLE 9—as though this one clause were the entire constitution. Not only does ARTICLE 9 forever renounce war

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as a sovereign right of the state, it also declares that military force will never be maintained. But Japan has a self-defense force that is sizable when measured by monetary outlay. The issue has been whether the self-defense force is unconstitutional and should be abolished, or whether the constitution should be amended to restore the sovereign right of defense to the state.[6] Why this debate continues without resolution can be explained by the authority the constitution derives from Japan's peculiar security relationship with the United States.

Because the constitution has come to be equated with ARTICLE 9, the debate over whether to amend that article is couched in terms of the entire constitution. And because the status and nature of the constitution have been left undefined for so long, the possibility of amending ARTICLE 9 raises questions about what will become of the rest of the constitution. In other words, will the process of amending one clause cast doubt on the desirability and efficacy of the entire document, the rights of the people, and the concept of popular sovereignty? Will the idea of the equality of the sexes, for example, be cast aside as an alien imposition, incompatible with native ways?

There is reason to suspect that a new constitution, written by the Japanese themselves, would very closely resemble the existing one, save for a legalization of the self-defense force. The practice of democracy, at least, has become part of Japanese life. But, at present, this is a recognition which escapes, and is left unarticulated in, Japanese thinking on the constitution.

LIBERTY LOST, LIBERTY GAINED

Underlying the definition of Japan's postwar state are the integral concepts of the liberty of the state and of the individual. They were born of defeat and occupation and have given rise to Japan's peculiar security relationship with the United States.

The American army of occupation stood above the Japanese emperor, constitution, parliament, and government. Japan's liberty of collective self-direction became subordinated to the will of General Douglas MacArthur, Allied supreme commander of the occupational forces in Japan. As the vanquished saw it, the order of the supreme commander was law and sovereign power resided with

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him. The Japanese state lost its independence. Liberty—in its oldest definition, dating from the ancient Greeks and Chinese, as the freedom of the state from alien rule—was lost. "Made in Occupied Japan" was marked on Japanese exports. At the same time, Japan gained a sense of liberty unarticulated by the ancients. The modern conception of individual liberty, a product of the more recent Enlightenment, entered Japanese life; individual liberty was no longer just a mental possession of an elite group of intellectuals familiar with Western texts. In the name of democratization, the occupiers enshrined in the constitution a set of inalienable rights for all citizens. The concurrent loss of collective liberty and gain of individual liberty have marked the evolution of the postwar Japanese state.

The essential measure of liberty for the occupied Japanese was its scope rather than its source. The Japanese were released from the sacrifices demanded by their state embroiled in total war. People could tend to the needs of their private lives and interests. While this phenomenon is common in other places after the conclusion of wars, what was striking about the Japanese after World War II was their disregard for liberty in another sense; they did not concern themselves with who controlled coercive power.

The Japanese, on the whole, did not seem resentful of the military occupation by their former enemy. The American occupation of Japan turned out to be remarkably smooth and successful—as much as military occupations can ever be. So traumatic was the experience of war and defeat that some Japanese even came to doubt the reason for their existence. One Japanese woman, in a letter to General MacArthur, pleaded for the castration of all Japanese men for the sake of world peace. General MacArthur received tens of thousands of letters addressed to the "new emperor." In a strikingly sycophantic tone, the writers praised the heroism and wisdom of their conqueror. They said, in essence, "Japan is now your country, our emperor has promised you obedience, your general headquarters is the government, do as you please."[7] The manner of the occupation was rather benevolent, it is true, but why did the Japanese people treat the American occupiers as liberators?

Japanese Marxists provided the standard answer to this question at the time. They saw in the destruction of the imperial state the Japanese people's liberation from feudalism and militarism, paving

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the way for a socialist revolution. While this interpretation gained much currency among intellectuals during the immediate postwar years, it misjudged the nature of liberation felt by the people. They were imbued with a sense of liberation that was more immediate, basic, and personal, less historical, philosophical, and political.

The people felt liberated from death, which had seemed certain during the final months of the war. At that time, the imperial state, declaring that the empire would never surrender, called for the martyrdom of all 100 million Japanese. It promised the people only the glory of death in a sacred war. Then suddenly came Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and unconditional surrender. American victory meant the recovery of life thought to have been hopelessly lost. The occupiers became liberators, providers of a second chance at life. Liberty, in its original definition as the freedom of the state from alien rule, seemed irrelevant when the pursuit of it meant the death of all Japanese, the extinction of the race. As for liberty being the absence of a coercive power, this meant nothing when the American occupiers provided food when mass starvation seemed imminent, when the crippled Japanese state possessed no such ability. What mattered to the Japanese people was not who governed them, but the extent to which government interfered with their lives.

The enthusiasm with which the Japanese public embraced the American gift of democracy reflected in part the recognition of its worth, but it also reflected their willingness to accept that which their liberators forced upon them. For a couple of decades after the war, democracy would mean peace, which in turn would mean freedom from death in war. The equation of democracy with peace had great appeal for the Japanese people.

The manner in which democracy came to the Japanese—as an imposition by an alien authority rather than as a product of popular struggle from below—challenged the Japanese people's ability to construct a clear conception of their democratic state. The viability and worth of democracy in Japan became identified with Japan's security relationship with America, as long as and to the extent that the Japanese continued to equate democracy with peace.

Simply put, democracy understood in this way suppressed the desire for liberty, if that is taken to mean the freedom of the state. The Japanese of the immediate postwar years were possessed with an intense fear of involvement in another war. To avoid that

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possibility, one obvious policy choice was for Japan to rearm in order to deter foreign aggression. But the Japanese, vanquished in war and victims of the new nuclear age, were impressed neither by the efficacy of their military power nor by the desirability of rearmament given their own history of aggression. And, on a practical level, the government during and immediately following the occupation deemed that there simply were not enough resources for the war-devastated country to expend on military preparedness.

America offered another option, extending to Japan a security umbrella, formalized by the conclusion of a treaty of alliance at the time of Japan's independence in 1952. Henceforth, Japan would make a minimum necessary effort toward military preparedness as a political price of maintaining American protection; at no point would Japan entertain the idea that its military either could or should provide for the security of the country. To maintain this arrangement, to preserve America—a self-consciously democratic America locked in an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union—as a buffer from international politics, the Japanese understood implicitly that democracy in their country was a necessary condition. And in this arrangement, as the political scientist Takeshi Ishida points out, Japan's international affiliation with the free world tended to become confused with the development of democracy in the domestic context.[8]

Japan's democratic state voluntarily abandoned the primary rationale of the state as guarantor of the country's physical security. This responsibility was entrusted to another state. Hoping never to have to sacrifice their individual liberty (life) in war, the Japanese willingly traded away their liberty of the freedom of the state (independence). Thus arose the identification of Japan as a semistate.

This attribute of the Japanese state holds true to this day, and will continue to hold until the security arrangement with America is altered.[9] Until then, America will remain a primary source of Japanese national identity.[10] After the end of the Cold War, the thrust of Japan's foreign policy remains the maintenance of its subordinate place in the security alliance with America. While there has been a small minority of conservative thinkers and actors—notable among political leaders were Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone—who have argued that true national independence cannot be regained until the people become prepared

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once again to sacrifice their lives for their country, such talk has had only a marginal impact.

MORALITY AND POWER

While a security partnership with America carried with it the danger of being dragged into America's wars, Japan was unwilling to build a defense sufficient to guard a neutral position in the Cold War. Japan refused to be the Switzerland of Asia. In one corner of America's global Cold War strategy, Japan found a way to preserve its peace by distancing itself from international politics.

Japan became part of the American alliance politics. Alliances, treaties, commerce, and wars are means ascribed to sovereign states in the Western state system. Balance of power and equality of sovereignty are the system's key operational concepts.

Postwar Japan has pursued a successful alliance policy with the United States, and by doing so has abandoned its sense of sovereignty. Though it is true that in the world of superpower confrontation only two states could genuinely claim full sovereignty, Japan's willful disregard for a sense of independence falls outside the explanations offered by theories of middle powers. As George Liska, a realist theorist steeped in the European tradition of power politics, intoned, "surely Japan's *samurai* spirit cannot be suppressed, and how can the stupor from defeat in one war last so long?"[11] But this comment finds little resonance in postwar Japan.

The rules of power politics, of the European state system, guided the Japanese state from its opening to the West in the mid-nineteenth century until 1945. With its defeat in World War II, it was as if Japan returned to the Confucian tradition of international relations. In the Confucian tradition, there is no sense of equality of sovereignty; the world is hierarchically ordered around a center that recognizes no equal. (The center was normally understood to be China, though claims were made that the center had moved to Japan.) This order of suzerainty and dependency is essentially moral and cultural in nature, and power flows from these dimensions.

The Cold War injected into the operation of the Western state system a powerful ideological dimension. Claims of moral, cultural, and historical superiority and exclusivity became central components of international relations. American-Soviet rivalry was not

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simply couched in terms of the relative effectiveness of their bombs but the truth of their respective ideas. In this way, Cold War international relations approximated the Confucian tradition.

The Confucian tradition offered Japan a way of understanding its station in the Cold War, with the United States replacing China as the center. The prowess of American material culture, the attractiveness of its sense of freedom, and its modernity struck the Japanese, especially during the early postwar decades, as superior and desirable. For these reasons, and because its security needs were served, Japan relinquished its sense of sovereignty. Coming from a different tradition, another middle power such as France could not imagine such a station. And the United States could not comprehend the psychology and nature of Japan's dependence.

DEMOCRACY AS SAMENESS AND EQUALITY

The overwhelming yearning for peace of the immediate postwar years began to ease as the American security guarantee seemed to prove its worth. But the politics of the late 1950s posed a major challenge to the equation of democracy with peace, with Japan's retreat from international politics.

Following the end of the occupation, the conservative government focused on the issues of constitutional revision, rearmament, strengthening the police, curbing the power of organized labor and the Left—that is, undoing the "excesses" of occupation reform and restoring the imperial state. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (who served in the Tojo cabinet at the time of Pearl Harbor and who, suspected of being a war criminal by the American occupiers, was banished from public life) symbolized the moment of reaction. He imagined the recovery of "full independence and sovereignty"—specifically the withdrawal of US forces from Japan and Japanese rearmament in order to achieve full partnership in the alliance with the United States. (Kishi was a leader Charles de Gaulle would have understood well.) But the new democratic forces, predominantly of the Left, in parliament, labor, and university managed to foil what they saw as a conspiracy to destroy democracy. At issue was whether the domestic democratic order was compatible with the country's increased involvement in international politics. The clash ended with the security treaty riots of 1960. Kishi resigned. Henceforth,

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alarmed by the extent of societal opposition to the country's involvement in international politics, conservative rule focused on domestic economic affairs—"income-doubling" was the slogan of the new conservative government headed by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda.

Beginning around 1960, with the advent of double digit economic growth and with it an economic definition of Japan, democracy began to acquire an identification with sameness and equality. The primary task of government became the redistribution, in a fair manner, of the benefits of economic growth. At the same time, politics, defined as the conflict of ideas, began to lose its hold. With the change in the manner of conservative rule, the oppositional forces which brought down Kishi lost their momentum. Labor unions transformed themselves into company-based units and came to agreements with management; they became more temperate in their use of the strike weapon in exchange for guaranteed job security for their members. As a result, employment policy per se was no longer a priority concern of government. The Socialist Party, the major opposition party, increasingly acted as if it were a lobby group rather than a political party. Thus, conservative party rule became entrenched—from its founding in 1955 until 1993 the Liberal-Democratic Party maintained its hold over government. The fall of the Liberal-Democratic Party in the summer of 1993 was a result of the party's fragmentation rather than a victory of the opposition at the polls. The Conservative Party, diminished in its rank and file, would return to power a year later in partnership with the Socialists, against a coalition of parties whose ideological positions lay somewhere between the Liberal-Democratic and Socialist parties, revealing how little politics have come to mean in postwar Japanese parliamentary life.

The trend toward the diminution of politics, defined as a conflict of ideas, which began in 1960, instilled the sense of democracy as sameness. And the postwar trend toward social and economic leveling added the element of equality to sameness. Occupation reform played a critical role in spurring the equalizing tendency. Postwar Japan abolished the class system of the imperial state. The postwar system of taxation, for example, heavily penalizes inheritance to avert the rise of a privileged class. Whereas the imperial education system distinguished between the elite and the masses,

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between the bright and the ordinary, the postwar education system stresses uniformity of access and results; the postwar ministry of education instructs public school teachers to focus on the lower end of a class to avoid having to fail any students. Japanese students in the compulsory education system do not repeat grades.

The understanding of democracy as sameness and equality, which gradually took hold during the last several decades, strengthened the cultural propensity toward consensus. Democracy thus became a social and economic, not a political, construction. The distribution of social and economic goods mattered; equality of opportunity in itself was not sufficient. The task of government became to ensure an acceptable pattern of distribution. In return, the people pledged conformity and consensus in the manner of the old village order, thereby diluting the politicality of the association represented by the state, emphasizing always the naturalness of the community.

In this way, liberty did not acquire the sense of freedom from interference by others—the basis of citizenship intended by the American reformers. In order for government to accomplish the task of equitable distribution, competition in society had to be suppressed, which meant regulations. And, by complying with regulations, the people necessarily abandoned their claim to individual liberty in exchange for sameness and equality. In such an arrangement, it is not the individual that functions as the building unit for political association; it is the sociability of individuals which weaves the fabric that is society.

MY HOME, MY COMPANY

The legacy of the imperial state has hampered the evolution of a postwar replacement. The architects of Meiji Japan (1868–1912) needed to build quickly a modern and centralized state out of a cluster of feudal fiefdoms to avert Japan's colonization by Western Great Powers. By the time the age of Western imperialism arrived on Japan's shores, most of Asia had fallen under the rule, direct or indirect, of one of the expanding European powers. To protect the state, the Meiji architects first had to create a state—holders of fragmented feudal power had to be persuaded, and many indeed coerced into subordination to the newly created political center in Tokyo. The people had to be made aware of a larger national

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identity above their loyalties to the village and the fief. New, and often oppressive, sacrifices, notably conscription and taxes, were imposed. To alleviate the antagonisms inherent in the state-building enterprise, the Meiji architects constructed an ideology of a familial national polity.

At the apex of the hierarchical national polity, imagined to be an extended national family, stood the emperor. All Japanese families, if traced back far enough in time, supposedly were related by blood to the imperial family. In this way, the Meiji architects recreated the familiar manner of village life on a national scale, with the emperor as head and father. To work and sacrifice for the state was to work and sacrifice for the family. The two Japanese ideograms for state—country and family/household—expressed the idea of the unity of the state, the emperor, and the family.

The Meiji experience is an accelerated example of Charles Tilly's portrayal of how war made states, and vice versa, and how this had happened in the European context over many centuries. With the growing reliance on mass conscription, confiscatory taxation, and conversion of production to the ends of war, the extractive power of the state rises enormously, but so do the claims of citizens on the state.[12] When the Japanese imperial state was destroyed, the post-war state inherited the welfare obligations, but its extractive power was greatly diminished.

According to the Aristotelian view of politics, the *polis* is a species of association among people, and the site of their activities is aimed at fulfilling the association's purpose. The first form of association is the household or family, next comes the association of households to form a village, and so on to the state itself. The *polis* is the final association which has reached the heights of self-sufficiency. And self-sufficiency, or the attainment of the general good, is the one and only purpose of the *polis* as a voluntary association. Whether the purpose of the general good can be attained depends on the degree to which the virtue of rule is directed to the advantage of the whole body of citizens.[13]

The experience of World War II cast doubt on the self-sufficiency of the imperial *polis*. It was difficult to imagine how death and destruction could be equated with the general good; the manner of rule had turned vicious, the purpose of state association betrayed. The antagonism between the interests of the state and the family,

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which the Meiji architects had managed to alleviate, could no longer be veiled. While Japan had previously engaged in wars, the degree of destruction of the family in World War II was unparalleled. When defeat finally came—imperial Japan's first and total defeat—the creed of the unity of the family and state became a dubious proposition. And occupation reform severed the structure and indeed the ideological connection between the state and the emperor.

Japan seemed ready for a new conceptualization of the state, for a new expression of the association of the Japanese polity. But there followed no sustained effort to articulate a new purpose for the state. Liberty of the household and the individual seemed dearer than any general good that might arise through association to form the *polis*—the whole no longer seemed greater than the sum of its parts.

My home-ism, reverting to Aristotle's first form of association, is how the Japanese identified their sense of primary association during the 1950s and 1960s. Then, in the early 1970s, the company came to be identified as the highest form of self-sufficient association. Supported by corporate lifetime employment, which became standard practice with the advent of growing prosperity, the interests of the company and the household came to be seen as identical. This is the Japan with which we are familiar today. How the collection of companies relates to the state is not a question which the postwar Japanese have needed to answer. In this Japan, the idea of patriotism, for example, cannot gain currency because the state is not articulated as the necessary object of such an allegiance.

The basis of the Meiji design, the family, survived the imperial state's destruction. The aim of the American occupiers to construct a state of popular sovereignty took an unintended path. In a sense, defeat and occupation removed the highest level of association from Japanese life.

SOCIETY WITHOUT CITIZENS

> Having by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal. . .We hereby promulgate. . .a fundamental law of State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are to be guided in Our conduct, and to point out to

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> what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

Thus began the preamble of the imperial constitution of 1889 drawn by the Meiji architects. Its claim to a succession "unbroken for ages eternal" and conformity "forever," its claim that the Japanese state was a timeless entity captured an essential aspect of Japanese culture which the American-authored constitution implicitly denied. Even after the abrogation of the imperial constitution, the understanding of historicity held. This explains, in part, why the postwar Japanese need not possess more than an amorphous conception of the state.

The homogeneity of the Japanese is the standard explanation for why they are secure in their identity without having to articulate a definition of the state. The commonality of blood, language, and culture suffice. According to the emperor myth, the imperial family and the Japanese people are said to be descendants of gods. While few today take seriously the myth of imperial origin, the assumption of the timelessness and continuity of the Japanese race remains operative. This assumption gives rise to the conception of Japan as a natural community, not an artificial, voluntary, or political association.

While the Greek philosophers invented human beings as political animals, there is no origin myth of the politicality of humanity in Japan. Whereas the great social traditions of the West are political traditions, there exists no comparable political tradition in Japan. In the Western tradition, society is a political society; the Greek idea of the city, for example, is self-consciously organized to provide self-sufficiency. In Japan, however, the household and village can be sufficient. For those steeped in the Western tradition, because the household and village by definition cannot be sufficient, the Japanese idea of the extension of the household and village to the national scale seems artificial. To Western thinking, the state is greater than the sum of its parts of households and villages. But the Japanese, who assume the naturalness of their community, are not self-conscious about it—the Japanese can invent human beings as economic animals dedicated to the company.

The Japanese concept of society is analogous to an organism which is created naturally, spontaneously, says Takeshi Ishida. The

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individual is one cell of the organism that is dependent on the whole for its being. In this way, the distinctions between the individual, society, and the state become blurred.[14] The Japanese word for human being/individual, *ningen,* can be translated as "among people." The notion of individual autonomy is weak, and so is the sense of individual political efficacy. Whether rule is virtuous or vicious seems to be decided more by natural forces than human will. "It cannot be helped" is an often expressed sentiment; perseverance in the face of adversity is an admired virtue.

Japanese society tends to inhibit the expression of individual will. When the notion of individual freedom was first introduced in Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, the purveyors of the Japanese Enlightenment effort had to explain with great difficulty that it did not mean selfishness. Though much has changed in Japanese life over the past century and a half, the association of individual freedom with selfishness remains. The concept of society as a voluntary association of individuals endowed with a sense of liberty is not Japanese.

There are no citizens in Japan because they never concerned themselves with political associations in the first instance. A citizen, according to Aristotle, is a constituent of the *polis* who shares in the task of the disposition of political authority; politics is the ultimate calling of the *persona* of the citizen. In both imperial and postwar variants of Japanese life—in which the individual is one cell of an organism—political authority is thought to reside above and beyond society and the individual.

VILLAGE ORDER

Social order is the most cherished value in Japanese life today. The concern for order makes for a conservative society. The definition of order comes from what the Japanese identify as the village norm.

Village rule emphasizes consensus. All must agree, or until all are persuaded into agreement a decision is likely to be postponed. Majority rule, which implies minority disaffection, is a thing best avoided. Except in extreme circumstances, the village does not banish its inhabitants. Thus, if an individual insists on disagreeing with the rest, a decision becomes difficult to make, the business of the village stalls, and order breaks down. Knowledge that life for

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that individual can be made rather unpleasant encourages conformity. The village functions best when the individual keeps his opinions to himself and follows the will of the community. In return, the village as a whole guarantees the livelihood and safety of the individual.

This emphasis on consensus is why American businessmen often find Japanese corporate decision-making slow; consensus-building requires time. It is also why the location of responsibility is vague; when all are responsible, there is no sense of individual responsibility. For example, at the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, American justice sought to place responsibility on a handful of men who had held leadership positions during the war. Unlike the defendants at Nuremberg, no Japanese could claim responsibility; they had been servants of the imperial will, not of the emperor, for he, too, was only an individual. Imperial will was the will of the community. Because the American occupiers had decided to spare the emperor from trial for practical reasons of occupation, the occupiers had to instruct the defendants to admit responsibility to protect the person of the emperor. The defendants understood and most of them were sent to the gallows, but the American logic of justice made little sense to the Japanese.[15]

Another feature of consensus is the slowness and difficulty in correcting a decision which proves to yield undesirable consequences.[16] Because minority opinions are not registered in the decision-making process, alternative courses of action do not readily present themselves. And because all are responsible for the wrong decision, no one wishes to identify the mistake. Thus, an undesirable situation is likely to be left alone—in hopes that it will correct itself—until it becomes unbearable. Only then is the village ready to admit the reversal of a decision. This is why change in Japan, when it comes, is thorough and often appears abrupt and, to some, unpredictable.

The village is what Isaiah Berlin calls the relative mindlessness of an authoritarian structure in which all men are prepared to exchange the painful privilege of choosing—the burden of freedom—for peace and comfort, for a union of interests, a life of common dependence and sacrifice.[17] What appears to be mindlessness to Berlin is a luke warm bath to contemporary Japanese commentators—one can soak in it for a long time, yet without the satisfaction of a good, hot bath. In the Japanese company, one is promoted

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along with his cohort, pay is determined by seniority, not performance. What matters is the status of the company. Individual recognition is traded for job security; layoffs are rare.

When the sense of individual liberty is weak, so is the notion of rights. Thus, the government task of distribution tends to be seen not as something the individual has the right to demand but as the largess of government. In this way, the government stands above the individual; the preamble to the constitution notwithstanding, the claim that "sovereign power resides with the people" is not a Japanese conviction. The vagueness of rights, in sentiment and practice, places the individual in an inferior and vulnerable position with respect to government authority and power. One makes petitions, not rightful demands. In Japan, the individual needs to protect his interest through social solidarity—the usual mechanism is the use of mediation to settle disputes and perceived wrongs. Mediations forge compromises rather than rulings of right and wrong. Rulings are the work of courts, and courts tend not to take up cases until they are satisfied that enough effort at mediation has been made. The individual knows from record that once a dispute reaches the court, the government is likely to win.

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The social contract of democracy, of sameness and equality, is guaranteed by the national bureaucracy; the social contract is depoliticized. The bureaucrats—the best and the brightest, top graduates of elite universities—are selected by examination; they are not elected by the public. They are mandarins of society endowed with a strong sense of duty toward the maintenance of social order and, of course, the expansion of their powers through the acquisition of larger budgets. The task of bureaucracy is administration, but the Japanese bureaucracy also legislates. It writes almost all the bills which the government submits to parliament. The bills are written in such a way that, after passage into laws, the processes and details of their administration are left to the discretion of the responsible ministries. The bureaucracy is the source and guardian of Japan's myriad regulations. Through the regulatory process, it distributes to the people social and economic goods.

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The Japanese bureaucracy is, in theory, accountable to parliament, the highest organ of the state according to the constitution. Parliament is where politics is supposed to take place, but since the early 1960s, until 1993, when the long-reigning Liberal-Democratic Party government fell, there was no politics to speak of, certainly none on the parliamentary floor. Bills written by the bureaucracy were introduced by the majority Liberal-Democratic Party and passed, though they might be accompanied by ceremonious nays from the opposition parties. There were no surprises.

The limited politics which did take place occurred behind closed doors. Members of the parliamentary affairs committees (*kokutai iinkai*) of the opposition parties cut deals with their Liberal-Democratic Party counterparts before the introduction of bills. Once minor adjustments were made in favor of the various constituencies, the opposition parties agreed to be present on the floor of parliament to vote against the government-sponsored bill. The Liberal-Democratic Party went through this motion to avert the possibility of legislating in a chamber empty of the opposition. That would have been seen by the public as the tyranny of the majority, quite undemocratic, and not in accordance with the norms of village order. Politics by parliamentary affairs committees was opaque and little understood by the public.

The manner of the Liberal-Democratic reign made parasites of the party's members and certain of its constituents. The daily affairs of Liberal-Democratic parliamentarians were at best unethical and at times corrupt and illegal. Lacking the experience and the need to legislate, they petitioned and, if they could, ordered the bureaucratic ministries to provide exemptions to regulations for select constituents. Thus, for example, special permission for a corporation wishing to make a capital investment controlled by ministerial regulation to avert excessive competition might be contravened. Corporations enjoyed the protection offered by bureaucratic regulations which covered whole industries; at the same time, they sought special exemptions for which they turned to parliamentarians with offers of political contributions. For those wishing to clear the high regulatory hurdle of entering an industry, the price was steep. (The Lockheed scandal in the early 1970s, involving the prime minister, marked an American disaster at playing the Japanese game.) Where there is regulation, there is bribery. Heavily-regulated Japan invites

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pervasive corruption. Corruption was a central aspect of Liberal-Democratic Party politics, and was therefore inseparable from the politics of the postwar state.[18]

As parliamentary politics turned increasingly corrupt, public dissatisfaction grew. Public support for political parties in general steadily declined, and so did voter turnout. The Liberal-Democratic Party managed to stay in power because, so long as the Cold War lasted, the public would not lend sufficient support to the Socialist Party, the first opposition party. And the Socialists did not field enough candidates to win a majority even if all of them were elected. Caught in a corrupt political system without an alternative, the public sense of political efficacy plummeted. By the end of the 1980s, almost 80 percent of respondents in a public opinion poll stated that the popular will was not reflected in politics.[19] But the public also knew that what mattered, the distribution of social and economic goods, was the work of the bureaucracy, not of parliament. Parliament as the representation of popular sovereignty held little meaning. To the extent that the Japanese recognized the state, it was the bureaucracy, the provider of gifts, unelected, nonpolitical, unaccountable to the public, that constituted the state in their eyes.

Some fifty years ago, the Americans gave the Japanese the power to choose governments, to act as citizens, and to begin a history of citizenship. But the politics of the postwar Japanese state, successful for a long time, has suppressed that power. Now, the pillars of the postwar state are crumbling. With the end of the Cold War, the fear of international politics is fading (although the recovery of full sovereignty does not necessarily imply militarization). The economy, which the Japanese had come to believe could only grow, plunged into a prolonged recession beginning in 1990; corporations have begun to lay off employees, altering the pattern of lifetime employment that had been the fabric of equality and sameness. The bureaucracy, accustomed to an easy distribution of goods within a growing economy, is unable to make the difficult choices of reducing its largess. Furthermore, with deregulation now understood as the way to revive the economy and to maintain good relations with the United States, the bureaucracy, which exists only to regulate, will have to be curbed; only strong political leadership will be able to do this. With the reconfiguration of political parties and the

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institution of a new electoral system, sparked by the fall of the Liberal-Democratic Party in 1993, alternatives within government are at last possible.[20] Parliament faces the difficult task of raising taxes during a time of economic hardship, of choosing which parts of society should be required to bear the burden. The state, which provided for socioeconomic equality and sameness while withholding opportunities for involvement in the political process, may at last be transformed. Because the Japanese life of order and prosperity is now threatened, the public is becoming increasingly interested in politics. While altering the village order will not be easy, there exists a constitutional design for popular sovereignty. The state may yet begin to take form in the Japanese consciousness.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Professor Nicholas Onuf of Florida International University for discussing the ideas in this essay.

ENDNOTES

[1]Michitaro Tanaka, *Ningen de arukoto* (To Be Human) (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 1984), 148.

[2]Yasuhiro Nakasone, *Atarashii hoshu no ronri* (A New Conservative Theory) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1978), 33.

[3]James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House), 331.

[4]For an analysis of the Japanese interpretation of the American-authored constitution, see Kyoko Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[5]NHK hoso yoron chosa-jyo, ed., *Zusetsu sengo yoron-shi* (Illustrated History of Postwar Public Opinion), vol. 2 (Tokyo: Nihon hoso shuppan kyokai, 1982), 128–29.

[6]The Socialist Party had been the primary political power behind the argument for the unconstitutionality of the self-defense forces. But with the arrival of a Socialist prime minister in 1993 (the first time in almost five decades), the party reversed its long-held position; the abolishment of the self-defense force is no longer at issue. Still, the debate over the nature of the relationship between sovereignty and military power and whether the constitution needs amendment continues.

[7]Ikuhiko Hata and Rinjiro Sodei, *Nihon senryo hishi* (Hidden History of the Occupation of Japan) (Tokyo: Hayakawa shobo, 1986), 172–73.

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[8]Takeshi Ishida, *Nihon no seiji to kotoba—jiyu to fukushi* (Japanese Politics and Words—Liberty and Welfare), vol. 2 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppan-kai, 1989), 180–81.

[9]Identification of Japan's "semi-sovereign" condition with the American security guarantee is being made by the nationalist Right, which is arguing for Japan's "full" rearmament. While I concur with this identification, I do not espouse the nationalist policy implication. The quest for Japan's "full" sovereignty can be realized only through the encouragement of a regional and global program toward demilitarization, which better reflects the spirit of the Japanese "peace" constitution.

[10]For thoughts on postwar Japanese national identity, see Masaru Tamamoto, "The Ideology of Nothingness: A Meditation on Japanese National Identity," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1994): 89–99.

[11]Conversation with the author, March 1982.

[12]Charles Tilly, "How War Made States, and Vice Versa," in Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 83.

[13]Peter Onuf and Nicholas Onuf, *Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776–1814* (Madison, Wis.: Madison House Publishers, 1993), 32–33.

[14]Ishida, *Nihon no seiji to kotoba—jiyu to fukushi,* 271–72.

[15]The vagueness of the location of responsibility in Japan is one major reason why the question of war responsibility cannot be settled satisfactorily in Asia and continues to flare into diplomatic incidents from time to time.

[16]Tanaka, *Ningen de arukoto,* 130–31.

[17]Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 158–59.

[18]It should be noted that, on the whole, bribery was not used for personal enrichment; elections were expensive to run.

[19]NHK yoron chosa-bu, *Gendai nihon-jin no ishiki kozo* (The Structure of Contemporary Japanese Consciousness), vol. 3 (Tokyo: Nihon hoso shuppan kyokai, 1991), 125.

[20]For a commentary on the upheaval in parliamentary politics, see Masaru Tamamoto, "Japan's Village Politics," *World Policy Journal* (forthcoming, Spring 1995).

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Vincent Cable

The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power

INTRODUCTION

THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, especially the speeding up of communications, and the extent of international economic integration have, together, brought into question the effectiveness of many traditional, national economic policy instruments. The erosion of economic sovereignty has led many to question the future of the nation-state as the main building block of governance. This questioning has, in turn, affected the terms of debate of national politics. There has been, in many countries, a rise of populist movements rejecting closer international integration and some of its most visible symbols, such as trade and migrants. What is variously described as a "new nationalism," the "politics of cultural identity," the "politics of the soil," "positive nationalism," or the "new mercantilism" reflects, each in a different way, a reaction to the loss of authority of nation-states and an attempt to reassert it or to assert other forms of identity.

This essay deconstructs what is loosely called "globalization," or economic integration, and the ways it affects the economics and politics of nation-states. It argues that simple determinism is not in order. There are complex iterative processes at work. Domestic policy-making and politics have been internationalized and foreign policies have been subjected to growing domestic pressures. The nation-state has "lost" sovereignty to regional and global institutions and to markets but has also acquired new areas of control in

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order to promote "national competitiveness." While technological change may have pushed in one direction, social and political forces may have pulled in another. As a consequence, the extent and pace of globalization is much more in evidence in some areas, notably finance, than in others.

Overall, the process of globalization has generally been longer and slower than much contemporary conceit will admit. It has also been cyclical and subject to major reversals. Between 1914 and 1945 a combination of war and economic nationalism (the latter sustained until very recently in China, India, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, among others) reversed a century's progress in integrating economies. Although international trade has grown faster than output throughout the postwar period, the share of trade in the gross domestic product (GDP) of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries only returned to 1913 levels by around 1970, and for the United States by the late 1980s.[1] For many Latin American and Asian countries (and Australia) it is still much lower. Arguably the main achievement of the postwar international economic order has been to restore the degree of "globalization" to a level close to that which existed in 1913.

Many of today's global markets are, moreover, not a creation of our contemporaries but existed in similar, if not identical, forms long ago. The boom in the 1980s in the syndicated lending market strongly resembles the nineteenth-century cycles of lending, overlending, default, rescheduling, and fresh lending. And the current discovery of "emerging markets" by institutional investors is not fundamentally different from the nineteenth-century portfolio investment in the United States, Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe on behalf of British small savers. From the South Sea Bubble to the 1987 "crash," the international transmission of crises of confidence has been understood, at least by prudent investors. Many of today's big projects—like the Eurotunnel or the Hong Kong airport—have a high degree of global complexity but not significantly more than when the Panama and Suez canals were under construction. Today's transnational companies had recognizable forebears in the trading companies of centuries past.

Nor have the political arguments about the impact of globalization changed very much. Perhaps the oldest debate in economics is over the advantages and disadvantages of globalization in the form of

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free trade. The protectionist arguments put forward in France last year against the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (the threat of "delocalization"; the "unfairness" of "social dumping"; the need for "reciprocity"; the indispensability of agricultural subsidy and self-sufficiency) spring from mercantilist assumptions scarcely changed for centuries: arguments against which Adam Smith inveighed in *The Wealth of Nations*. As John Dunn has put it: "the fundamental antinomy between the Ricardian image of free world trade as a global public good and the more skeptical vision of trade as a worldwide battle ground, on which only the most manipulative and ruthless of state craft can effectively protect the national populations, goes back to the dawn of modern politics."[2]

This essay is concerned with the domestic political reactions to the intensification of globalization, which, historically, have fluctuated between adaptation, on the one hand, and rejection, on the other. Many people are bewildered by changes which seem beyond their control. Such concerns have a long pedigree: "by the 1880s in Europe, conservatives saw in themes of ethnic purity and the concept of race a barrier against the onslaught of an increasingly complicating and fragmenting world and as a weapon for the assertion of identity on a wider stage."[3] Prejudices of this kind helped to cement some nation-states (Germany) and fragment others (Austria-Hungary) just as they help today to unify some societies (Japan) but divide many others.

Populist arguments about the disruptive effects of economic integration have a timeless quality which owes little to technology or advances in economic thinking. Mr. H. Ross Perot's antagonism toward Mexican low wage competition and Sir James Goldsmith's antagonism toward Asian competition in Europe[4] were never better expressed than in a seventeenth-century petition to Queen Anne to ban Indian textile imports: "English workmen could not compete with Eastern labour. . .(because) the people in India are such slaves as to work for less than a penny a day whereas ours there will not work for under a shilling."[5]

THE MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

Technology and Global Economic Integration

There are two main technological drivers behind globalization. First, and more sedate, transport costs have fallen with improved

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physical communications: better cars; jet aircraft; containerization; motorways. Second, and more spectacular, advances in computing power and in telecommunications—digital systems, satellite technology, and, more recently, fiber optics—have transformed the ease, speed, quantity, and quality of international information flows.

These changes affect economic activity in some specific ways. First, transactions and communications costs and times are falling rapidly. Many goods and services are becoming "tradable" that hitherto were not, and are therefore exposed to competition (i.e., perishable and seasonal fashion items; components of integrated production processes; "back office" accounts; and design work). Second, global communication systems make it possible for companies to coordinate efficiently across a wide range of countries their production planning and financial operations, and to run truly global operations. The concept of a global company is not new—the British East India Company and the early oil companies and plantation businesses were such—but many more companies can now operate globally to much greater advantage in a far wider range of activities. Third, information, per se, has become tradable: management consultancy; films, records, and compact discs; television news; telecommunications services; software systems, design, and programming. It is no coincidence that the Uruguay Round had some of its most testing moments over "information" issues that were scarcely thought of five years earlier: intellectual property protection, market access for films, and telecommunications. Fourth, capital has become highly mobile in the form of money, up to the point when it is converted into fixed assets.

Finance Capital: "The End of Geography"

Money is "an information product. The essence of money is. . .the information it conveys, whether as a store of value or medium of exchange."[6] Thus, Richard O'Brien begins his explanation of the ways in which computerization and advanced telecommunications (involving almost instantaneous linkages) have transformed international finance. There are now global markets for currency transactions and all forms of marketable securities. Competition is intense and capital is highly mobile.

However, technology alone cannot explain the process of financial market integration. This could only happen with the further

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step of financial deregulation: the removal of capital controls since the early 1970s; the removal of controls over interest rates; and the lifting of traditional barriers to entry into banking and other financial services. Liberalization policies and the globalization of finance made possible by new technology have powerfully reinforced each other.

Global financial markets have several major implications for the economic sovereignty of countries. Capital is now so mobile that markets will ensure that holders of financial assets receive roughly the same, risk adjusted, real return everywhere. Any country that offers significantly lower returns will experience capital outflow and a rapidly depreciating exchange rate. The recent fall in the dollar was not a product of speculative frenzy but a hardheaded calculation by financial institutions that they had too many dollars in their portfolio given the risk of higher inflation in an expanding US economy and the relatively unattractive returns on US Treasury paper. Any government that attempts an alternative, "reflationary" strategy and neglects these financial market fundamentals (as, say, the French Socialists did in 1980) risks a financial crisis. The sheer scale of profit-seeking finance capital that can be mobilized in currency markets far exceeds what any government, or even governments acting in concert, can put against it. Foreign exchange trading in the world's financial centers exceeds a trillion dollars a day, a multiple of fifty times, or more, of the daily amount of world trade and greater than the total stock of foreign exchange reserves held by all governments.

It is virtually impossible now to go back to exchange controls as an economic regulator. For economies whose financial markets are integrated into electronic networks, there is no "paper trail" for exchange controllers to follow; evasion would be massive, rapid, and largely unpunishable. Even those Latin American countries (or India or Russia) that have lacked a high degree of global integration, and yet endeavored to avoid adjustment in the 1980s, allowing their exchange rates to become overvalued, found that they experienced massive capital flight, which exchange controls could not stop. Various proposals have been made by Jacques Delors and others for taxing speculative transactions as a way of restoring greater stability of rates, but there is considerable skepticism among economic specialists as to their effectiveness.

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The changes are profound. But how do they affect the fundamentals of economic sovereignty? Rather less, in fact, than it appears. Governments cannot fix their nominal exchange rates through exchange controls or expect to resist strong movements by using reserves. But they can manage the rate by using interest rates if they are willing to subordinate monetary policy to this end. For those governments that choose to peg their currencies externally—the members of the European Monetary System (EMS); countries like Hong Kong, Poland, Czechia, or Estonia, which have a dollar or deutsche mark peg—the policy regime they follow is much like that of the gold standard in the nineteenth century, without gold. Late nineteenth-century Britain, the economic hegemon of the period, accepted the surrender of economic sovereignty implicit in the gold standard: that any unsustainable deficit on trade would produce a gold outflow and an automatic contraction in money supply and recession. Modern foreign exchange markets will more quickly overwhelm any government with a lapse of policy discipline but the principles are essentially the same.

For those governments that elect to pursue an independent monetary policy—the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, and Russia, among others—the option of monetary independence remains. What these governments are, in effect, doing is choosing their own rate of inflation; having done so they then largely surrender exchange rate determination to the foreign exchange markets. The markets will balance the returns in different currency assets, taking account of real interest rate differentials and exchange rate risk. What is different in today's financially globalized world, compared with earlier experience with floating exchange rates, is that trade no longer matters very much in exchange rate determination because of the sheer weight of capital flows. So a country can run a current account deficit for long periods, like the United States has.

Further reflection may suggest that the area of discretion left to national governments is not as great as it appears. Governments may well decide to exercise their sovereign control over the printing presses, but while it is possible, even in a globalized world, to have an economic policy as distinctive as that of Ukraine or Serbia, or Greece within the European Union (EU), its durability must be in some doubt since the advantages of "independence" are not at all obvious. Many governments have rationalized their role in a finan-

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cially interdependent world in an opposite sense; even that most nationalistic of countries, France, has consciously opted to have its monetary policies, in effect, determined by the German Bundesbank.

Foreign currency markets are but one of the dimensions of global financial market integration, though by far the largest in terms of turnover and implications for national policy. International, cross-border bank lending also grew twice as fast as world trade in the last three decades. With the advent of the debt crisis, securities markets grew vigorously, replacing bank lending in importance; cross-border equity related securities increased from $200 million to $20 billion in five years (1983–1987) and the stock of international securities quadrupled to $19.5 trillion in 1988 from the 1982 figure.[7] The last few years have seen comparable growth in portfolio investment in emerging markets and in cross-border dealings in financial innovations like derivatives.

All of this has a complex effect on nation-states: individuals and companies (and governments) have more access to cheaper finance; but individual countries are more exposed to internationally transmitted shocks and national regulators have been obliged to cede control to global markets that are wholly unregulated (currency markets), lightly self-regulated (bond markets), or imperfectly regulated (as with multinational banking, whose imperfections were exposed by the BCCI scandal).

Foreign Direct Investment and Multinationals

A second driving force in the globalization process has been the rapid growth of direct foreign investment through transnational corporations (TNCs). As explained earlier, this is a phenomenon that is by no means new; by 1913 there were not only the early trading operations of the East India and Hudson Bay Companies but TNCs that were the direct ancestors of today's industrial companies: mainly British and American industrial companies that invested a significant part of their assets in, for example, textiles, food, chemicals, and engineering production abroad. The process continued in the interwar period, though disrupted, like trade, by the economic nationalism and instability of that time. (One estimate, admittedly crude, is that the stock of world foreign direct investment fell from around 9 percent of the global GDP in 1913 to less than half of that figure and had not recovered its earlier impor-

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tance, even by 1990.)[8] Nonetheless, helped by advances in communications and (outside of the developing world) by liberal economic policies, the postwar period has seen a considerable expansion. A large and increasing proportion of international trade derives from this overseas investment, and trade is consequently intrafirm rather than international (estimated at over 50 percent of the international trade of both the United States and Japan and 80 percent of British manufactured exports).[9]

The rapid growth of TNCs as a force in the world economy has been discussed for so long as to have become a cliché. There have been, however, within the last decade, some major changes that have perhaps changed the nature as well as the scale of direct foreign investment (and certainly underline its complexity and variety). First, some companies have moved beyond the stage of having subsidiaries in a variety of markets (what have been called "multidomestic" companies) to becoming globally integrated, exploiting advantages of communications technologies and flexible production methods to achieve major economies of scope and coordination, as well as scale. An example is the recent change in the Ford Motor Company's strategy to produce "global" cars from its several European and American operations.

Second, there was, after the mid-1980s, an explosive growth of foreign direct investment (FDI)—by roughly 400 percent over six years—far greater than previous growth and three times faster than the growth of trade.[10] Most of this capital was invested among the "triad" of the United States, Japan, and the European Community (EC). Much was in the service sector involving the integration of banking and other services into the global economy.

Third, within the last few years, after decades of stagnation, there have been signs of a very large inflow of FDI into non-OECD countries, brought about by the opening up of countries like China, India, Mexico, Russia, Hungary, Brazil, and Argentina. Since many of these markets are actually or potentially very dynamic and cost differentials from traditional locations are large, future flows could be huge.

How does the growth of FDI affect the economic sovereignty of nation-states? There are several possibilities. First, the sense of identity associated with "national" companies and the loyalties flowing from that identity are disappearing. Companies that a few

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years ago were nationalized United Kingdom public utilities—British Gas, British Telecom, British Airways—are now global companies with increasingly tenuous connections with Britain. What used to be called British Leyland, the "national" car company, disappeared successively into a partnership with Honda and ownership by BMW. In Britain (like Canada, Australia, Holland, Singapore, and Argentina) the national origin of the owners of leading companies may no longer be a very controversial issue, though elsewhere (France, Korea, Japan, India, and, to a degree, the United States) it is immensely sensitive and cuts into the heart of the issue of what nation-states exist for.

The idea of multinational companies as "stateless" has been given impetus by the claims of Robert Reich and others that companies not only relocate production to maximize global economies of scale and minimize costs but also relocate "research, design, and development" facilities and company headquarters, too, in "global networks."[11] Recent research, however, has cast serious doubts on this assertion: US companies are shown to conduct no more than 9 percent of their technological activity abroad, and while there is a higher proportion in Europe, it seems not to be increasing.[12]

The question of identity is also less clear-cut than the rhetoric about globalization often suggests. Analysis of the attitudes and behavior of executives suggests considerable differences in the "cultures of capitalism," which, even within the highly integrated European market, have made successful cross-border corporate mergers exceedingly rare.[13] There may be a few British, Dutch, Swiss, or Belgian companies that have begun to create a genuine sense of a global identity but most multinationals clearly reflect the ethos of their home country management and shareholders. Moreover, many "global" companies are less global than they seem to be or claim to be. Ford, for example, has 80 percent of its fixed assets still in the United States; McDonald's and Pepsi still have a majority of fixed assets at home. Nonetheless, it may be only a matter of time before the buildup of overseas assets, professional recruitment in international markets, and global networking within companies transforms the culture of companies into something that is no longer "national."

Second, the dominance of TNCs in trade flows has changed the meaning of "exports" and "imports." Are US "exports" simply the

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goods and services that pass across US borders or do they include the production of US subsidiaries in Canada, Mexico, and Europe and/or the sales to Japanese subsidiaries in the United States?[14] In a wholly integrated, globalized world such issues would not be of great concern (who worries about the magnitude of Minnesota's exports or the Anglo-Scottish trade balance?) but in a world where national governments retain some policy discretion and people care about national economic "success," they have to be addressed. If they were adequately addressed, it would be increasingly clear that the conventional benchmarks are useless; the United States, for example, runs a large "surplus" on trade if the operations of US companies abroad are taken into account. But the point has yet to register with many national trade officials who are preoccupied with bilateral deficits.

Third, the mobility of capital and the importance of FDI have subtly changed the nature of national economic policy. Governments have long worried about "national competitiveness," by which they have usually meant the competitiveness of exports and import competing activities. In countries with a mercantilist tradition this concern has expressed itself in the idea that exports should be promoted and imports discouraged. The idea that exports should be promoted as a symbol of national success is still a powerful one and finds expression in export credit competition and statesmen traveling around the world as salesmen for their countries' products. Yet, "competitiveness" is no longer predominantly a trade issue. Rather, it is about creating the right business conditions—infrastructure, deregulation of markets, skilled and educated labor, financial stability—to attract or retain mobile capital. The Porter concept of "competing nations"[15] captures the spirit of the new agenda, already being developed in small open economies like Singapore (and not-so-small countries like Britain).

Trade in Goods and Services

I suggested earlier that the globalization of trade is less spectacular and less secure than in relation to capital flows. World trade has grown more rapidly than global output in the postwar period (6 percent as against 3 percent in the 1960–1990 period) though much of this growth is specifically attributable to the dynamic export performance of East Asia and the integration of Western Europe.

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The limits of globalization can clearly be seen in the United States, which, despite openness in many respects, exports only just over 10 percent of its GDP. Many countries have resisted trade liberalization or have been marginalized from it. In some sectors—agriculture, textiles, steel—trade is planned and regulated in the industrialized West to a degree that would not have been out of place in the Communist bloc. And the extraordinary intensity of resistance to rather modest trade liberalization underlines the stumbling blocks to further opening.

Nonetheless, there are changes in the trade field of a qualitative kind which are having a serious effect on economic sovereignty. First, a substantial segment of trade is now intra-industry rather than interindustry, often due to specialization within TNCs. Traditional factor-based "comparative advantage" is now an inadequate explanation of patterns of trade; arguably a more important factor is the internal logic of specialization within TNCs, as already described above. There are now large parts of the economy where it is no longer possible meaningfully to disentangle "national" exports and "foreign" imports for trade policy purposes (one reason why protectionist rhetoric often cannot be translated into action and why, for example, it is scarcely conceivable that large scale trade warfare would erupt among members of the EU or between the United States and Canada).

Second, one area of trade which is growing very rapidly is in services which penetrate much deeper into national societies than a movement of goods. This phenomenon partly reflects the growth of services which underpin the globalization process itself: more foreign earnings or expenditure from air travel and shipping, cross-border insurance business, and the spread of multinational banking. It also extends international competition into areas hitherto safely (if inefficiently) nontradable: engineering, legal, and accountancy services; retailing (as with the advance of Seven-Eleven and Blockbuster Video throughout Europe); and nursing and cleaning services. Most serious in terms of social and political impact is the opening up of telecommunications and multimedia services to international competition. It was no coincidence that in the closing stages of the Uruguay Round, Jack Valenti, representing Hollywood, was one of the most influential US lobbyists: Hollywood and Cable Network News are arguably now more important in trade than General

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Motors or United States Steel; the British music industry "exports" more than the aerospace industry. These are not just amusing factoids; they illustrate a new dimension of globalization through trade: traded services that can mold cultural values and provide information through news, entertainment, and advertising, and which also cut to the heart of nations' senses of identity.

Third, as economies become more deeply integrated through trade as well as investment, the traditional, explicit barriers to trade disappear (which they mostly have for manufactures). Obstacles to trade are becoming more opaque and stem from practices hitherto regarded as the preserve of the nation-state. Thus, Japanese consumers' conservative preference for buying Japanese and the inefficient Japanese retail system have become "hidden barriers to trade." The Japanese-United States bilateral trade negotiations (the SII) have dealt with reform of the United States education system, the adoption by the United States of metrication, and improving United States savings behavior (since all, indirectly, would help rectify the United States' external imbalance).

A further dimension to the deepening of integration between countries is the attempt at global, or regional, harmonization of standards. Different technical, environmental, and consumer product standards can be an obstacle to trade. Car exhaust emission standards have been used to block car imports. Even where standards are not a deliberate trade barrier, a profusion of national practices fragments global and regional markets and usually puts foreigners at a disadvantage. One solution is to harmonize standards. This has been tried in the EU but it has run into problems both of complexity and absurdity (trying to make all Europe's cucumbers straight). A softer "mutual recognition" approach has been adopted and used also in GATT (as, for example, in the mutual recognition of professional standards in the EU's Single Market and the GATT's agreement on product standards). But this leads to complaints that "mutual recognition" in the interests of free trade leads to a "dive to the bottom," particularly in areas like environmental and social standards, where producers in one country may derive a competitive advantage from tolerating lower standards. This has in turn led to pressure for "minimum" standards. Poorer countries argue—and with great justice—that they are then forced to adopt higher standards than is appropriate for their level

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of development and amount to a form of disguised protectionism. The rights and wrongs of the matter are not relevant for discussion here, merely the observation that trade policy is increasingly about aspects of national life that were hitherto purely "domestic."

Trade policy has also become the battleground for those trying to spread what they see as universal values, since trade makes differences in values transparent and is also a way of gaining leverage over other countries. Thus, trade policy has become intertwined with environmental preferences (restricting dolphin-unfriendly Mexican tuna and trade in tropical timber); human rights (China); animal rights (trade in tropical birds; sealskins; whales; furs); and labor standards. Within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU and in the GATT, environmental and social policies are becoming the subject of international negotiations. The economic basis of harmonization in many of these areas is very questionable since they fail to respect genuine differences of wealth and taste and involve creating impediments to trade when more appropriate remedies are available. But it is an unsurprising consequence of high levels of interdependence that citizens of one country are trying to influence policy elsewhere since it affects the terms of competition and because, as fellow global citizens, they want to interfere.

Thus, as trade and foreign investment become interwoven, international trade negotiations increasingly move into other areas of national economic policy hitherto seen as of exclusively domestic concern. As governments face this mounting list of demands to change their national practices, they are in a bind: either they allow foreigners to negotiate over what Mrs. Thatcher called "the nooks and crannies of national life" or else tensions (or "systems frictions") build up between trading partners employing different rules and conventions.

Movement of People

One respect in which globalization was more advanced in earlier generations than today was in the acceptance of large numbers of migrant workers. The magnitude of intercontinental migration by the European "huddled masses" to the United States (or Canada, Australia, Argentina, Brazil) in the period from 1880 to 1913—an annual average of 600 thousand to 1.5 million people[16]—was argu-

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ably a far greater proportion of the population of host or originating countries than migration from poor to rich countries today. Countries that were major exporters of people in generations past—like China or India—no longer are (or are able to be). The decline in the importance of mass migration as a global phenomenon (except for—usually temporary—cross-border refugee movements) is even more striking when we consider that the potential for migration, as represented by the difference in living standards and life opportunities between rich and poor countries, is now so much greater than a century ago. Some argue that the differentials are so great that the market forces represented by migration will burst through the controls much as drugs already have. The smuggling of people from Mexico and China (and from Haiti and Central America) to the United States, the increase in "asylum seekers" in Germany, and the semi-official South Asian migration to Japan may suggest that strict control is difficult. The trend, however, is to strengthen restrictions, and this is reflected in international negotiations (NAFTA has been followed by a tightening, not a relaxation, of cross-border movement; the GATT services negotiations mostly excluded free trade in services that involve labor migration).

Controls over migration (to the extent that they are successful) could be said to represent a powerful brake by the nation-state on globalizing forces. Two important qualifications, however, need to be made. First, despite severe control, some migration has taken place, which has created, legally or illegally, significant and distinctive immigrant minorities in countries where they did not previously exist (Germany, Scandinavia, France, the Gulf states—even Japan) or changed the composition of countries which, while immigrant receiving, did not have today's ethnic diversity (Australia, Canada, the United States). Second, the restrictions apply overwhelmingly to the unskilled and unqualified; those with money or useful professional qualifications are much less restricted (moreover, business travel and international tourism have created opportunities for mobility among this group that are not widely shared). What Robert Reich calls the "symbolic analysts" or "elites" are part of a globalized, increasingly denationalized environment while their fellow citizens are cut off from it. This differential behavior is bound to have significance for the way nation-states are seen and function.

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Globalization and Global Policy Regimes

Globalization is largely private sector driven. It represents, therefore, a shift in the locus of decision-making not only from the nation-state to transnational actors but also from national governments to the private sector. For this reason, economic liberalization and globalization have often gone hand in hand, as with financial sector deregulation, foreign exchange decontrol, and freedom of trade.

There is, however, one factor pulling in the opposite direction. As the global system becomes more integrated, there is a demand for international public goods that neither markets nor nation-states will provide and (positive or negative) externalities that they cannot capture. These international public goods are roughly summarized as follows: systemic financial stability; the rule of law and dispute settlement needed for an open system of trade and investment; common standards for weights, measures, and interconnection; management of global communications networks like aviation, telecommunications, and sea-lanes to prevent congestion and disasters; management of environmental concerns like Autartica, the atmosphere, and oceans (and to stop cross-border pollution as with acid rain and sewage dumping in shared seas like the North Sea).[17]

All of these require some form of institutional development beyond the nation-state. Some of these activities are largely self-regulating, since the main commercial users have a collective interest in providing for the public good, as is the case with bond markets (International Securities Markets Association) and many industrial standards (the International Standards Organization [ISO]). In some cases, semiautonomous national constitutions provide the institutional cement (Central Banks in the Bank of International Settlements). In some cases, there is mixed public/private sector participation, as in the International Telecommunications Unions. But, mostly, there is sovereignty pooling by governments through new institutions (the EU; the World Meteorological Organization) and treaty obligations (the Antarctic Treaty; the Montreal Protocol). There is a complex but rich system of governance growing up to manage globalization (summarized in *Figure 1*). It is a moot point as to whether this aspect of globalization detracts from the sovereignty of nation-states or maintains (or enlarges) it.

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FIGURE 1. Recent Evolution of Global Regimes



Source: Vincent Cable.

THE NATION-STATE: WHAT IS LEFT?

Remaining Areas of Discretion

It is tempting to conclude that economic globalization has made the traditional nation-state redundant. The truth is much messier. This is partly because nation-states differ enormously in scale; in the United States, China, or India the narrowing of policy options as a result of global economic forces is much less obvious than in Holland or the Philippines, let alone in Tuvalu or Luxembourg. The messiness occurs also because there are some areas within which national governments retain substantial areas of discretion and others where they are pooling sovereignty to manage the globalization process. National economic sovereignty is being eroded, slowly and differentially, not eliminated.

The first and most obvious area of control, as noted above, is *inward migration.* In the EU, there has been a liberalization of internal migration to create a true Common Market but it has been

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matched by a commitment to clamp down on non-EU immigration. There has been a joint commitment that restrictions "should be maintained and where necessary strengthened." Despite some leakage through illegal entry and asylum seeking, there is little doubt that where governments resolve to curb immigration singly or (as in the EU) jointly, they can do so. The position in the United States is less clear because the political debate about the relative merits and demerits of immigration is unresolved, though the 1994 Congressional elections suggested that there is a powerful mood for tighter restrictions.

The significance of migration control in an increasingly interdependent world economy is that it provides governments in relatively high wage economies with one instrument to protect the real wages of some segments of native labor from external competition, particularly in nontraded services. It also protects their "identity." This is now becoming one of the most important residual functions of the nation-state, primarily of value to high income states (arguably, immigration controls are economically damaging to the restricting country, but we are concerned here with political perceptions).

Second, despite the general trend towards liberalization in *trade,* major areas remain where national trade policy action is still strong: where there are powerful coalitions of workers and national businesses, notably in agriculture, steel, and textiles; where there is active use of "anti-dumping" measures to restrict "unfair," "low cost" competition, a practice which appears to be growing in the United States and the EC despite some multilateral disciplines; and, under the banner of "strategic trade policy," where favored new industries are promoted through subsidies and government procurement. Also, the reemergence of crude trade bilateralism—as in the United States and Japan trade dispute—is another sign of the tenacity of mercantilist thinking and policy-making. After the desperate efforts required to bring the Uruguay Round to a conclusion, it would be heroically optimistic to say that globalization has displaced the mercantilist trade policy-making behavior of nation-states.

Even in the much more liberal environment of capital movements, the nation-state retains substantial areas of discretion. In some countries, inward investment is still very small and access difficult, most obviously in Japan, Korea, and India. Even in Ger-

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many and Switzerland, entry by takeovers is extremely difficult because of distinctive national systems of corporate governance. And even where governments cannot or do not wish to control capital flows directly, they can manipulate them indirectly: for example, in the case of direct investment through investment promotion and tax and incentive regimes.

Subsidiarity

The question of what nation-states can or should do in the face of globalizing influences has expressed itself in Europe in the form of a debate about "subsidiarity." The subsidiarity principle, which derives from old arguments about the scope of federalism at the time of the drafting of the United States Constitution, is that action should be taken at the lowest level at which it is efficient; in economists' terms, nation-states (or subnational units) should do those things which do not create "externalities" for their partners in economic integration, global or regional.

The problem is that the subsidiarity principle does not give clear-cut answers. Labor standards and social policy are preeminently national matters, but, increasingly, there is pressure to "globalize" these issues through harmonization in order to prevent what is seen as competitive undercutting. Tax should be a national or local matter, but where there is competition to attract investment through lower business and income tax rates, tax bases can be eroded. Public spending preferences should be a national or local matter, but they become international through public procurement involving tradable goods and services. Monetary policy is national, but one government's actions affect another's, and in Europe there is a growing recognition that, among neighbors at least, monetary independence is an expensive luxury.

Governments are increasingly under stress, facing demands for action by their citizens but externally constrained. The stress shows itself in two main ways. As nation-states gradually lose control over economic forces in some areas, they try to "nationalize" those activities they potentially can control. Thus, in trade policy, governments have been forced to accept the logic of tightening multilateral disciplines, but, as with the United States Super 301, politicians simultaneously strive to invent new ways of pushing national discretion to its limits. The Reagan and Thatcher administrations did

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much to open their respective economies to external influences by stripping away regulatory controls affecting capital movements and trade, but the Reagan administration fiercely resisted pressures from elsewhere in the Group of Seven (G7) to curb its budget deficit, and Mrs. Thatcher fought hard (with mixed success) against Britain being constrained in its economic policy by the EMS. There is, thus, an underlying tension and contradiction in the policies of most governments: embracing certain aspects of globalization and loss of sovereignty while resisting others in the name of the sovereignty of the nation-state.

The tension also appears in another way. Governments are under growing pressure to do more for their citizens to help them adjust to changes brought about in part by intensifying international competition: meeting the costs of structural unemployment and of educating the next generation to a higher level; creating higher standards of infrastructure and environment. To meet these costs, the state in most Western countries is generally taking a larger share of the GDP (after fifteen years of the Thatcherite "revolution" in Britain and the privatization of almost all nationalized industries and utilities, the government share of the GDP—40 percent—is actually larger than when it took over from a Socialist administration!). Yet the tax burden to support social safety nets is itself a determinant of competitiveness. One consequence of the mismatch between what governments are expected to provide and what the tax base can support is the emergence, almost everywhere, of structural public sector deficits. One of the remaining privileges of the nation-state is the scope it provides for independent fiscal policy and deficit financing, but even this activity is eventually circumscribed by international financial markets: which foreign investors are willing to lend and on what terms.

Equity and Distribution

One of the most crucial functions that nation-states still perform, and are expected by their electorates to perform, is maintaining a sense of "fairness" in the distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth (the mix of concerns varies from country to country). What makes the very open Nordic economies distinctive is their particular Scandinavian concern with egalitarianism. Fiscal policy—taxing

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and spending—is the main redistributive instrument of the nation-state. Globalization is, however, making the task more difficult.

The difficulty arises from two sources. First, some factors of production are mobile: capital wholly so, professional and skilled labor partly so. Since firms and investors will try to maximize their risk adjusted, post-tax rates of return on capital, countries that have abnormally high or low rates of business tax will lose or attract capital. The same applies to higher income personal tax rates. Consequently, there has been a convergence around lower corporate and higher band income tax rates in many countries. Governments are, then, forced back onto indirect taxes as a revenue source, which tends to be regressive in character.

The second difficulty, in rich countries, arises from the "factor price equalization" process whereby trade and/or migration between countries with different availability of labor can have the effect of pushing up the relative returns to capital and pushing down the relative returns to labor (particularly unskilled labor) in the (rich) country. This could partly explain the stagnation in real wages and the widening income inequality within the United States in the 1980s, though there is much controversy on this point.[18] This is in addition to those who suffer injury from international competition (the injury is often exaggerated but nonetheless real).

Governments may, therefore, be faced with great difficulty in meeting domestic expectations of "fairness." Some will try to deal with the problem by deflating expectations about governments' redistributative role (the Thatcher, Reagan approach). Others try to achieve redistributive objectives through some form of protectionist device (European agricultural policies is a classic example, but one which also highlights the expense and ultimate futility of such methods). A major challenge governments will face is how to maintain a domestic consensus on "fair" income distribution, when they seem to have declining room for maneuver because of external constraints.

THE POLITICAL REACTION TO ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

The changes represented by global economic integration have implications for domestic politics and the balance of forces within states. The most obvious consequence of globalization is that forces of

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international competition, and the mixture of opportunity and personal risk that they represent, affect a widening spectrum of the population. Not just steel and textile workers, but bank clerks, journalists, creative artists, shopkeepers, employees of public utilities, and doctors operate increasingly in a global as well as a local marketplace. This breaking down of established borders is, and always has been, part of the dynamics of capitalism. Anthony Giddens has described how it is the nature of the Western world to create new risks as a result of bringing communities into closer contact.[19] But these risk-generating linkages, and the associated insecurity, are occurring largely in a political vacuum caused by the decline of traditional "Left-Right" politics.

Global integration has specifically affected the positions of organized labor and the sense of working class solidarity, which have been the mainstay of left-wing parties in the developed world. Labor, unlike capital, is largely immobile. As Susan Strange puts it, "the reshuffling of the pack in the production structure has affected class relations more directly than it has affected international relations. . . .[T]he fact that a transnational company can move its plant. . .while a worker can not move to another country has robbed labour unions in industrialised countries of their power. . . ."[20] We have already noted that globalization may be squeezing the wages and job prospects of the more unskilled workers in rich countries in particular. At the same time, for the educated and moneyed section of the population, the opportunities presented by globalization—travel, wider experience, promotion—are great. We thus have one, potentially large, disadvantaged, alienated, and powerless element in society and another which is flourishing but has less of a stake in the success of any particular country.

Such tendencies might lead to a loss of authority of those who govern in the name of the nation-state. Jürgen Habermans writes of a double crisis, of "rationality," where the state cannot protect its citizens in ways they have been used to expect, and a crisis of "legitimation," where the state cannot any longer rely on the loyalty of its citizens.[21] Matthew Horsman and Andrew Marshall describe the consequences: "Fragmentation and integration have undercut traditional affiliations. . . .[T]hey are also weakening political elites, compromising their power to reallocate resources and to promote stability. . . .But atomization has not altogether destroyed the sense

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of allegiances citizens feel. . . .It has displaced it, shifting all previous to different levels. . .based on perceived commonalities of ethnic background, religion and language."[22] There is, thus, a chain of cause and effect which links economic globalizing forces to contemporary expressions of "tribalism" or "cultural identity."

A Politics of Identity

The preceding argument can be expressed in another way to suggest that what may be happening politically is not just a set of isolated, if interesting, events but is nothing less than the emergence of a new "organizing principle": a reorganization of political loyalties on a fundamentally different basis.[23]

For many societies, and certainly those of the Western world, the traditional political organizing principle has been a dichotomy between "Left" and "Right," reflecting different views about equality and class loyalties and about the respective roles of state versus private ownership and public versus private spending. These controversies have not disappeared, but they have lost much of their intensity. The collapse of communism and, more generally, the intellectual retreat of socialism have greatly narrowed the area of debate. As a consequence, old parties of the "Right" or "Left" have been swept away (Italy, Canada) or, more commonly, have retained their outward form but adopted policy positions that are scarcely distinguishable from their rivals (the shift of French, Spanish, British, and Brazilian Socialists to "social democracy" and the switch of Italian, Polish, and Hungarian Communists to moderate reformism) or, in some cases (Australia, New Zealand, Argentina), are ever more zealously market oriented than the "right-wing" parties.

At the same time, powerful new parties and movements within parties have emerged or reemerged almost everywhere asserting some form of cultural identity. The specific focus may be different: language (Canada, Belgium, Spain, India, Hungary, and the former Soviet Union); religion (Algeria, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Palestine, India again, Nigeria, the "Christian coalition" in the United States, Ireland, and confessional nationalism in the former Yugoslavia); race (the National Front in France, South Africa, Malaysia, Rwanda); caste (India); or other forms of "regional" identity cutting across nation-states (Scotland, Lombardy). These can be treated as a pastiche of different political phenomena or, alternatively, as represent-

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ing one pole of a new type of political dialectic. One extreme is the expression, politically, of a unique, exclusive identity; the other is a more liberal, eclectic, inclusive approach, characterized above all by what can be described as an emerging sense of "multiple identity" within which people (and parties) reconcile the various claims on them in the increasingly complex, blurred world of globalization. (See *Figure 2.*)

FIGURE 2. The Role of Identity in Politics



Source: Vincent Cable, *The World's New Fissures: Identities in Crisis,* Demos Paper No. 6 (London: Demos, 1994).

Where the politics of identity is powerful, it has redefined the political agenda (*Figure 3*). Many of the new concerns center on the role of the nation-state and national identity in terms of responses to globalization. In France there is some restrained Left-Right argu-

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ment about privatization, inequality, and labor rights, but much greater passion has been generated by the Maastricht Treaty, GATT, and immigration. The politics of the United States is heavily influenced by nationalism (in relation to trade and migration) and by religion. There is no strong correlation with traditional "Left-Right" divisions. Protectionism is being advocated by the democratic "Left" and the republican "Right" and by Perot supporters who do not match the old classification at all. The interweaving of issues is obviously complex, but the changing nature of domestic politics is focusing attention onto the question, "what are nation-states for?" and what do they do in a world where governments face considerable external constraints on their freedom of action? Ironically, one of the answers to the apparent weakening of the economic sovereignty of nation-states may be a reassertion of economic nationalism in new forms.

FIGURE 3. The Political Agendas



Source: Vincent Cable, *The World's New Fissures: Identities in Crisis,* Demos Paper No. 6 (London: Demos, 1994).

New Forms of Nationalism

Nation-states are under pressure from within and from without. Yet, except in a few rather special cases (the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—all formerly communist dictatorships, and the first two empires) the nation-state is still with us and seems likely to be around for a while. Even such improbable conglomerations as India, Indonesia, Canada, and Nigeria manage to

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hang together. Central to their survival will be the ability to carve out a role that is compatible with both the forces of global economic integration and the internal strains created by the politics of identity. This means emphasizing what Anthony Smith calls the "Western" model of nationalism based on common laws and institutions, a mass civic culture and territory as against "Eastern," ethically based nationalism.[24] Various survival strategies are apparent.

Defensive Nationalism. The behavior of the French-Balladur administration in relation to the GATT was more than just a defense of influential vested interests—the farmers and the media. It was a strong reassertion of French identity. The defense by the Japanese and the Koreans of their rice economy had similar inspiration and effect. India has a growing *swadeshi* (self-reliance) movement organized by the "right-wing" Hindu opposition BJP, as well as nervous Indian businessmen fearful that competition means being bought out by foreigners. Even leaders with strong liberal credentials—Salinas in Mexico or Yeltsin in Russia—have dug in their heels to protect what is seen as the "national patrimony," represented, for example, by the energy sector.

However, defensive nationalism is not, in itself, an adequate strategy. If it is taken too seriously there is the risk of isolating the country from the mainstream of globalization or creating unsustainable demands for protection and budgetary support from uncompetitive sectors (the Burmese or Ukrainian road to ruin). If, on the other hand, it is merely symbolic and ineffective, the state will have undermined its own credibility (the Slovakian "divorce" was premised on a belief in the potential for defensive economic nationalism that has not been achievable, seriously eroding the legitimacy and cohesion of the new state).

"Positive Nationalism." The idea of "positive nationalism" essentially tries to recast in modern idiom the old mercantilist philosophy that imports (goods, capital, people) are bad, but exports are good. The postwar experiences of Japan and Korea have lent some credibility to the idea that it is possible to be mercantilist in an outward looking and economically successful way; that globalization can be controlled by "national" companies for national ends; and that wise governments can steer resources to enhance long-term growth. Some of this thinking is prevalent in many countries (the

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"Korean model" is frequently cited as an example in many developing countries, Japan in the rich world). There are also elements in the United States: the belief in "strategic trade policy" and the use of unilateral trade measures to pressure trading partners into making market opening concessions. The idea of a head-to-head confrontation between the United States, Japan, and the EU fits comfortably with this view of the world.[25]

"Positive nationalism" has, however, several fundamental weaknesses in an era of globalization. First, it presupposes that it is possible to define economic activity in national interest terms, when in reality growing numbers of companies are operating as global firms and consumers do not have the same interests as favored producers. Second, it assumes that governments are good at being "positive," when experience shows that bureaucratic and political imperatives often prevail. Third, treating global economic activity essentially as a zero-sum game can lead both to interstate friction and to a neglect of global rules without which globalization cannot work effectively.

The "Competing Nation." A subtly different version of "positive nationalism" recognizes that capital is mobile, that companies are increasingly global, that governments have little talent for "picking winners," and that competition occurs, essentially, between companies rather than countries. Nonetheless, a sense of national economic purpose can be created around the idea of "competitiveness": creating a pool of highly educated and flexible workers, an efficient infrastructure, sound money, and a good quality of life. Such a "competing nation" is then well placed to operate as an open economy, attracting mobile financial and human capital. At the same time, some areas of discretion are still open to governments—migration control for example. This is the "Singapore model," now being intentionally or unconsciously adopted by large numbers of small states, others which are not so small (Britain is a major country trying to position itself to be as attractive as possible to foreign investors), and some of the reforming economies of Eastern Europe, like Hungary and Czechia.

A difficult balancing act for governments following this paradigm is to generate a strong sense of national cohesion and purpose while operating within the constraints of global (or regional) rules

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and accepting the verdict of global markets. There is a twofold response to this dilemma. One is symbolic nationalism, squeezing maximum political advantage from events that have a patriotic appeal but do not interfere with a strategy of openness: fighting the Argentines; flogging American teenagers; sporting prowess. The second response is an insistence on "subsidiarity": not countenancing encroachments on sovereignty (especially those that affect "competitiveness") that go beyond what is strictly necessary for efficient integration (e.g., Britain and the European "Social Charter"). But this approach requires a sensitivity and an ability to respond to external pressures that owes much to country size and traditions.

Federalism. Another approach for small and medium-sized countries is to try to recreate a sense of national identity and cohesion through larger units. The Zollverein, the German customs union, which formed the economic platform for the German nation-state, has been seen, at least by some Europeans, as a role model for the future EU. Certainly for European "federalists," the goal of a United States of Europe has been a guiding vision. It is also progressively being realized, the Maastricht Treaty being the latest step. The vision is one which subsumes the antagonistic nationalism of old, not so much in global disciplines but in a kind of supernational state.

It is possible in the very long term to envisage a world of large entities, "supernations"—the United States, the EU, Russia, Greater China, India, Brazil—which capture many of the economies of scale and scope that globalization offers and manage to create an overarching sense of "national" identity to encompass many nationalisms within a federal structure. One problem, however, is that even the largest nation-states are having to respond to globalization by opening their economies to trade and foreign investment (as China, Russia, and India are all doing) or by building yet bigger structures (the United States and NAFTA; a recreated Soviet Union). And, as the EU is discovering through its enlargement, the bigger the structure the smaller the sense of identity: hence the "deepening" versus "widening" debate. There is, moreover, a danger of regional "blocs" becoming a platform for new forms of exclusive nationalism, which undermine globalization and lay the basis for conflict. The Zollverein is not an altogether cheering precedent in this regard.

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Another, and perhaps complementary, development is the growth of subnational identities within federal structures. Many of the roles of the "competing nation"—facilitating capital inflows; setting tax and public expenditure priorities—can be dealt with at the level of Wales rather than Britain, California rather than the United States, Quebec rather than Canada. Indeed, the move to larger units gives the new "nationalisms"—of Scotland, the Italian and Spanish regions, Flanders, and Wallonia—space to operate within a loose European federal structure (which is why Scottish Nationalists and the Lombard Lega favor the vision of EU federation). In China, much economic decision-making is now devolved at the level of the province and city. In India, central government is delegating a wider range of investment promotion, regulatory, and fiscal powers to the states. The new South African government has transferred much of its economic decision-making role to regional assemblies. The latest Brazilian constitution is highly federalist. In these cases, there is a recognition that multilayered forms of identity and responsibility have to be created around (above and below) the nation-state.

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of globalization has led to a reduction of the room for maneuver of national governments in a growing number of fields (but not all). This cannot but have political implications. As Martin Wolf points out in a recent article, globalization, in the form of freer commerce, undermines the collectivist values represented by the state to the benefit of the freedom of individual residents.[26] The erosion of these values will undermine the cohesion of nation-states as national identities: long understood as one of the justifications for mercantilist ideas.[27] In the face of domestic political forces that assert alternative claims of "identity," national governments face the difficult task of retaining and asserting enough sense of shared nationhood to maintain their underlying legitimacy while adjusting to a world in which the role of government in national states is becoming increasingly circumscribed.

One response is the idea of "competing nations," whereby governments recognize that it is companies, rather than they, which compete, but retain some influence in economic decisions: attracting mobile capital; raising the education level of the home popula-

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tion; ensuring financial stability; trying to improve the physical and cultural environment; creating a sense of civic "fairness."

But if the national responses of the "competing nations" are to be made compatible with international economic integration, there has to be supranational law and order. History has taught us that much of what we regard as the inexorable advance of globalization is, in fact, fragile and reversible. Without strong global (and regional) rules it can be rolled back.

There are currently global rules and institutions but they are not strong. The GATT (and its successor, the World Trade Organization) rests overwhelmingly on consent. Free trade has not so far proved easily enforceable. The International Monetary Fund has little influence over the economic policies of major governments even when their behavior affects other nation-states. Many international economic rules rest on informal understandings: the Bank of Settlements agreement on bank capital adequacy; the "gentlemen's agreement" on trade credit; the OECD code on investment and multinational corporations; the General Agreement to Borrow; ISO standards. Global economic governance—the cooperative structures within which nation-states have to operate in a globalized economy—hangs somewhat precariously by these threads of common understanding. If they snap, we could see the resurrection rather than the death of the nation-state.

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Technological breakthroughs in interdisciplinary social research, computer hardware, and audiovisual communication will have increasing impacts on the modern state in the next twenty years. The American example will certainly be followed by the other developed nations; this trend, in fact, is already evident. Germany, Scandinavia, France, and England and the Commonwealth are ten to fifteen years behind the United States in applied social research. As with other aspects of technology, it is reasonable to assume that the comparative American advantage will be eliminated in areas where capital investment requirements do not exceed funding capacities and where appropriate expertise is available.

The rapid five-year generational changes in computing and communications technology should help accelerate the use of social research technology to produce information for government. Computers will become sufficiently cheap and compact for application in most social research operations. The netting together of cheap, interactive TV sets, computers, desk consoles, and pocket terminals into enormous, decentralized data banks and high-speed central processors is probably only a decade away. Social scientists then will no longer be able to excuse themselves from doing quantitative empirical work by complaining of the costs of large data samples and statistical analyses.

Clark C. Abt

From "Social Science Research and the Modern State"
Dædalus 108 (4) (Fall 1979)

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Susan Strange

The Defective State

THE ARGUMENT TO BE DEVELOPED in this essay is based on three simple propositions. Perhaps the most important is that the nature of the competition between states in the international system has fundamentally changed. The second proposition is largely consequential: as the form of competition between states has changed, so have their nature and their behavior towards one another. The third proposition, which is hardly new or original, is that authority over society and economy is undergoing another period of diffusion, after two or three centuries in which it became increasingly centralized in the institution of the state. The three propositions together suggest two quite important conclusions. One, based on tacit premises about the state as the most important unit of analysis, is that much of Western social science is obsolescent, if not yet quite out-of-date. The second—the good news—is that the three propositions may offer the basis for a Cartesian synthesis of opposed paradigms in international studies, a synthesis which could resolve, at long last, a jejune dialogue of the deaf between apparently incompatible schools of thought about international relations that has bedeviled academic discussion—and puzzled a great many students—for most of the latter half of the twentieth century.

When I say that the nature of the competition between states has fundamentally changed, I mean that in the past states competed for control over territory and the wealth-creating resources within territories, whether natural or man-created. Now they are increasingly competing for market shares in the world economy. In this compe-

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tition, territory is no longer the main basis for wealth-creation, no more than the amount of land in cultivation determines the value-added output of an agricultural enterprise. Resources—water, minerals, forests, etc.—may be an asset in the competition for market shares, just as the lack of them may be a constraint and a handicap. But they, too, are no longer the major determinant of success in the competition between states. Indeed, there are states, like Australia or Argentina, richly endowed with land and natural resources, which have often been far slower than resource-poor states, like South Korea, to win market shares in products or services where high value-added output offers better profit margins.

And when I say that as a direct consequence of this largely economic competition, the nature of states and their behavior has changed, I mean that industrial policy and trade policy are becoming more important than defense and foreign policy. States are obliged by structural change to seek commercial allies rather than military ones. Some of these allies will be other states, as in regional economic associations.[1] Others will be foreign-owned firms. And the agendas for interstate discussion and bargaining are also changing, as are the issues arising in domestic politics.

The third proposition needs less explanation. The concept of the "new medievalism"[2] has been around for some years now; there is a developing consensus that the state is coming to share authority in economy and society with other entities. These include, in my interpretation, not only transnational companies (TNCs), including banks, accounting and law firms, and international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or Inmarsat, but also non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International or the Olympic sports organization and transnational professional associations of doctors, economists, and scientists. Within the state the authority of central government is, perforce, increasingly shared with local and regional authorities. The proposition, in short, is that state authority has leaked away, upwards, sideways, and downwards. In some matters, it seems even to have gone nowhere, just evaporated. The realm of anarchy in society and economy has become more extensive as that of all kinds of authority has diminished.

As to the two tentative conclusions, the study of economics, sociology, and politics or government continues for the most part to take the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Either the social scien-

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tist studies and analyzes political, social, or economic issues within a specific state, or he is content to make comparative studies of two or more national societies, economies, or systems of government in blithe disregard of the common structural forces at work in the global political economy.

I am not arguing that states themselves are obsolete. Collectively they are still the most influential and therefore critical sources of authority in the world system. But they are increasingly becoming hollow, or defective, institutions. To outward appearances unchanged, the inner core of their authority in society and over economic transactions within their defined territorial borders is seriously impaired. They are like old trees, hollow in the middle, showing signs of weakness and vulnerability to storm, drought, or disease, yet continuing to grow leaves, new shoots, and branches. Some are clearly more defective in terms of their ability to play their roles in society, further advanced in decrepitude, than others. But the structural forces bringing about the hollowing of state authority are common to all, and it is hard to envisage a reversal of the trends.

Finally, the jejune dialogue, which I hope my three propositions might resolve, will be familiar to anyone who in the last twenty or thirty years has been engaged in studying and teaching international relations. But not, perhaps, to others. Actually, it is a very old debate, not only between the realists and idealists, but a triangular one in which both are contested by the radicals or structuralists, whether Marxist or Gramscian. But from the late 1930s until perhaps the 1960s the old debate was eclipsed as World War II and then the Cold War gave the field to the realists, the analysts of power politics. They despair of changing an international political system based on territorially defined authorities (states) which claim sovereignty and independence from others. They use research and argument to enable states—usually their own—to cope better with the system and to survive in it. Idealists, by contrast, use research and argument to change the system, to reduce conflict and foster cooperation between states and by these means gradually to transform the system. They are variously labeled pluralists, liberal internationalists, neofunctionalists. Basically, they are reformers. The radicals, favoring radical structural change of social and economic relations, regard the interstate political system as one facet of an unjust structure of power. Although critical of the status quo, they

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are less certain now than ever of how to engineer the kind of change they would like. The threeway dialogue is barren, jejune, and unproductive because the three paradigms have no common basis for debate. A great many students, consequently, have been presented with three different *a la carte* menus and left to puzzle out for themselves whether and how a sensible synthesis between the three is possible.

THE COMPETITION BETWEEN STATES

The starting point for this proposition is science and technology—an aspect of human relations often taken for granted by both economists and political scientists. Our common sense will confirm that since the Enlightenment the pace of scientific advance and technological change has steadily accelerated. It is continuing to do so. There is every reason to expect that the future will see an even faster rate of change. The nature of telecommunication technology is one very obvious example. No man or woman under the age of thirty would recognize the technically unsophisticated world of the 1960s or even the 1970s—no fax, no personal computers, no mobile phones, no video shops, no DNA tests, no cable television, no satellite communication networks.

Advances in science and technology have involved increased capital costs—in the research and development of new products and processes, and then in the installation of the means to deliver them to the market. The added capital needed for investment, combined with the shortening of the product (or process) life in the market, meant that in business after business the sales that could be made in the national economy, within the territorial borders of the state, were not enough to amortize the capital debt (in whatever form) before the product or process was overtaken by technological change. This was true even of large national markets; even more so of small and developing ones. Sweden is an example of a small economy whose firms (i.e., Asea, SKF, and Alfa-Laval) realized early on that their only hope of survival lay in the wider world market. South Korea is an example of a developing economy that is too small—even with a highly protected home market—to absorb the output, based on economies of scale, of shipyards or car or shoe factories using up-to-date technology.

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Thus, accelerating technological change, not (as economists have blindly argued) any internal preference within firms for reducing transaction costs, explains the rapid internationalization of production in the world market economy, a process which, inevitably, relaxes the authority of the state over the enterprises based and directed from inside their territorial borders. This "globalization" is more than the rise of multinationals, so-called. They have been around for a long time. Rather, what has changed is that products and processes mostly designed and developed for national markets are now mostly designed and developed for a multinational market—for the reasons just given. It is the markets, not the enterprises, that are multinational. This is not inconsistent with the fact that in some sectors firms need to use new technologies to adapt their products or services to local conditions.

The statistics are impressive—35,000 large TNCs with 150,000 affiliates, a total stock of foreign investment worth some $1,700 billion[3]—but they are only the roughest indicators of what has been happening. Firms may derive the bulk of their profits from foreign sales without ever setting up production abroad. The growth is faster among the uncounted small, specialist enterprises than among giant corporations and conglomerates. Licensing and franchising, which only rarely involve any transfer of funds, are the growth areas in international production.

And the political consequences are even more important. The break involved when a firm goes into foreign markets is the symbiotic one between national government and national enterprise. Once the firm has many political masters instead of one, and once it senses that it has to appear a "good citizen" of host states other than its state of origin, it becomes engaged in a political juggling act, negotiating with ministries, labor organizers, and suppliers and distributors in several countries at once. Governments, for their part, have become acutely aware that they are competing, as rival suitors, for the favors of foreign firms. These firms often have attractive assets that native ones lack. They may have command of better technology and therefore are more likely to gain and keep market shares—and also to give employment to local citizens. They may have better access to capital, and they may have established distribution systems giving them instant access to foreign customers—and therefore to foreign exchange if they will set up a local

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production plant. The Chrysler Corporation's worldwide distribution system was the one clinching factor that in the 1960s led Mitsubishi to agree—despite past official policy—to allow at least some American cars and parts into the Japanese market. The result of competition between states is an ongoing process of state/firm bargaining in which governments may often offer greater inducements, waive more rules and demands, to a foreign firm to enter its territory than it will to a native one to stay. The native firm, finding its market share eaten away by foreign competition, may scream for protection. But there is evidence, from the 1930s, 1970s, and 1990s, that the response of home states is often cosmetic, if only because there are other interests in more competition and cheaper products that will cancel out the protectionist lobby.[4]

The offers from governments in newly industrializing countries (NICs) are likely to be more generous and seductive than those from governments of developed countries. First, the NICs are hungrier for the capital, technology, and market access that TNCs command than are the industrialized countries. In addition, their rate of growth, of market expansion, is apt to be at least twice that of the industrialized countries; typically, it will be 6 or 7 percent, as opposed to at most 3 or 4 percent in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Second, the competition among host states—including the home state of any firm—is apt to have an eroding effect on two important sources of state authority: the power to tax and the power to regulate markets, including labor and financial markets.

In order to show how the nature of interstate competition can alter the use of state power and the behavior of states towards each other, we must contrast the present kind of competition with that which for centuries—millennia even—characterized the interstate system.[5] The fact that there are differences between neighboring societies in culture, social institutions, religion, folk memories, and traditions is enough to account for the pursuit and defense of autonomy. The wish is almost universally shared to maintain those differences. But that cannot be achieved without government. And government does not come for free. Rulers, whoever they are, demand payment. They require command over the means of coercive force for internal and external purposes. Internally, they need coercive force to maintain against potential rivals the privileges and perquisites that go with government. Externally, they need coercive

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forces to deter or repel threats from other states to their autonomy. Shakespeare's *Henry V* is a vivid demonstration of the two needs: after the long civil War of the Roses, the king needs military command to charge and eliminate suspected rivals—those he brands as "traitors." Only then can he safely set out to use the same military power to acquire a larger realm—more land to tax—across the English channel.

The main source of revenue that has allowed government to maintain command of coercive force has, for most of human history, been farming. Conquest of neighboring lands offered one means of increasing revenue. The larger the territory of the state, the more peasant labor was available to work the land. Marriage, if custom required the bride to bring a dowry of valuables and of land, was another. (Henry V found both new land *and* a new bride in France). Commerce could also be taxed as a supplement to the resources of the government. In North Africa in the fourteenth century, the political economist Ibn Khaldun discovered that when the gold traders changed their route and that supplementary source of revenue dried up, the local rulers encountered resistance from the peasants if they taxed them too hard. A rapid turnover of rulers resulted because the revenue from land was insufficient to give the rulers command of enough military power to quell potential rebels.[6]

To reiterate, the wish for autonomy from others gives rise to the multiplicity of states. Military power under the control of government is a means to that end. It is also necessary to keep control over the institutions of government and to maintain a monopoly of the privileges and perquisites of government. When there is competition for both control and privilege, there is conflict, as we can see from the conflicts in the former Soviet Union since 1989, and in Rwanda, Vietnam, Somalia, and many other places. Thus, it seems likely that civil conflict is becoming a greater threat to personal security than is interstate conflict. The affluent states are aware that their affluence depends on a continued world market share rather than a command of territory or resources. War could destroy that source of affluence, so they now show every sign of regarding a major war between themselves as unthinkable, and not only because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons.[7] It is only a few states—like Iraq and Iran—with highly authoritarian, repressive governments who are, for the time being, immune to the moderating influence of

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a middle class with material aspirations, and whose rulers can disregard the imbalance of costs and benefits in going to war.

Yet, the affluent states (i.e., the United States, Britain, France, and Germany) continue to spend vast sums on maintaining their military capabilities. Part of the explanation comes from the military-industrial complex. This was perceived more than thirty years ago by President Eisenhower, and in the meantime has become ever more firmly entrenched in the US economy. But part also comes from the very nature of the new game of competition between states. State support for firms in defense industries, by means of government contracts, can hope to gain market shares both for the firms and for the state, and not only in the markets for arms but also in world markets for civilian goods and services which benefit from the same technology. The rationale for this rather expensive acquisition of market shares is found in popular uncertainty as to whether major war between advanced industrial societies really is obsolete. Only time will still such doubts; as long as they remain, defense ministries will command government revenues and defense industries will be protected and maintained.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

For the nature of an individual state to change very radically is neither new nor unusual. The French Republic after the Revolution, the Empire after the Terror, were both radically different in their ideologies, institutions, and strategic objectives from the French state under the Bourbons. The federal government of the United States underwent almost as radical a transformation during World War II, when it became, temporarily, manager of a largely state-planned and substantially state-owned economy.[8] War, revolution, demographic change, great enrichment or sudden impoverishment, inflation or depression, even climatic or ecological change can account for profound political change.

But that all—or nearly all—states should undergo substantial changes of roughly the same kind within the same short period of time is really a new phenomenon. Even the last big change in Europe, from states based on a feudal system of agricultural production to states based on a capitalist system of industrial production, was spread over two or three centuries. It did not take place

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as quickly or as evenly as the changes recently experienced by the vast majority of states over the last twenty or so years.

The reasons suggested here—the accelerating rate of scientific discovery and technological change; the shift from land, labor, and capital (in that order of importance) as the key factors of production to capital, information, and energy; and the shift from production for local and national markets to worldwide markets—were structural changes. No national society that experienced economic growth and development remained insulated from these changes. Only the least developed of the poor countries (mostly in Africa) experienced few of these changes. Even the states with planned economies, which are now in the process of joining the world market economy, shared the same experiences.

Just how these structural changes have undermined the authority and ultimately, I believe, the legitimacy of the state can be summarized in three major hypotheses, and one minor one. The first major hypothesis is that there has been a great increase in the asymmetries of state authority. In other words, while the US government may have suffered some loss of authority, the loss has been to the markets, not to other states; whereas, for other states, their vulnerability not only to the forces of world markets but also to the greater global reach of US authority has markedly increased.

The second hypothesis is that some authority over less politically sensitive issues has shifted from national states to international authorities of various kinds, both interstate institutions and private and commercial organizations. There has been, one could say, an "upward" shift of authority as well as the first "sideways" one. The minor hypothesis—not so universally experienced—is that there has been in many states a "downward" shift of authority, from central authority to local and regional authority. And the third major hypothesis is that, as a result mainly of the integration of the world economy, in finance, transport, and communication, as well as production, there are some important responsibilities of political authority that no one in a system of territorially defined states is in a position fully to discharge.

If each of these is taken in turn, it becomes apparent that the nature of all states has changed as a result of commonly experienced structural changes. The hypothesis of increased asymmetric power is one which academic opinion in the United States has

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found most difficult to accept. Indeed, it has been nearly twenty years since American social scientists began to complain of a loss of American power in the world. And it has been only in the last three or four years that the still widespread belief in American decline has been challenged and questioned.[9] Outside the United States, where the global reach of US political decisionmakers was often palpable and painful, perceptions have always been very different, even though some academic writers followed the American intellectual way of thinking. It is the toads beneath the harrow who are bruised by its passage.

ASYMMETRIES OF STRUCTURAL POWER

The study of international relations has not helped on this issue. Concerned with relations between states, it naturally tended to think of power *in relations*—what I would call relational power—and in the balance of power between states, not between states and other political authorities on the one hand and markets and society on the other. Except among Marxists and *dependistas*, the idea of power exercised over both markets and social relations through structures, by influence over the way decisions are made, agendas are set, and transactions and negotiations are conducted, has not taken hold. Yet, only by looking at the structural power exercised—often unconsciously—over other states, markets, private individuals, and firms by the agencies of the United States can the extent of the asymmetries of state power be appreciated.

The difference can best be illustrated by some simple examples: two from international politics and two from world markets. In the Gulf War, the key decisions on when and how to attack Iraq were made by the US government and were backed and implemented by its former Cold War allies as a consequence of the relational power exercised in a series of bilateral relations. In Yugoslavia the fundamental imbalance of military force between the Serbs and the Bosnians was indirectly the result of two ways in which the United States exercised its structural power in matters of security. First, as part of its Cold War strategy it had supplied arms to the former Yugoslav government, making that army the second largest in Europe. Second, the United States used its influence with other allied governments to institute and maintain an arms embargo against the Bosnians.

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Without leadership from Washington, it is doubtful whether this unevenhanded treatment of the civil conflict would have persisted for so long. True, the divided opinions and policies of the Europeans prevented them from taking any concerted stand on this matter, as on others, and for this inaction and indecision they are much to blame. But as the superpower on whose protection the other affluent allies have so long depended, the United States' influence in matters of security is hard to resist.

Moreover, what Anthony Sampson once called the "arms bazaar," the private trade by manufacturers, dealers, and governments in weapons of great technical sophistication and destructive power, is a major feature of the global security structure. It could hardly have developed to the extent it has without the tacit consent of the United States, whose taxpayers and manufacturers have a vested interest in expanding marginal sales. And this lethal trade, as portrayed in John Le Carre's *The Night Manager* and many other current bestsellers, clearly reflects at the global level the prevailing American attitude that guns are just another consumer good to be sold freely on the market.

The oil market is another example of a world market that is much influenced by political decisions made by the United States. The oil market was effectively liberated by the US government in the 1950s from liability to normal corporate taxation. The result has been that throughout the world states have given extraordinarily free financial rein to the oil majors. Only after the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in Alaska did the US government, through the courts, demand more accountability in the conduct of the oil business—an example which other states have not been slow to follow. Altogether, the business civilization that now prevails throughout the world for the decisionmakers in government and in business is one shaped by and modeled on the business civilization of America.[10]

My last example is taken from what I describe as the knowledge structure—the power structure in which choices are made about what knowledge is acquired, stored, and disseminated, and to whom. Here, there can be little doubt that power lies with American universities and American professional associations. The number of foreign students enrolled in US colleges and universities compared with those enrolled in European or Japanese universities is an indication of the American dominance of the world market in

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higher education. The influence of US laws on patents and property rights in medicine and pharmaceutical research throughout the world similarly demonstrates a structural power that directly affects the life chances—good or bad—of millions of people.

In the financial structure, there has been much discussion recently of the tremendous growth in trade in futures, options, swaps, and other so-called "derivatives." The chief officials of the Federal Reserve, the US Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange Commission have all denied Congressional misgivings. There was no danger to the system and no need to tax, restrict, or control the practice, they said. Given the integration of financial markets worldwide and the transnational competition of banks and other players in the market, no other state can reverse the deregulatory trend. It was clearly set by US decisions in the mid-1970s, and competition has ensured that it has gathered speed. Any attempt at national regulation outside the United States would only move the business offshore.

There are many other ways to illustrate the consequences of structural power on the unequal ability of national governments first to develop different perceptions of how a market economy should be managed and then to devise national policies and measures to implement those perceptions.[11] For example, while the United States has the power to put pressure on Taiwan to revalue its currency or even to improve its protection of native wildlife, Taiwan has no countervailing power over US monetary or environmental policies. Sometimes, as with the US pressure on China over human rights, there are seen to be limits to the global reach. But the fact of increased asymmetry among sovereign states is undeniable.

This means that the notion of the sovereignty of the state in matters of domestic jurisdiction—though enshrined in ARTICLE 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter—has become even more of a fiction than it was in 1945. The concept of the equality of states before the law was always a convenient legal fig leaf for the realities of power. Even in 1948, in a now-forgotten case before the United Nations, the law was powerless to prevent the Indian invasion and occupation of the state of Hyderabad. Forty years later, no one seriously queried the legal propriety of the US hijacking of Noriega in the "sovereign" state of Panama. Now that the United States has largely succeeded in creating an open world economy in its own liberal

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image, and patterned according to its own value preferences and judgments, the fig leaf of equal sovereignty even before the law has become more flimsy than ever.

THE DIFFUSION OF AUTHORITY

If I have dealt at some length with my first hypothesis, the increased asymmetry of structural authority in the world society and the world economy, it is because this is the one given the least recognition in the literature either of comparative political science or of international relations. No less important are the other two hypotheses: that authority has shifted from states as a collectivity of political authority both upward and downward; and that in these various modifications of the conventional model in which territory, state authority, and economy are coterminous, some authority formerly exercised by states is not really being exercised by any political authority.

Let us take first the shift of authority away from states as a collectivity of established, legitimate authorities to other sources of power. These include intergovernmental organizations like the IMF or the Commission of the European Union, and also nongovernmental organizations like Amnesty International, Médecins sans Frontières, the Save the Children Fund, or Greenpeace. They also include the growing number of TNCs engaged in the manufacture or processing of traded goods and the service enterprises such as law, accounting, and consulting firms, and the financial operators associated with them but playing a somewhat different role.

About the "upward" diffusion of authority to international organizations, both intergovernmental and nongovernmental, I have little to say. Not because it is an unimportant part of the picture but because it has been more fully explored elsewhere. There is little need to labor the point that the authority of the state is, increasingly, being either shared with, sustained by, or constrained by these proliferating authorities.

The same, I believe, is true of the "downward" diffusion of the authority of the central institutions of many states to local or regional authorities. There is hardly a federal state, with the possible exception of Switzerland (where the decentralization of power from Bern to the cantons has always been jealously guarded and

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maintained), that is not experiencing some tension between federal and state authority. Again, this is a development on which others may have a more informed view than I, and on which the evidence is rather scattered and stochastic. Therefore, I shall not have more to say on this point than that the nature of devolution within states calls for more comparative research and structural analysis.

More controversial and perhaps more important is the diffusion of authority from states as collectivities of authority based on territorial control to transnational enterprises and associations based on other sources of power. If one is heard saying that TNCs have power in the international political economy, it is often misinterpreted as meaning that the "multinational" firm has somehow usurped the role of the state—sovereignty-at-bay, footloose multinationals and all that—so that governments are mere pawns in the hands of corporate managers. That is an old and sterile debate from the 1970s, based on the notion that the authority of national government and the authority of corporate management are similar and somehow transferable from one to the other.

My hypothesis is different and goes back to the sources of structural power in society and economy. The shift I am concerned with is between the sources of structural power, not a change of hands on the levers of that power. It was explained and rather extensively illustrated in *Rival States, Rival Firms, Competition for World Market Shares,*[12] a book I wrote with John Stopford, Professor of International Business at the London Business School. We argued that the U-turns we observed in so many developing countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s from protected home markets, state ownership, and import substitution to liberalization, privatization, and export promotion, and from antipathetic exclusion or restriction of the operations of foreign firms to an altogether more welcoming and accommodating posture, were no accident.[13] All these changes came about through the control exercised by those foreign firms over the means to the end of earning foreign exchange which governments desperately needed and were unable to achieve any other way than by negotiation and bargaining with the foreign firms. This "new diplomacy," as we termed it, was based on the bargaining power exercised by the firms and derived from three assets coveted by states. Perhaps the most important asset was the access to foreign markets and customers which it would take inex-

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perienced domestic firms years of effort and large investments to acquire for themselves. The other obvious asset was mastery of up-to-date technology, which experience had shown was not easily transferred to less-developed countries (LDCs) by edict of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the United Nations. In addition, there was access to the financial resources made available in global financial markets. Especially in the 1980s, the limited access of indebted LDC governments had been demonstrated in the most painful way. But General Motors or Matsushita or Asea Brown Boveri had no such problems. Banks would lend to them, securitize their promises to pay, or underwrite their shares or bond issues. They were creditworthy in the eyes of the market as governments of many developing countries were not.[14]

To understand the nature of the shift it is necessary to look beyond the new diplomacy of state/firm bargaining to the increase in the political, as opposed to the purely economic, activities and responsibilities of transnational enterprises. I will mention just two such responsibilities: the responsibility for the location of production; and the assumption of judicial and welfare responsibilities within the community. When a transnational firm, German or Japanese, let us say, decides to shift production offshore to Latin America or to the Asian mainland, the political management of the consequences is not a matter for the state but for the firm. And the consequences of thousands of such shifts, as Deanne Julius has predicted, will be a major transfer of manufacturing capacity from the "developed" economies of America, Europe, and Japan to what used to be known as LDCs. Firms, responding to markets, effect more change in less time in the distribution of wealth in the global economy than all the international organizations and bilateral aid programs have done in nearly half a century. Firms are also—and this is one important consequence of the "Japanese miracle"—assuming a much greater political role in the provision of welfare. Not only are the pensions, bonuses, and fringe benefits provided by firms for their employees much more important in many cases than anything the state provides, but more "progressive" firms see what is essentially a political role for themselves in the community, as dispensers of charity, as sponsors of sport and culture, as providers

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of medical or other services to the community beyond the office or the factory gates.

By comparison with the literature on international production (especially industrial production of manufactured goods) relatively little attention has been paid to the political economy of the service industries. Political functions of a kind central to any market-based capitalist economy, which used to be exercised either by the state or under close state regulation, are now being exercised by firms in service sectors—accountancy firms, large transnational law firms, insurance companies, and management consultants.

CONCLUSION

I suggested in the opening paragraph of this essay that two conclusions might emerge from the analysis briefly presented here. Actually, they are more in the nature of questions. One suggested conclusion was that Western social science—and especially social science directed at the world system—had overemphasized both the role of the state and the violent conflict between states as the core problematique of the system. The second suggested conclusion was that changing the problematique of international studies could resolve at long last the opposition of paradigms, the dialogue of the deaf, between optimists and pessimists, idealists and realists, in the study of the international system. Both conclusions lead to questions for which I have no certain answers.

The first conclusion that peace or war is no longer the core problematique poses the question, "If not that, then what is, or are, the issues?"[15] If interstate war is on the way out, that is, incidentally, one very good reason for the declining authority of the state. The state was once the guardian of national security; its right to loyalty and obedience and its authority to levy taxes rested fundamentally on that role. If the role goes, and if it is then insufficiently replaced by the welfare role of the state as guardian against economic insecurity—whether from unemployment, illness, pregnancy and parenthood, or old age—it is little wonder that its authority declines. But a new problematique takes the place of the old. There is a world economy and a world society, but territorial states still claim a sovereignty they are not, for the most part, capable of exercising as they used to. It is also a system, as my first hypothesis suggested,

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in which the asymmetry of power between states has greatly increased. This asymmetry means that the most powerful are able to block, even veto, any exercise of authority in global issues of the environment, of financial regulation, or of the universal provision of basic needs for food, shelter, and health care.

The question that arises is how to deal with this asymmetry of structural power. If the hegemon, or dominant power, either will not or cannot play its stabilizing, confidence-building role, what is to be done? Ten years ago, my answer would have been that it must be persuaded by the argument that it was *in its own long-term interest* to play the hegemonic role. But that was during the Cold War, when the balance of power, the need to hold the Western affluent alliance together in opposition to the centrally planned economies of the Soviet bloc, provided one strong motive for good government from Washington. Now there is no such check on the natural (but destructive) unilateralist tendency in the US political system. Today, my answer, tentative as it must be, is that the only way to remove the present hegemonic, do-nothing veto on better global governance is to build, bit by bit, a compelling opposition based on European-Japanese cooperation but embracing wherever possible the Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans who share some of the same interests and concerns for the future.

The second conclusion that because the problematique has changed a new synthesis of realism about the international political economy and idealism for the future of mankind becomes possible raises a different question—or, rather, series of questions. These relate to the second and third of my hypotheses—that authority over society and economy has become diffused in a neomedieval fashion, and that some necessary authority once exercised by states is now exercised by no one. The first question, more disputed by economists than by political scientists, is how much in the way of rules, supervision, and intervention by political authority is necessary for the system's continued stability, equity, and prosperity—I would not prejudge the issue by saying "growth." What, in other words, is the sine qua non of political management for a capitalist, market-oriented, credit-dependent economic system of production, trade, and investment? Just as experience and the record of history have clearly shown that society can tolerate a certain measure of violence and insecurity, that economies can carry on despite a certain degree

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of inflation in the value of money, a measure of financial instability, the answer to the question, "How much anarchy is too much?" is by no means clear. To put the question another way, how much does it matter to the system, to the people living in and by it, that half of Africa and certain parts of Latin America and Asia remain sunk in political chaos, economic stagnation, recurrent famine, endemic disease, and internecine warfare? I do not know the answer, but it does seem that social scientists shirk the responsibilities that go with their privileges if they fail to think about that question.

The second, even harder question is where is that authority to come from, if we agree that the centrifugal process of diffusion of authority away from the state is unlikely to be reversed. The diffusion is no problem in itself. It only becomes a problem if, in the process of dispersion of power, there are tasks that someone should do and no one, no institutions nor associations, does. Functionalists, old and new, put faith in the professionals, in technocrats and bureaucrats who they believed might be more attentive to the public interest, less swayed by personal interest. The experience of bureaucracies in international organizations, and notably in the European Commission in Brussels, hardly sustains their faith. But could better systems of accountability and probity be devised? Or can the resources of transnational firms, their concern for the health and welfare not of one country but of the global economy on which they depend for survival, be harnessed in some new form of syndicalist self-government, as in the settlement of trade, property, and liability disputes? Legal theorists in global jurisprudence have developed the notion of *autopoesis* as the possible basis for a new international order where government by the state fails or is incomplete. How could this be translated into a sufficiently coherent substitute for the authority of states?

None of these are easy questions. But unless the intellectuals can find the courage to abandon the impedimenta of a fast-vanishing past and can start thinking anew about some of the basic issues of society, polity, and economy, progress of any kind toward a sustainable system will be impossible. Figuring out the questions is a necessary first step.

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ENDNOTES

[1]Charles Oman, *Globalisation and Regionalism: The Challenge for Developing Countries* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1994).

[2]Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[3]United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, *World Investment Report,* 1993. The UNCTC is now a part of the UN Economic and Social division, New York.

[4]Joseph Davis, *The World Between the Wars, 1918–1939* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).

[5]It is hardly necessary to explain why a competitive interstate system exists. Attempts to substitute a world empire for it, or to maintain indefinite isolation from other states, have all failed, and neither alternative to interstate competition appears feasible in the foreseeable future. Therefore, it is the nature of the competition between states, not the existence of an interstate system, that is the crucial question.

[6]Yves Lacoste, *Ibn Khaldun: the birth of history and the past of the Third World* (London: Verso, 1984; translated from the French, Paris: Maspero, 1966).

[7]John E. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[8]Harold G. Vatter, *The US Economy in World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

[9]Joseph S. Nye, *Bound to Lead* (Boston, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's Purpose* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993).

[10]Susan Strange, "The Name of the Game," in Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, ed., *Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990).

[11]Susan Strange, *States and Markets,* 2d rev. ed. (London: Pinter, 1994).

[12]John Stopford and Susan Strange, *Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[13]Ibid.

[14]There may be a conceptual problem here for political theorists, though not, I think, for political economists. It is whether it is possible to talk of the "power of markets" as distinct from the power exercised by foreign-owned firms (FOFs) because of their reputation in the markets. Observing the contests in recent years between the markets in foreign exchange and the central banks of states, it seems more sensible to talk of the power of the market than the power of individual banks or operators (let alone individual prophets and soothsayers like Henry

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Kaufman or George Soros). The latter only exercise power over outcomes through the structures of the market.

[15]This is not to say that there is no danger at all of nuclear catastrophe; only that it is much less acute a danger. Nor is it to say that there is no threat of violence to the security of the individual, only that such threats as there are are more likely to be civil, intra-state conflict either between criminals and police or between warring factions, or between state forces and dissidents or separatists.

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Vivien A. Schmidt

The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the Decline of the Nation-State

WHEN GEORGE BUSH ANNOUNCED the beginning of a new world order, he had in mind a world in which democratic governments would together keep peace in the world and make it possible for everyone to be free to prosper in a liberalizing international economy. Peace, as we quickly came to see, was a pipe dream, as has been global prosperity. The only part of the agenda that has been continuing on schedule is the liberalizing. Capital has become increasingly mobile and business increasingly international as borders that act as barriers to trade fall and as regulations that constrain commerce are lifted.

This has largely been the product of the concerted efforts of nation-states that, through international trade organizations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), international financial entities such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and regional bodies such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have sacrificed their own independence as they have increased that of business. It has also resulted from the political and economic reforms internal to nation-states, such as privatization, deregulation, and decentralization, which have diminished central governments' powers at the same time that they have freed business even more.

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What are the consequences of this liberalized new world order for the nation-state? In this essay I argue that however beneficial it may be for global prosperity and business, the jury is still out regarding its effects on global democracy and government generally. Because the international and regional organizations in no way constitute supranational governments, and because they quite narrowly focus on trade, they are freeing business from the traditional constraints imposed by national governments and societal interests without substituting some equivalent at the supranational level. The result is a strengthening of business, with transnational corporations less tied to nations and national interests, and a weakening of the nation-state overall, in particular of the voice of the people through legislatures and nonbusiness, societal interests.

Some would counter that the rise of regional and international trade organizations will have strengthened the nation-state by reinforcing executive power and reinvigorating the rule of law;[1] and that business will always be subject to national regulation, whatever the origin of that regulation. This is, no doubt, true, but it suggests a partial view of what constitutes strength for the executive and implies a limited definition of the nation-state, since it ignores the role of legislatures and societal interests. Moreover, it entirely overlooks the potential impact of all of this on the state-society relationship, and it denies the effect on nations of multinational corporations that put global profits before community interests.

To begin with, while the power of the executive may be enhanced, autonomy will be diminished, as governments must negotiate with others on the formulation of policies that in the past had been their purview alone. Moreover, the strengthening of the executive and the judiciary refers primarily to powers over legislative and societal interests, not to state capacity, which will in many cases be weakened. By liberalizing their trade policies, by deregulating their economies, and by privatizing their enterprises, national governments have much less control over what goes on in their own territory or what their own multinationals do elsewhere, and they no longer have the resources they had in the past to solve social problems. At the same time, multinational corporations are less bound economically, politically, and morally to nation-states, while supranational bodies such as GATT, NAFTA, and the EU, by

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concentrating on trade, have given scant attention to the social spillovers.

Most importantly for issues of democracy in the nation-state is the fact that at the same time that the executive may very well have been strengthened, the legislature is likely to be weakened, to say nothing of the societal interests that will have increasing difficulty gaining a voice in decisions made at the supranational level that cannot be modified at the nation-state or local levels. In other words, deliberative democracy may also suffer as a result of this new economic world order. But it will suffer differently, depending upon the nation's particular characteristics as well as the extent to which it had to change in order to meet the competitive challenges created by the new international economic environment. Within Europe, the smaller European countries and France have suffered more disruption than Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. The two most powerful economies in the world, the United States and Japan, have so far felt very little of all this, although they are likely to feel the effects increasingly over the next few years, as regional trade bodies such as NAFTA or the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation gather momentum, and as the World Trade Organization (WTO) develops.

Thus, nation-states are experiencing the disruptive effects of the new economic world order at different rates, and although many will undergo a weakening of the nation-state and of the voice of the people, a few may find one or the other strengthened—Italy and Japan being cases in point. Overall, however, democracy is at risk.

None of this is to suggest that we should turn back the clock and abandon the international and regional attempts at coordinating economic policy. It is, rather, to point to the dangers inherent in these attempts and to recommend that governments begin thinking of ways to overcome the greatest threats to national democracy and, by extension, to global stability. The real challenge is not so much to establish supranational bodies capable of ruling on the whole panoply of social and economic problems involved in the internationalization of trade as to ensure that nation-states provide new vehicles for democratic expression at the national level that also provide national democratic access to supranational decision-making.

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INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES ON THE NATION-STATE

In recent years, the editorial pages of newspapers have been covered with impassioned accounts of the problems confronting nation-states. Some have been concerned that the internationalization of the financial markets has left governments with minimal influence and little to do other than stabilize prices and government spending in order to avoid pressures on their currency and to attract investment. Others have expressed alarm over the growing power and concentration of multinational business (the top five hundred of which control two-thirds of world trade). Yet others have warned of the potential labor adjustment difficulties and the threat to national labor and environmental standards resulting from the efforts of international and regional trade organizations, in particular with regard to NAFTA. And some have even linked the internationalization of trade to the breakup of the nation-state, not only by reference to the relatively benign cases of separatist movements in places such as Quebec, Catalonia, and the Basque region, but also in terms of fundamentalist religious and communitarian movements.

In response to many of these problems have come increasing calls for the creation of supranational *political* institutions to deal with the social spillovers resulting from the decisions of supranational economic institutions. So far, such calls have fallen on deaf ears. No one wants to meddle with the markets.

The Pressures from the Rise of Business

There is little new in the argument that the increasing internationalization of business has freed it from the constraints of national governments. In the 1960s and 1970s, a vast literature developed on multinationals that saw the increasing economic interdependence and technological advances in communications and transportation as contributing to the escape of large corporations from nation-state control, and even to the rise of a new transnational corporation that would lose all national identification.[2] Very quickly, however, scholars found that the view of the overarching power of the multinational corporation and the concomitant decline of the nation-state, whether seen in a positive or negative light,[3] was

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overstated. Much of it overestimated the power of the multinational corporation and underestimated that of the nation-state.[4]

The predictions of the 1970s appear more relevant today, as home and host countries have been giving up their traditional controls over business in a wide range of areas in the context of international and regional trade agreements. As a result, multinationals have been coming closer to the "stateless" ideal that in recent years has come to symbolize the escape of business from nation-state control, where companies aspiring to status as global corporations seek to dissociate themselves from their countries of origin, with their operations scattered around the world and their subsidiaries lobbying as members of whatever country in which they are located.[5]

The statelessness of the multinational manifests itself in a variety of ways: the dispersion of operations; the loss of loyalty to home or host country when it comes to jobs and operations; and the ability to avoid burdensome taxes. As US Secretary of Labor Robert Reich has argued, the dispersion of operations through the growing numbers of joint ventures, the increasing importance of capital markets for financing, the multinational character of production, and so forth, make corporations part of a "global web" that increasingly defies categorization by national origin.[6] Moreover, along with this dispersion of operations, multinationals have increasingly lost any sense of obligation to stay in communities in which they have invested. Even multinationals from countries such as Germany, where corporations have traditionally felt a social obligation to the community in which they operate, have increasingly been relocating with an eye to lower taxes and lower wages. And whether they stay or move, multinationals successfully use their mobility to pressure workers and to gain wage concessions. Finally, multinationals have also been quite adept at minimizing their tax liabilities through transfer pricing, setting profits or losses in countries where tax laws are beneficial to the company, despite the best efforts by countries such as Japan and the United States to limit this practice.

Multinational business' independence from the nation-state is growing not only as a result of its increasing economic freedom but also because of its growing political clout. Business has access to supranational negotiations not only through national governments, but also directly. And it also has influence, as in the case of the

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NAFTA negotiations with regard to the automotive market,[7] or in the EU, where the influence of business lobbies varies from sector to sector.[8] Although agency capture of the kind found in the United States is infrequent, given the range of interests seeking influence in each policy area,[9] and while clientelism of the Italian variety is also rare, given the bureaucratic culture that places more value on technical arguments than on political influence,[10] Eurocrats nevertheless risk falling into quasi-clientelistic relationships, given their reliance on industry experts and their need to make quick decisions.[11] But even short of this, business' privileged access to supranational decision-making ensures that policy interactions have shifted from an almost exclusive reliance on national government bargaining to one that includes, if it is not dominated by, business actors in the transnational private sector.[12]

Few have questioned the newfound freedom and influence of the multinationals. Those who have been concerned with detailing the characteristics of the new stateless corporation have tended to be charitable, arguing that multinationals are no longer of serious concern because they are bound for reduction to their smaller parts as a conglomeration of companies[13] or as part of a "global web" that denies significance to their bigness as well as to their country origin.[14]

Operations are one thing, control another. There is no doubt that global corporations have operations scattered everywhere. But suggesting that the country origin of large corporations no longer matters, or that their size does not count because of their decentralized organization, is a big leap of faith. Even if the conventional wisdom is correct in assuming that national governments today can do little more than invest in infrastructure, training, and education in order to make their countries more attractive to investors, there continue to be other ways in which governments make a difference to large corporations. For example, incorporation laws and tax laws continue to affect how corporations operate (e.g., Japan's high tax on profits that leads Japanese firms to concentrate on gaining market share or America's tax laws that favor debt over equity). Furthermore, the corporation generally has a special relationship with the home country, being able to count on the government to come to its aid, to protect existing markets, and to help it penetrate new ones. In addition, the culture of the multinational company, as

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much as its control, tends to remain identified with nationals of the company's country of origin.

Control of the multinational, in short, remains in the hands of relatively few individuals, who, by virtue of their nationality and position, have special access to power in nation-states, and who, by virtue of the global nature of their responsibilities, have the ability to avoid national control. Concern with this aspect of the increasing power of the multinational has generated only sporadic articles in the popular press. However, the honeymoon of the 1980s, when CEOs were depicted as heroes in the press, is over. In the United States, top management greed is now the focus of attention, as news magazines detail the astronomical compensation packages that, in 1993, provided CEOs with salaries that topped $200 million. In other advanced industrialized nations, the press has focused more on the corruption of CEOs, the insider trading scandals and illegal political campaign contributions in France, banking improprieties in Spain, and bribes and illegal campaign contributions in exchange for favors and contracts in Italy and Japan, among others.

Although CEOs remain the focus of criticism because of their ability to exploit their positions for personal or professional gain, that focus may shift to their power over the enormous economic organizations that they head that increasingly seem to escape political and, therefore, popular control. This may generate a new set of radical critiques that revivify the older theories and that concentrate on the inherent political dangers of multinationals controlled by a small elite of professional, capitalist managers with seemingly unchecked economic power and national loyalties only when it suits them.

The concern with business power and those who wield it is likely only to grow as trade liberalization progresses. This constitutes a major challenge to the independent powers of the nation-state. But this is not the only challenge.

The Pressures from the Rise of Supranational Organizations

The pressures on the nation-state resulting from the rise of supranational organizations are many, but cluster around two interrelated issues: *1)* the political problems resulting from the loss of national sovereignty and the diminution of governmental autonomy;

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and *2)* the economic and social problems resulting from the impact of trade internationalization.

There is no doubt that the rise of supranational organizations is undermining national sovereignty and governmental autonomy. The potential threat to national sovereignty was a major concern of those opposed to NAFTA, although labor and environmental issues held center stage. The much more immediate threat to national sovereignty represented by the Maastricht Treaty, which proposed monetary union and greater political union, was the main focus of the debates in European Community (EC) member countries, with the referendum in France passing only by a slim margin, with the one in Denmark not passing at all, and with none even held in Great Britain, for fear of the results. That same threat was also a major issue during debates on GATT ratification in Congress, as the new WTO is seen to usurp US trade prerogatives, such as its ability to impose sanctions unilaterally with Super 301.

Underlying many of the concerns about giving up national sovereignty is fear of the loss of governmental autonomy, and the possibility that national standards and mores will be compromised. This fear has been less pronounced with regard to the EC/EU, which already has an elaborate institutional structure to allow nations a say on the common standards to be developed, than it has been with NAFTA, where opponents complained about the lack of linkage between the economic issues and the social, and in particular the lack of a social charter to guarantee workers' rights; about the labor adjustment problems and the dangers of a "race to the bottom" where poorer areas would loosen standards and cut social programs to attract capital and jobs; and about the environmental hazards that were likely to fester without adequate oversight.[15]

The experience of the EC/EU suggests that although many of the specific trade and environmental problems that have worried NAFTA opponents will find solution over time through mutually elaborated and agreed upon rules and standards, labor's demands for guaranteed rights and protections are unlikely to be met. The EC/EU has, in fact, been no more successful than NAFTA in linking trade to labor, generally because of tremendous resistance by certain member governments to any such coordination. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers of 1989, which was adopted by all member states except Great Britain, was entirely

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voluntary in terms of its implementation by member states, and was not included in the Maastricht Treaty, primarily because of Great Britain. The best hope for labor with regard to the internationalization of standards, ironically enough, is in the multinational corporations themselves, many of which have already been in the process of standardizing working conditions across their many subsidiaries in Europe.

The GATT has generated another series of concerns. Some fear that higher standards enacted by national legislatures to protect consumers, workers, culture, and so forth will be deemed unfair restraints on the free movement of people, goods, services, and money. Such fears, although not entirely unfounded, are exaggerated. The experience of the EC suggests that higher standards will be ensured gradually in a process related to the development of the trade agreements themselves. In the EC, the social field was, for the most part, originally placed outside the supranational competence of Community institutions, and Commission activity in this area was modest (with the exception of environmental policy) until the Single European Act of the mid-1980s, which officially brought health, safety, and environmental and consumer protection into Community competence and insisted that the Commission start from a high level of protection in these areas.[16]

Higher standards also mean standardization, which in turn means that governmental autonomy is threatened. Although majority voting in the EC/EU remains largely an exception to the consensual rule, the possibility of a vote has encouraged compromises in areas of product regulation that had been blocked for years.[17] The EC/EU has sought to minimize the threat to governmental autonomy as much as possible through the principle of subsidiarity, which seeks to ensure that regulation occurs at the lowest administrative level possible.

It is in the economic regulation area, however, that governmental autonomy has been most undermined, as member states have altered their economic policies in response to EC/EU-recommended changes in the state's role in the economy and the regulatory environment for business. These consist, more specifically, of changes that began slowly with the removal of customs barriers in the 1960s, followed by membership in the European Monetary System (EMS), established in 1979, in which member states peg their

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national currency to the deutsche mark, and then speeded up in the 1980s with the relinquishing of control over exchange rates, the opening of the financial markets, the ending of price controls, and so forth. In addition, they encompass changes in competition policy, product standards, sectoral rules governing different businesses, and all that the opening of the borders entails in terms of the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people.

The loss of autonomy involves not simply the fact that each member state in the Council of Ministers is only one of twelve,[18] or now fifteen, but also that much power has been given over to the EU Commission and to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Not only does the Commission draft the directives that governments must then put into practice, once passed by the Council of Ministers, but it also rules on, and overrules, actions that governments used to decide unilaterally, in such areas as industrial policy and regional policy. The Directorate-General on Competition, for example, has, in several instances, not allowed the French government to provide grants to nationalized enterprises on the grounds that they were disguised subsidies, and it rejected the proposed acquisition of *de Havilland* by Aerospatiale, much to French dismay.

The ECJ has been a less noticed but important force in the subversion of national autonomy. It has been acting as if it were the supreme court of a federal system, the guardian of an entrenched written constitution by which it was empowered, rather than the court of a loose economic federation, which, although its decisions are binding on national governments, has no formal power over national legal systems and no enforcement powers.[19] The most dramatic instance of this judicial activism is a 1991 case in which the ECJ ruled in favor of Spanish fishermen on the grounds that a proposed directive intended to liberalize the European fishing industry, which had been torpedoed in the Council of Ministers by Great Britain, should have been passed and therefore had become EC law.[20]

Thus, the EC/EU, whether through economic policy recommendations, standardization procedures, or court decisions, has in many different ways undermined the autonomy of national governments. No one is complaining much, however, because in exchange for the loss of autonomy has come a larger market, higher standards, better protections for all citizens of the EU, and greater economic stability.

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This is likely to be the pattern of the future for NAFTA and even GATT countries. In fact, there are already signs that even without any one world organization, not only official treaty organizations but also professional associations of governmental regulators (e.g., international banking and securities regulators in the derivatives market) are seeking to make order out of the chaos that has come from the freeing of the market.

NATIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

The unwritten story behind the internationalization of trade lies not so much in how international and regional trade associations are diminishing the autonomy of the nation-state, or in how multinationals are escaping the control of the nation-state, but in how nation-states have been altering their policies and policy-making processes to function in the new international arena. These changes have, in most instances, undermined the nation-state's particular kind of democracy by strengthening executive power vis-à-vis societal interests and freeing business from its traditional constraints.

As the most advanced of the international and regional trade bodies, the EC/EU's impact on member states deserves special attention because it offers lessons on what may happen to other countries as the WTO, NAFTA, and other regional trade bodies grow in significance. It also shows that national responses to the pressures of internationalization differ widely, depending not only on the particular state-society relationship embodied in the policy-making process (corporatist, statist, or pluralist), but also on such factors as country size (small or large), culture, history, governmental structure (federal or unitary) and capacity (to reform or not), labor history (conflictual or consensual) and organization (cohesive or fragmented), and business size (large or small), organization (cohesive or fragmented), and orientation (domestic or international).

Among the threats to democracy in the nation-state, the most significant is that posed by the structure of decision-making in the EU. The EU suffers from a "democratic deficit," given a Council of Ministers that relies more on the European Commission and its bureaucracy for recommendations than on the European Parliament, which performs only a consultative role.[21] And this only compounds the problems at the nation-state level. The EU enhances

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the powers of the executive to the detriment of the legislature and societal interests through a "two-level strategy" to overcome domestic opposition: first, through its mantle of legitimacy and, second, through the creation of policies by way of an insulated process that offers national legislatures and societal interests few opportunities for comment or change.[22] The Maastricht reforms that gave the European Parliament a legislative function and strengthened its control over the executive reduced but did not eliminate this democratic deficit.[23] Nor did the various reforms in member states that followed upon treaty ratification.

Most seriously for democracy in European countries, the policy changes governments have instituted in response to outside economic pressures have combined to bring about major alterations in the balance of relations among major players in the policy-making process. Business generally has become stronger, more independent and mobile, and less in need of the close relationships with government or of the compromises with labor that it had developed throughout the postwar years. Labor, by contrast, has become weaker with respect to business at the same time that it has increasingly been shut out of policy-making processes by liberalizing governments. And, government has become more dependent, with Brussels having usurped much of its autonomy in policy formulation and much of its flexibility in policy implementation. The result is that societal interests, with the exception of business interests, have less access to decision-making at the national level, let alone at the supranational level.

This lack of access is not necessarily a problem in cases where societal interests remain convinced that governments are representing their interests at the national and supranational levels. But as national governments continue to deregulate and privatize, to reduce taxes, and to diminish their own control over economic policies generally, they have increasingly less capacity to meet societal needs in the face of economic downturn, especially in such areas as employment and social welfare. The result is that those societal interests whose needs have not been met have become disenchanted with both national governments and the supranational agreements into which they have entered, and have become a potentially disruptive force.

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The Smaller European Countries: Unbalancing the Corporatist Relationship

During the postwar period and in some cases even before, a number of smaller European countries developed systems of social concertation that have often been characterized as corporatist. This means that business and labor (represented by peak associations) together with government (represented by state agencies) formulate and implement policy, often absent any independent role for parliament. This relationship has, in recent years, become unbalanced in most smaller European countries.[24]

The pressures of internationalization, including membership in the EC/EU, have been major contributing factors to the problems of corporatism, despite the fact that small European states with corporatist policy processes had been thought more capable of responding to outside challenges than larger states because of those relationships.[25] The problem is that the traditional "class compromise" that has helped explain the stability of corporatist polities[26] no longer works in a world of capital mobility and financial integration, where labor rightly sees business as less bound to it, morally or economically, and where business can obtain concessions from both labor and government without the traditional compromise. And governments, no longer able to use public spending programs to reconcile the conflicting demands of labor and business as they had in the past without running into macroeconomic trouble (any such action is seen as contributing to inflationary pressures, a signal for capital outflow and foreign currency speculation), have had less interest in maintaining the old corporatist arrangements and have instead promoted change by embracing market-oriented policies.[27]

This has been occurring at varying rates, primarily in relation to the states' degree of openness to international financial and business pressures. While such EC/EU members as the Netherlands (a typical corporatist state) and Belgium (much lower on the corporatist scale) found their particular brands of social concertation in jeopardy by the early 1980s, such non-EC members as Austria (another typical corporatist state) and Sweden were able to delay the impact of international economic constraints until the late 1980s.

Of course, EC/EU membership has been only one of a number of factors that help explain the vulnerability of the social concertation

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systems of small European countries. One of the major differences between Belgium and the Netherlands, on the one hand, and Austria and Sweden, on the other, has been that the former have had strong, internationally oriented financial institutions that acted as major advocates of financial integration and trade liberalization, while the latter have not. In addition, there are institutional differences involving the size, organization, and orientation of business concerns: Swedish and Austrian business associations have been large and cohesive, with Swedish business, although large and international, as domestically rooted as smaller, noninternational Austrian business (with the exception of state-owned enterprises); Belgian business and its associations have been divided culturally along linguistic lines as well as in terms of size, while Dutch business and its associations have been divided along domestic/international orientation lines. There have also been differences in labor history and organization: Swedish and Austrian unions, like their business associations, have been large and cohesive and have had a history of consensual relations with business, while Belgian and Dutch unions have been more fragmented and conflictual.

Finally, there have been political differences, in particular the social democratic governments in Austria and Sweden that continued their commitment to the social welfare state long after Belgium and the Netherlands had elected center-Right governments that sought to cut back social spending and government intervention in the market economy.[28] This meant that Austria and Sweden were able to delay the inevitable, although the signs of strain in the corporatist relationship were increasingly apparent.[29] By the 1990s, Austria and Sweden had begun embracing the changes, membership in the EU among them: Sweden, pushed by the collapse of its currency; Austria, concerned by fears of its increasing marginalization and lack of internationalization.

Germany: Corporatism under Siege

Germany, although also generally characterized as a corporatist nation, has not had the same problems as the smaller European nation-states.[30] Given its position as the lead economy in the EU and one of the most advanced industrialized nations, it has not been vulnerable to the same external pressures as the smaller European nation-states. With the deutsche mark the lead currency in the

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EMS, Germany, or more specifically its independent central bank, the Bundesbank, has set monetary policy for all the EMS members and has led all the other EC/EU countries in imposing restrictive monetary policies and austerity budgets to guard against inflation. But, whereas for Germany the past few years of austerity and relatively high interest rates have proven salutary, given the pressures resulting from unification, for many other European countries this has often entailed deeper recession.

The level of internationalization of German business, which has made it the second largest export nation in the world, together with its particular business structure (the close business-banking partnership in which banks provide long-term, low-cost financing at the same time that they protect businesses from takeovers), has made German business less vulnerable to outside pressures. Moreover, Germany's social concertation system made possible the innovations in production systems, in particular the move from Fordism to flexible specialization,[31] that spared it from the radical restructurings that businesses of other nations went through beginning in the late 1970s. Only recently have German firms begun the rationalizing of operations and the shedding of workers that have been endemic to most other advanced industrialized nations. As a result, Germany has managed to maintain its corporatist set of relationships much longer than the smaller, corporatist European countries.

Because Germany has been committed to the "three 'Cs': consensus, corporatism, and cooperative federalism," and because that consensus is institutionalized, both the "social partners" in the corporatist relationship and the "governmental partners" in the federal system have had access to supranational decision-making. Business and labor associations have been largely included in deliberations involving major moves forward on European integration, while the *Länder,* which play a major role in policy implementation in a great number of areas affected by EU regulation, have been largely brought into the policy formulation process by the federal government.[32]

Most importantly, perhaps, German institutions did not have to change much to respond to the requirements of European economic integration. To begin with, the German federal system, with its emphasis on the importance of law as a regulatory instrument and its respect for local government, parallels EU practice in the first

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instance and is supported by the EU principle of subsidiarity in the second.[33] Moreover, the German central bank was already independent, unlike in France and Italy (until recently). In addition, Germany had no need to alter its business-government relationship. Not only was the government already less present in the economy in terms of nationalized enterprise (at least compared to France subsequent to the 1981 nationalizations), but the government also played no formal interventionist role in the economy, although it provided subsidies and the like for key industries on an ad hoc basis.

This is not to suggest that Germany is the ideal market-oriented economy. In fact, despite the formal governmental commitment to market-orientation since the end of World War II, German business relations have generally been characterized more by cooperation than by competition, aided by the banks that sit on the boards of competing firms and, as both a source of credit for and an owner of equity in major German firms, often play the kind of leadership role for industry that the government plays in France.[34]

European integration has not jeopardized Germany's corporatist democracy because it has been protected by the power of its economy and the nature and organization of its institutions. Germany, nevertheless, today finds its corporatist relationship under siege, the result of unification. The signs of strain are at the margins of society, reflected in the rise of antiforeigner sentiment and in the rise of right-wing extremism and brought about by the high unemployment rates and adjustment problems experienced in the former East Germany, as well as by the malaise in the former West Germany, related, among other things, to growing ambivalence with regard to unification and resentment of its costs.

France: The Statist End to Old-Style Statism

While Germany has, so far, felt the least change, France has felt the most. France's statist pattern of policy-making, where governments have typically formulated policy unilaterally but allowed societal interests in at the implementation stage, has been disrupted by European integration.[35] This is not only because of the major deregulatory reforms that have transformed the economy from state-led to market-oriented,[36] thereby loosening the ties that have traditionally bound business and government, or because of the decentralizing reforms that have transferred national powers and

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resources to local authorities.[37] It is also because the government has lost autonomy at the formulation stage and flexibility at the implementation stage.

The French business-government relationship has changed dramatically as a result of European integration.[38] The tensions between two competing strands of economic management policy, that is, of *dirigisme* (state direction) of the economy and liberalism, with its greater emphasis on the market, came to a head in 1983, when the socialist government, faced with abandoning either major elements of its *dirigiste* policies or the EC (and in particular the EMS that it had joined in 1979), decided to remain in the EC.[39] French exceptionalism could not last long in an increasingly interdependent global economy and in an integrating Europe. The strict monetary policies and economic austerity program that diminished government resources almost guaranteed the further liberalization of the economy, since, no longer able to stimulate industry through demand, governments had to turn to more supply-side measures in order to improve the competitiveness of French industry, with deregulation a top priority.[40] By the 1990s, the traditional *dirigisme*, in which French governments set macroeconomic policy relatively independently of the international economic climate and engaged in "micromanagement" of the microeconomic sphere, had ended.

The result is that the ties that traditionally bound French business to government have been loosened. Business has become increasingly independent of the state, and not only as a consequence of the deregulatory policies that divested the state of its traditional *dirigiste* instruments. As business has been increasingly subject to the imperatives of world competition, the constraints of the market, and the demands of technological advancement, it has looked less to the government for guidance. And as alternative sources of financing have grown as a result of the opening of the markets along with the internationalization of capital, business has turned less to the government for support. Moreover, as French big business has gotten bigger, consolidating, concentrating, and expanding worldwide in response to the challenge of European competition, other supranational firms have become its ally and the EU its interlocutor. French business now has the kind of access to policy formulation at the EU level that it never had at the national level, where lobbying has

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traditionally been regarded as illegitimate, and it has been encouraged in this by the national government.[41]

While French business has become freer from the traditional constraints, French government has become less free. European integration has diminished governmental autonomy in policy formulation, as we have already seen, at the same time that it has done little to enhance the powers of national parliaments, which in the case of France are already exceedingly meager. Most dangerous for France's statist model of democracy, however, is the diminished governmental flexibility at the implementation stage. In the statist model, societal interests that traditionally have had little say in policy formulation have generally been accommodated at the implementation stage, when civil servants adjusted the rules to respond to interest group needs in order to avoid potential confrontation. This approach to implementation, summed up in de Tocqueville's famous phrase, "The rule is rigid but the application flexible," is in jeopardy. Because the EU regulatory model regards any exceptions to the rule as illegitimate, its increasing presence has called into question the administrative nature of the French state, where making exceptions is the rule. Societal interests that have little access to EU policy-making, by contrast with business, will therefore find themselves increasingly shut out of any direct access to the decision-making process at both the front and the back ends. And, finding less accommodation, they may engage in more confrontation, albeit with less success. This has been most apparent in the agricultural sector in the context of the GATT talks. "Vegetables on the highways and pigs in the street," however, have not been as effective forms of protest as they were in the past because the government is no longer as free to bend to the pressures of confrontation.

Although European integration has encouraged modernization of France's economic institutions, it has generated a crisis for France's political institutions, as citizens and their elected representatives find themselves increasingly frozen out of the policy-making process. The crisis manifests itself in the increasing disillusionment with government officials and the attacks on their probity; in the disaffection of the electorate and the rising extremism of the Right; and in the general malaise that comes from the increasing banality of political discourse and the lack of new ideas that have followed the

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disintegration of left-wing and right-wing ideological divisions. Until the French find a way to adapt their statist model to the new realities, the crisis is likely only to deepen.

Great Britain: Liberal Statism with a Difference

Great Britain has felt the impact of integration much less than France, despite the fact that it, too, has a statist pattern of policy-making, where government can formulate policy absent significant interest group input. This is because Great Britain in some ways anticipated the changes demanded by European integration, in particular with regard to the business-government relationship, and in other ways successfully resisted them, especially with regard to social regulation.

Great Britain has historically had a more laissez-faire ideology, more open financial markets, and a less close business-government relationship than either France or Germany. Throughout the post-war era, it has had a more "liberal" and international approach to economic policy than most of its European neighbors, often sacrificing the domestic economy on the altar of its ambition to remain a world power. Whether the policy involved deflating the economy in order to maintain a strong pound or restraining domestic investment in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments, the government put international economic considerations above domestic economic health.[42] And they seem to have continued this under Thatcher and Major, with laissez-faire ideology substituting for world ambitions.

Although Great Britain, like France, has traditionally had a powerful executive and a strong bureaucracy, it has also had "an abiding prejudice which sees it as the natural business of government to react—not to act," in particular with regard to business.[43] This cultural aversion to government intervention in the economy, combined with the size of its markets, has always ensured the government of a smaller role with regard to economic matters, and problems whenever it tried either statist experiments similar to those of France in the planning sphere or corporatist ones in the social concertation sphere.[44] Thus, although the executive is strong, as in the typical statist model, it is limited. It was this strength, however, that enabled Prime Minister Thatcher to begin her radical

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program of privatization and deregulation, even before the pressures of European integration seemed to demand it.[45]

Great Britain has been ahead of the EC/EU in the economic arena, in macroeconomic and microeconomic policies as well as in its openness to the international economy. Therefore, it was less vulnerable to the pressures which hit both France and the smaller European countries. Although it has in some sense been behind EC/EU member states in the social arena, it has managed to avoid some of the potentially most onerous (in its view) aspects, in particular with regard to the social charter.

Great Britain's particular form of liberal statist democracy has been little affected by integration, especially by comparison with France. Because of the traditional role of parliament as a forum for the vigorous debate of ideas, the British people, through their parliamentary representatives, appeared to have had more voice on the whole set of issues related to integration than did the French people. Because the rule of law is more respected in Great Britain than in France, the European model of regulation has not been as disruptive there as it has been in France at the implementation stage—on the contrary, Great Britain has one of the best records on implementation of EU directives. And because British common law is similar to the EU in its precedent-setting approach, the validity of ECJ decisions has not been questioned as much as in France.

In one area, however, Great Britain is likely to have increasing problems. Because Great Britain alone among EC/EU member states has recentralized, taking power back from local governments, it is likely to find the subsidiarity principle, as it applies to subnational authorities, increasingly difficult to reconcile, not only with its policies toward local governments, but also with its use of the subsidiarity principle to defend against the further shift of powers to EU institutions.[46]

Statism, Italian-Style: Paralysis followed by Crisis

Like Great Britain, Italy has changed less in response to the pressures of European integration than has France, but not from a lack of need. Italy has been unable to carry out the reforms required by integration, given a statist polity characterized by a weak executive and parliamentary paralysis. Its current on-going economic and

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political crises result from this, as well as from the internal collapse of its institutions stemming from the corruption scandals.

Unlike France or many of the smaller EU member states, Italy has yet to shift to strict monetary policies and to submit to the discipline of the market. During the 1980s, in fact, at a time when other EC members were deregulating, privatizing, and instituting austerity budgets to reduce inflation and deficits, Italy was not. Despite Italy's enthusiasm for going forward with European integration, seeing this as a way of reinforcing the executive from the outside, many of its actions remain in violation of Maastricht guiding principles. For example, although Maastricht recommends an open market economy with free competition favoring an efficient allocation of resources, Italy only recently recognized the market economy; it had no competition law until 1990; it continued direct interventions on prices and quantities, thus distorting resource allocation; and it persisted in providing state subsidies and other aid to public sector companies. It also fell short on the Maastricht recommendations for public finance, the monetary regime, and the financial regime, having failed to monitor sufficiently government deficits (now 1.7 times the EU average) and public debt (now at 1.7 times larger than that of the Group of Seven [G-7] nations). The principle of full independence of the central bank was ensured only in 1993; and price stability has yet to become the monetary regime's primary objective.[47]

Much of the problem for Italy has been its particular model of statist policy-making, which is weak by comparison with France's. Rather than the state appearing as an entity apart from governing parties, in their service but independent of them, administered and embodied by a bureaucratic elite that is impermeable to outside interests, Italy has been characterized by *partitocrazia* (party government). In Italy, parties predominate, controlling the state, with parties deciding what to send to parliament and dominating the interest articulation process, such that where groups exercise influence, they do so as clients and/or patrons of political parties. In the system of *consociativismo* (consociationalism), opponents are coopted by bringing them into the governmental machinery, ensuring compromise and coexistence such that even disagreements over substantive policy issues do not jeopardize governing coalitions

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(although they may lead to the creation of new governments and cabinet reshuffling).[48]

This system has recently collapsed under the weight of the pressures of European integration, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the communist threat that had served to justify the consociative balance, and, most importantly, the corruption that by the early 1990s had careened out of control, as dramatized by the *mani pulite* (clean hands) and *tangentopoli* (bribe city) scandals. With this collapse, many changes are likely to occur, although it is hard to determine when, since the reform of the electoral system has not yet led to any other major institutional reforms.

The executive has yet to produce the promised deregulatory and privatization laws, largely because of parliamentary paralysis, a result of the fact that the parliament is a transformative rather than an arena legislature. And there has been no change so far in the structure or culture of the bureaucracy. Most importantly, however, even if the reforms are passed, there is some question as to whether they will hold, since Italy continues to be characterized by a process of policy-making that goes way beyond France in following the principle that ensures that rigid rules are bent in the implementation process. In other words, in Italy the future may very well mimic the past, when "the formal *dirigisme* of these state-sponsored reforms was belied in practice,"[49] and where confrontation was an accepted course of action when accommodation or co-optation were not available.[50]

This was "democracy, Italian style,"[51] a style that, as in France, will be increasingly at odds with the demands of the European regulatory model. Unlike France, however, where the bureaucracy has been leading the changeover to this model, in Italy the changeover is most likely to be led by the judiciary, which has proven itself in the recent scandals and which (with the exception of Portugal) is the only self-governing judiciary in the world without political oversight.

Japan: Statist Resistance to the Pressures of Internationalization

Compared to the European nations generally, Japan has changed little, despite the pressures of the GATT and its main trading partners, in particular the United States. In fact, while France, with a similarly close business-government relationship, has embraced

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change, deregulating, privatizing, and decentralizing, its strong bureaucracy leading the way, Japan has resisted most efforts at internal reform and has dragged its feet with regard to opening its markets. However, reforms resulting from the opening to the outside may also force an opening on the inside, with the loosening of the ties that bind business and government leading to a strengthening of the voice of nonbusiness societal interests.

Japan has, until very recently, remained largely immune to outside pressures, able to control its international economic policies and achieve its economic objectives because of a "confluence of domestic political structures," organized in a "conservative network of technologically advanced industry, finance, and the state bureaucracy."[52] This network is characterized by close business-government interaction, which, much like in France before the reforms of the 1980s, involves leadership by elite civil servants[53] in a relationship that, whether one wishes to place the emphasis on state control, characterizing the Japanese business-government relationship as one of "administrative guidance,"[54] or on business, characterizing it as one of "reciprocal consent,"[55] ensures orderly cooperation in a competitive market economy. Despite inroads into the bureaucracy's leadership role by the politicians since the mid-1970s,[56] and a diminution in its authority over business,[57] the bureaucracy continues to have tremendous power.

The very structure of business helps to explain the greater success of the Japanese business-government relationship by comparison with the French. Japanese business has been much more organized and cohesive, not only through trade and peak associations, but also through the *keiretsus* and the semipermanent linkages between large firms and their smaller subcontractors. This structure also helps explain the greater success of the Japanese economy: the Japanese *keiretsu* performs a function similar to that of the German banking-industry partnership, providing industry with long-term financing at low cost and stable relationships that have traditionally allowed it to focus on penetrating markets without worrying about short-term profits.

For Japan, much of the resistance to change has to do with the fact that it has had a winning combination in its business-government relationship and business structure. The current political crisis has had less to do with economic issues and the related pressures,

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intense as they are given the three-year economic slump, and much to do with the decay within. The Japanese statist model also has some similarities with the Italian, having also had a party government that encouraged corruption and bribe-taking, but without the need to share the spoils with opponents. Unlike in Italy, however, the bureaucracy remains, for the moment at least, relatively untouched by the scandals, and thus retains prestige and a leadership capacity that increases as that of politicians diminishes. This bureaucracy continues to constitute a major obstacle to change, largely unwilling to jettison a system that has served it and the country so well for so long.

Change is, nevertheless, occurring, albeit slowly. Pressures are coming from the outside as well as the inside. To begin with, the Japanese economy is already more open than it was, the result of bilateral talks with the United States as well as multilateral ones involving the GATT.[58] Outside pressures, however, have been most successful in the case of individual companies or sectors, as in the 1994 deregulation of cellular phones, or where such *gaiatsu* (outside pressure) is manipulated by internal groups for their own purposes.[59] Overall, deregulatory reforms of the kind seen in France or other European countries have not been forthcoming. Japan remains a highly regulated economy.

However, as Japan's economy moves from a manufacturing base toward service and information-based industries and from dependence on exports to domestic consumption, internal pressure for change is also likely to build. Manufacturers are already pressing for deregulation of the service industry, while consumers are increasingly looking for bargains. Such internal pressures, together with the greater opening to the outside, are likely to force a move from what is very much a producer oriented society to a more consumer oriented one, with a concomitant end to the archaic distribution system that raises consumer prices and shuts out foreign firms, but also employs many people. The increased competition resulting from foreign goods penetrating the market and from domestic producers scrambling to retain market share could also cause cracks in the *keiretsu* system. It could even jeopardize the system of lifetime employment (which has already been showing signs of strain).

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Economic changes are only the beginning. Political changes, already apparent with citizen dissatisfaction with the Liberal Democratic Party and increased impatience with its successors, are also likely to generate demands for greater access to the political process, especially by groups traditionally left out, such as women, environmentalists, and workers not protected by lifetime employment. Ultimately, regionalism is also likely to grow, with concomitant demands for decentralizing reforms.

The United States: Recreating a Quasi-Statist Pattern in a Pluralist Polity

The United States, with its pluralist pattern of policy-making, in which interest groups are involved in policy formulation, but not in implementation (where the regulatory model holds sway), has probably been the least subject to change as a result of international pressures. This is primarily because the United States, as the hegemonic power of the postwar period, has been doing the pressuring. But it is also because it has had less far to go than many other countries, having had larger, more open financial markets ensuring greater capital mobility, a large, already highly deregulated economy that was deregulated even more in the 1980s, and a traditional separation of business and government, with an even more pronounced cultural aversion to state intervention in the economy than Great Britain. Consequently, the foreign trade policy, which originated in the post-World War II conviction that the internationalization of trade was the best way to avert future wars and which has been used to open up other economies to American business, has not much affected the American economy, other than to represent a competitive challenge for American business. Moreover, the fact that the foreign trade policy-making process has for a long time taken a quasi-statist form, as Congress, through a variety of institutional mechanisms, allowed trade officials to make major decisions in its place, has not mattered so far. But as NAFTA widens and deepens and as the GATT becomes the WTO, America's pluralist pattern of policy-making is likely increasingly to be threatened.

In the foreign trade arena, the quasi-statist pattern of policy-making characterizes fifty years of the preference of the White House and the State Department for liberal trade policies overriding the protectionist impulses of Congress. This quasi-statist system

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began in 1934 with the Reciprocal Trade Agreement, which shifted the issue from domestic policy, under the jurisdiction of Congress, to foreign policy, under the jurisdiction of the executive.[60] Although the institutional mechanisms changed over time as the focus shifted from tariff to nontariff barriers, and as Congress itself democratized,[61] the "statist" elements remained, in particular bureaucratic responsibility for policy formulation and insulation from external pressures. Most recently, the "fast-track procedures," which began with the Trade Act of 1974, were reiterated in 1988, and were extended in 1991 to cover the Uruguay Round of the GATT and NAFTA, together with Super 301, which enables the United States to retaliate unilaterally against those practices it deems unfair, only ensured that the executive would continue to dominate in the trade process.[62] When it came time for the NAFTA vote in the autumn of 1993, the fast-track procedures ensured passage despite major opposition, as they also did with the GATT. Future trade negotiators are not likely to be so lucky, as fast-track procedures were not extended at the time of the GATT vote.

Even with the variety of institutional mechanisms to shield Congress from special interest pressure, there is always the danger that special interests can prevail, as in the 1982 "voluntary" EC steel export restraints and the 1983 toughening of restrictions on textile imports. But at the same time that it threatens to unravel international trade agreements, it also serves as an extremely effective bargaining tool for trade negotiators, who can use the threat of congressional action to gain further concessions. Throughout the 1980s, even as protectionist sentiment mounted in the face of growing deficits, Congress tended to propose statutory bills primarily as a means of pressuring the executive branch to stand tough and to negotiate more firmly with trade partners, rather than as a means of taking the initiative themselves.[63]

Whatever the advantages for the United States of the pluralist backdrop to the quasi-statist pattern of policy-making in the foreign trade area, the quasi-statist nature of the process of negotiation means that societal interests will have little say in the formulation of policies that are likely increasingly to affect the American economy. Moreover, given the regulatory model operative in the United States, there is no recourse after the fact—societal interests will find little accommodation at the implementation stage. The response to NAFTA

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is a good indication of how concerned about this American interest groups have already become. The challenge for the United States is to find some way of allowing these groups access without undermining the international negotiation process entirely. The United States, after all, has been ideologically committed to trade internationalization. And yet, the United States is likely in the future to be the greatest threat to internationalization, given its decentralized institutions and weak executive, and a Congress that is more and more vulnerable to the pressures of special interests.

THE DECLINE OF THE NATION-STATE?

The new world order is becoming incorporated, and business is rising. For the moment, the nation-state as we knew it is in decline. This is a serious problem, since the nation-state will continue to be the prime interlocutor in an increasingly complex world, and the only one that speaks with authority to both supranational and subnational authorities. The challenge for the nation-state is twofold: First, it must ensure that as the world becomes increasingly interdependent economically as a result of the internationalization of trade the social spillovers are not neglected. This is not so difficult, as long as advanced industrialized nations exercise leadership. Second, it must find new ways of ensuring democratic access to the national decisions that are part of the supranational decision-making process. This is much more complicated. But unless nation-states make their citizens feel that they are participating in the supranational decisions that increasingly affect their lives, the legitimacy of both the supranational organizations and the nation-state will be increasingly open to question.

ENDNOTES

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[52]T. J. Pempel, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policies: The Domestic Bases for International Behavior," in Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty,* 141.

[53]Byung Chul Koh, *Japan's Administrative Elite* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1989).

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[55]Richard Samuels, *The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), x.

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[60]Destler, *American Trade Politics,* 16. For the history, see David A. Lake, *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). See also Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics* 16 (4) (July 1964); and Elmer E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935).

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Rogers Brubaker

National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe

FOR WELL OVER A CENTURY, the "national question" has been central to politics in the vast and variegated region occupied before World War I by the three great multinational empires—Habsburg, Ottoman, and Romanov—that sprawled eastward and southward from the zone of more compact, consolidated, integrated states of Northern and Western Europe. With the breakup of the Soviet Union—heir to the Romanov Empire—and of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia as well, the last of the region's avowedly multinational states have disappeared. Everywhere, political authority has been reconfigured along ostensibly national lines—a process that began with the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans in the nineteenth century but occurred chiefly in two concentrated bursts of state-creation, the first in the aftermath of World War I, the second amidst the rubble of the Soviet regime.

Yet nationalism[1] remains central to politics in and among the new nation-states. Far from "solving" the region's national question, the most recent reconfiguration of political space—the replacement of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia by some twenty would-be nation-states—has only reframed it, recast it in a new form. This essay addresses this new phase and form of the national question, focusing on the triadic relational nexus linking national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands, and illustrating its dynamically interactive quality with a discussion of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The essay, I should emphasize, does not offer a substantive analysis of the national ques-

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tion in post-Soviet Eurasia. Rather, it begins to develop a particular analytical perspective, best characterized as consistently *relational*, that is intended to inform further research on the subject.

A TRIANGULAR CONFIGURATION

Central to the new phase and form of the national question is a particular relational configuration. This is the triangular relationship between national minorities, the newly nationalizing states in which they live, and the external national "homelands" to which they belong, or can be construed as belonging, by ethnocultural affinity, though not by legal citizenship. This relationship has been engendered, or given new urgency, by the new (or newly salient) mismatch between cultural and political boundaries. The massive nationalization of political space in the region has left tens of millions of people outside "their own" national territory at the same time that it has brought the national, or putatively national, quality of both persons and territories into high relief. Perhaps most spectacularly, some twenty-five million ethnic Russians have been transformed, by a dramatic shrinkage of political space, from a privileged national group, culturally and politically at home throughout the Soviet Union, into minorities of precarious status, disputed membership, and uncertain identity in a host of incipient non-Russian nation-states. Many other groups in the region are similarly "mismatched," attached by formal citizenship to one state (in most cases a new—and nationalizing—state) and by ethnonational affinity to another. Among the more important are the three million ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Serbia; the two million Albanians in Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia; the nearly two million Serbs living (before the war) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the nearly one million Turks in Bulgaria; the Armenians in Azerbaijan, especially in Nagorno-Karabakh; the Uzbeks in Tajikistan and the Tajiks in Uzbekistan; and the Poles in Lithuania and other Soviet successor states.[2] All of these groups, as well as numerous smaller groups (or potential groups, since in many cases their "groupness" is more a political project than a social fact),[3] must contend not only with political and economic reconfiguration and dislocation but also with two mutually antagonistic nationalisms—the "nationalizing" nationalisms of the states in which they

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live, and the "homeland" nationalisms of the states to which they are linked by ethnofraternal ties. All are, therefore, inscribed in the triangular relationship adumbrated above between the minority communities themselves, the states in which they live, and their external national "homelands."

That relationship is not everywhere and always conflictual. In the case of the residual, though still large (at least two million strong), German minority in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, for example, the triangular relationship has a unique and largely nonconflictual configuration. This contrasts starkly with the interwar period. Then, too, there was a dynamic triangular interplay between the huge German national minority, the newly nationalizing states of East Central Europe in which they lived, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Germany as their external national "homeland." That relation was deeply conflictual, even in the Weimar period, and it became fateful after the Nazi seizure of power. Today, by contrast, guaranteed immigration and citizenship rights in a prosperous and stable external "homeland" act as a powerful solvent, and magnet, on German minority communities. For despite its own economic and political troubles, Germany remains a powerfully attractive destination. Given the new freedom of exit of the last five years, these immigration and citizenship rights in the Federal Republic of Germany have caused the steady depletion of the German minority communities through heavy emigration. Within a generation, these rights extended by the external "homeland" are likely to lead to a final dissolution of the centuries-old German presence in Eastern Europe.

In cases where the triangular relationship is more deeply conflictual, the new Europe, like interwar Europe, confronts a potentially explosive—and in some cases actually explosive—dynamic interplay between a set of new or newly reconfigured *nationalizing states,* ethnically heterogeneous yet conceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites promote (to varying degrees) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation; the substantial, self-conscious, and (to varying degrees) organized and politically alienated *national minorities* in those states, whose leaders demand cultural or territorial autonomy and resist actual or perceived policies or processes of assimilation or discrimination; and the *external national*

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"homelands" of the minorities, whose elites (again to varying degrees) closely monitor the situation of their coethnics in the new states, vigorously protest alleged violations of their rights, and assert the right, even the obligation, to defend their interests.

Since the last term is vulnerable to misunderstanding, I will characterize it a bit more fully. By "homeland" I do not mean the *actual* homeland of the minority, in the sense that they or their ancestors once lived there. That is not necessarily the case. Nor need the minority even think of the external state, or the territory of that state, as its homeland. "Homeland" is a political, not an ethnographic category; homelands are constructed, not given. A state becomes an external national "homeland" for "its" ethnic diaspora when political or cultural elites define ethnonational kin in other states as members of one and the same nation, claim that they "belong," in some sense, to the state, and assert that their condition must be monitored and their interests protected and promoted by the state; and when the state actually does take action in the name of monitoring, promoting, or protecting the interests of its ethnonational kin abroad. Homeland politics takes a variety of forms, ranging from immigration and citizenship privileges for "returning" members of the ethnic diaspora, through various attempts to influence other states' policies towards its coethnics, to irredentist claims on the territory of other states. Interwar Europe was plagued by this last and most dangerous form of homeland politics. Not only Germany, but also Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union were openly revisionist. They all sought to reverse the territorial losses inflicted on them by the post-World War I settlements. And they justified their revisionist stances by invoking the need to protect and ultimately to reincorporate coethnics stranded as minorities in the region's new or reconstituted states. A key question today is whether what has been called Weimar Russia will become a revisionist power and, if so, what form its revisionism will take.

National minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands are bound together in a single and highly interdependent relational nexus. Projects of nationalization or national integration in the new nation-states, for example, "exist" and exercise their effects not in isolation but in a relational field that includes both the national minority and its external national homeland. In this relational field, minority and homeland elites continuously monitor the

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new nation-state and are especially sensitive to any signs of projects of "nationalization" or "national integration." When they perceive such signs, they seek to build up and sustain a perception of the state as an oppressively or unjustly nationalizing state. And they might act on this perception. The minority might mobilize against the perceived projects of nationalization and might seek autonomy or even threaten secession. The homeland, claiming the right to monitor and protect the interests of its ethnic conationals abroad, might provide material or moral support for these initiatives and might lodge protests with the nationalizing state or with international organizations against the perceived projects of nationalization. This protest activity will react back on the nationalizing state, although it will not necessarily dissuade it from its nationalizing projects, and it might even lead to their intensification. The minority might be accused of disloyalty, the homeland of illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of the nationalizing state.

The dynamic interdependence linking national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands in a single web of relations calls for analysis in its own right. This requires a reorientation in the study of nationalism. While the burgeoning corpus of work on nationalism includes large, if dated, literatures on national integration in new states and on national minorities, as well as a smaller, more recent literature on state intervention on behalf of coethnics in other states, these have remained isolated from one another. I know of no studies that develop an explicit analytical or theoretical account of the relational nexus linking national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands.[4] Some studies of particular nationalist situations—especially historical ones—are sensitive to interactive dynamics of this sort,[5] but none, to my knowledge, has worked out an explicit model or provided a sustained analytical discussion of the relational field and its interactive dynamics. To begin to do so is the task of this essay.

NATIONAL MINORITIES, NATIONALIZING STATES, AND EXTERNAL NATIONAL HOMELANDS AS ARENAS OF STRUGGLE

To invoke, as I have done, a relationship between three terms might suggest that the terms themselves are fixed and given. They are, however, not fixed entities but *variably configured and continuously*

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contested political fields. Thinking of what we summarily call national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands as political fields is a useful way of making explicit the fact that these are *dynamic* and *relational* concepts and should not be reified or treated in a substantialist fashion.

National Minority

A national minority is not something that is given by the facts of ethnic demography. It is a *dynamic political stance,* or, more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing stances, not a *static ethnodemographic condition.* Three elements are characteristic of this political stance, or family of stances: *1)* the public claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethnocultural nation;[6] *2)* the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocultural nationality; and *3)* the assertion, on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality, of certain collective cultural and/or political rights.

Nationality-based assertions of collective cultural or political rights, although similar in form, vary widely in their specific content. They range, for example, from modest demands for administration or education in the minority language to maximalist claims for far-reaching territorial and political autonomy verging on full independence. Other aspects of the stance of national minorities are also highly variable. While some favor full cooperative participation in the institutions of the host state, including participation in coalition governments, others may favor a separatist, noncooperative stance. And while some may shun overtures to external parties, believing it important to demonstrate their loyalty to the state in which they live and hold citizenship, others may actively seek patronage or protection from abroad—whether from a state dominated by their ethnic kin or from other states or international organizations.

This variation in specific claims to collective rights, and in overall "stance," occurs not only between but within national minorities. The full range of stances just sketched could be found, for example, among the Sudeten Germans of interwar Czechoslovakia.[7] This variation in stances within a single national minority, this spectrum of related yet distinct and even mutually antagonistic stances adopted by different segments of "the same" ethnonational group, suggests

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the analytical usefulness of the notion of field. Using this notion, developed and employed by Pierre Bourdieu in an impressive variety of studies,[8] we can think of a national minority not as a fixed entity or a unitary group but rather in terms of the *field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances* adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to "represent" the minority to its own putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world, each seeking to monopolize the legitimate representation of the group.[9]

Competition in the representation of the group may occur not only among those making different claims for the group qua national minority, but also between those making such claims and those rejecting the designation "national minority" and the family of claims associated with it. This is no mere academic possibility. Think, for example, of "Russians in Ukraine" (and bracket for the moment the difficulties inherent in the very expression "Russians in Ukraine"—the fact that this expression, with its clean syntax, designates something that does not in fact exist, namely a definite, clearly bounded group of Russians in Ukraine).[10] There are different ways of conceiving what it means to be a Russian in Ukraine, only some of which are consistent with conceiving Russians in Ukraine as a national minority.

At one pole, Russians in Ukraine are understood as being persons of Russian ethnic origin, most of whom speak Russian as their native language, who nonetheless belong to the Ukrainian nation, understood as a political, territorial, or civic nation, as the nation of and for all its citizens, regardless of language and ethnicity, not as the nation of and for ethnic Ukrainians. Were this the prevailing self-understanding of Russians in Ukraine, there would be no Russian "national minority." There would be persons of Russian ethnic origin and persons speaking Russian as a native language, but they would not claim to be members of the Russian nation or nationality.[11] There is, of course, no chance of this view monopolizing the field of competing identities. Indeed, it may recently have been losing ground, as support for independent Ukrainian statehood among Eastern Ukrainian Russians has waned with the rapid deterioration of the Ukrainian economy. But it does belong to the field of competing stances.

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Where does this leave us? If we rethink the concept of national minority along the lines sketched here, the apparent clarity and simplicity of the concept dissolve. National minorities are not the internally unified, externally sharply bounded groups that our ordinary language suggests. I will continue to speak of "national minorities" for convenience, but it should be understood that this is a loose and imperfect designation for a field of competing stances, and that the "stakes" of the competition concern not only *what* stance to adopt as a national minority but *whether* the "group" (or potential group) in question should understand and represent itself as a national minority.

Nationalizing State

A similar set of points can be made about the concept of "nationalizing state." I choose this term rather than "nation-state" to emphasize that I am talking about a dynamic political stance—or family of related yet competing stances—rather than a static condition.[12] Characteristic of this stance, or set of stances, is the tendency to see the state as an "unrealized" nation-state, as a state destined to be a nation-state, the state of and for a particular nation, but not yet in fact a nation-state (at least not to a sufficient degree); and the concomitant disposition to remedy this perceived defect, to make the state what it is properly and legitimately destined to be, by promoting the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation.

Such a stance may be an avowed and expressly articulated "position." But it need not be avowed or articulated for it to be "real" in the sense that matters for this essay, namely exercising a *real effect* on the minority and "homeland" political fields. This may be the case if policies, practices, symbols, events, officials, organizations, even "the state" as a whole are *perceived* as nationalizing by representatives of the national minority or external national "homeland," even if this characterization is repudiated by persons claiming to speak for the state. To ask whether such policies, practices, and so on are "really" nationalizing makes little sense. For present purposes, a nationalizing state (or nationalizing practice, policy, or event) is not one whose representatives, authors, or agents understand and articulate it as such, but rather one that is perceived as

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such in the field of the national minority or the external national homeland.

This raises a further complication. What does it mean for a state to be perceived as nationalizing in the political field of the national minority or that of the external national homeland? It is not sufficient for anyone who acts in those fields to perceive and characterize the state as nationalizing. The perception has to be "validated" or socially "sustained." The perception and characterization of the host state and its practices and policies are themselves crucial objects of struggle within the political fields of the national minority and the external national homeland.

A national minority—to return for a moment to this concept—is a field of struggle in a double sense. It is (as we saw earlier) a struggle to impose and sustain a certain kind of stance vis-à-vis the state; but at the same time it is a struggle to impose and sustain a certain vision of the host state, namely as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state. The two struggles are inseparable: one can impose and sustain a stance as a mobilized national minority, with its demands for recognition and for rights, only by imposing and sustaining a vision of the host state as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state. To the extent that this vision of the host state cannot be sustained, the rationale for mobilizing as a national minority will be undermined.

I do not want to give the impression that all that matters are the external perceptions of a host state's policies and practices as nationalizing. Such external perceptions—and the political stance they help justify and sustain—are indeed more important than the self-understanding of participants in the political field of the nationalizing state, but they are not independent of the political idioms used by participants in that field. When nationalization is an explicit project rather than merely a perceived practice, when host state policies and practices are expressly avowed and articulated as nationalizing, the perception of the state as a nationalizing state will be much more likely to prevail in the external fields—among the national minority or in the external national homeland.

Nor is it unusual for participants in the host state to articulate projects of nationalization, to conceive and justify policies and practices in a nationalizing idiom. Such an idiom is not only eminently respectable but virtually obligatory in some contexts. This is

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often the case in new states, especially those that, for historical and institutional as well as ethnodemographic reasons, are closely identified with one particular ethnocultural nation.[13] This is the case in almost all Soviet and Yugoslav successor states, thanks to the legacy of Soviet and Yugoslav nationality policy, which fixed and crystallized ethnocultural nations and endowed them with "their own" territorial "polities," that is, with polities (or pseudopolities) that were deliberately constructed as *belonging to* particular ethnocultural nations.[14]

Whether we are talking about perceived nationalizing stances or openly avowed nationalizing projects, there is a great deal of variation among such stances and projects, not only between states, but *within* a given state. The notion of field can be useful here too. It brings into analytical focus the wide range of nationalizing stances within a single state, the spectrum of related yet distinct and even mutually antagonistic stances adopted by differently positioned figures in and around the complex inter- and intra-organizational network that we call, for convenience, "the state."

We can think of a nationalizing state not in terms of a fixed policy orientation or a univocal set of policies or practices but rather in terms of a dynamically changing field of differentiated and competitive positions or stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual figures within and around the state, competing to inflect state policy in a particular direction, and seeking, in various and often mutually antagonistic ways, to make the state a "real" nation-state, the state of and for a particular nation.[15]

An example of competition among nationalizing stances might help make this a bit less abstract. Consider the question of language. Elites in all Soviet successor states believe it necessary and desirable to promote the language of the nominally state-bearing nation. This is a nationalizing stance that all share. Yet there have been vigorous struggles, in all successor states, about *how* this should be done. Should knowledge of the national language be required for citizenship or for certain types of employment? If so, what level of knowledge? How should the legacy of linguistic Russification be combated, and knowledge of the national language promoted, when a substantial fraction of the majority nationality does not speak the national language (as is the case, for example, in

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Ukraine and Kazakhstan)? In what circumstances should the use of other languages be permitted, or required, in public life, in the school system, or in the associational sphere of civil society? What mix of incentives and authoritative measures should be employed to promote the national language?

External National Homeland

Since the analytical points to be made are similar to those made about national minorities and nationalizing states, the concept of external national homeland can be treated more briefly. It, too, denotes a dynamic political stance—or, again, a family of related yet competing stances—not a static condition, not a distinct "thing." Common to "homeland" stances are the axiom of shared nationhood across the boundaries of state and citizenship and the idea that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic conationals who live in other states and possess other citizenships. These shared assumptions and orientations define a "generic" homeland stance. But there is great variation among particular homeland stances, great variation in understandings of just what the asserted responsibility for ethnic conationals entails: Should ethnic conationals living as minorities in other states be given moral support, or also material support? What sorts of ties and relations with the homeland or mother country should be fostered? What sort of immigration and citizenship privileges, if any, should coethnics abroad be offered? What sort of stance should they be encouraged to take vis-à-vis the states in which they live? And what sort of stance should the homeland adopt toward those states? How forcefully should it press its concerns about their policies toward minorities? What weight should those concerns be given in shaping the homeland state's overall relations toward the states in which its coethnics live? And how forcefully should it press its concerns in the various international forums that monitor and set standards for policies toward minorities? These are all contested questions in homeland states.

The various homeland stances compete not only with one another but with stances that reject the basic premise of homeland politics, or at least set sharp limits on the permissible forms of homeland politics. According to these anti-homeland stances, which are more

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consonant with classical understandings of interstate relations and international law, a state may, indeed must, protect its own *citizens* even when they live in other states. But it cannot legitimately claim to protect its *ethnic conationals* who live in another state and hold the citizenship of that state. The field of struggle to inflect state policy is therefore constituted by struggles over *whether* and *how* a state should be a homeland for its ethnic conationals in other states.

THE TRIADIC NEXUS: A RELATION BETWEEN RELATIONAL FIELDS

As I have argued, national minority, nationalizing state, and external national homeland should each be conceived not as a given, analytically irreducible entity but rather as a field of differentiated and competing positions, as an arena of struggle among competing stances. The triadic relation between these three "elements" is, therefore, a *relation between relational fields*; and relations *between* the three fields are closely intertwined with relations *internal to,* and *constitutive of,* the fields. The approach to the national question adopted here is consistently and radically *relational.*

A central aspect of the triangular relational nexus is reciprocal interfield monitoring: actors in each field closely and continuously monitor relations and actions in each of the other two fields. This process of continuous reciprocal monitoring should not be conceived of in passive terms, as a registering or transcription of goings-on in other fields. Rather, the monitoring involves selective attention, interpretation, and representation. Often, the interpretation of other fields is contested; it becomes the object of *representational struggles* among actors in a given field.

Such struggles among competing representations of an *external* field may be closely linked to struggles among competing stances *within* the given field. Thus, the struggle to mobilize a national minority may be linked to a struggle to represent the host state as a nationalizing or nationally oppressive state. Conversely, proponents of nationalization may seek to represent the national minority as actually or potentially disloyal, or the homeland as actually or potentially irredentist. The breakup of Yugoslavia illustrates both linkages: efforts to mobilize the Serb minority in Croatia depended on efforts to represent Croatia as a dangerously nationalizing state,

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while nationalizing elites in Croatia sought to represent the mobilizing Serb minority as disloyal and Serbia as an irredentist homeland.

Perceptions and representations of an external field may be linked with stances within a field in two ways. On the one hand, the stances within a field may be prior and governing. In a strong sense, this occurs when a stance to which one is already committed "requires" a certain representation of the external field, and therefore generates efforts to impose or sustain it through deliberately selective interpretation or outright misrepresentation and distortion of developments in that external field. In a weaker but still significant (and very widespread) sense, it occurs when a particular stance to which one is already at least provisionally committed disposes one, in entirely "sincere" and noncynical fashion, through well-known mechanisms of selective (mis-)perception and (mis-)representation, to accept a particular representation of an external field, a representation congruent with one's own (already provisionally adopted) stance or position.

On the other hand, perceptions and representations of developments in an external field may strengthen or undermine existing stances or evoke or provoke new ones. In this case, instead of already-committed stances governing perceptions and representations of the external field, commitments to stances emerge interactively, in response to perceived and represented developments in the external field.

Thus, stances may shape (and distort) perceptions and representations of an external field, or they may take shape in response to perceptions and representations of developments in that external field. The two processes, although analytically distinct, are often intertwined in practice. The Yugoslav case, for example, abundantly illustrates how strong initial nationalist dispositions or stances among some Serbs and Croats shaped and distorted perceptions and representations of the other, through both sincere selective perception and cynical misrepresentation; it also illustrates how others, initially indifferent to nationalism, came to adopt nationalist stances in reaction to perceptions and representations of seemingly threatening developments in other fields.

This dual linkage exemplifies three general features of the relational nexus with which we are concerned: *1)* the close interdependence of relations *within* and *between* fields; *2)* the *responsive* and

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interactive character of the triadic relational interplay between the fields; and *3)* the *mediated* character of this responsive interplay, the fact that responsive, interactive stance-taking is mediated by representations of stances in an external field, representations that may be shaped by stances already provisionally held.

THE TRIADIC NEXUS AND THE BREAKUP OF YUGOSLAVIA

Having sketched the triadic relational nexus in abstract terms, I would like to conclude with a more concrete illustrative discussion. Volumes have been written about the collapse of Yugoslavia, and many more are sure to follow. My aim here is not to provide even a summary account of the collapse, but rather to highlight its crucially triadic form and to indicate—if only programmatically, and in desperate brevity—how the relational approach outlined above might illuminate its bloody dynamics. I limit my attention here to the first phase of the breakup, involving Croatian and Slovenian moves toward independence and culminating in the war in Croatia; I do not discuss the war in Bosnia.

The first phase of the Yugoslav collapse was presented in the American press as a dyadic struggle. On one side stood Serbia, determined to reassert centralized control (and therefore Serb hegemony) over Yugoslavia as a whole, or, failing that, to carve out a "greater Serbia" from the ruins of the state. On the other side stood Slovenia and Croatia, seeking autonomy and ultimately independence in the face of the Serbian push for hegemony.[16] Yet while the Slovenian issue was indeed dyadic, the Croatian conflict was, from the beginning, fundamentally triadic, involving a tension-fraught dynamic interplay between an incipient national minority (Serbs in Croatia), an incipient nationalizing state (Croatia), and an incipient external national homeland (Serbia).

Seeing the core dynamic in this way is not simply a matter of "adding" the Croatian Serbs to the equation. Rather, it directs our attention to differing underlying processes. The dyadic view of the Serb-Croat conflict construes it as involving a push for Serb hegemony, a responsive Croatian secessionist movement, and a subsequent war of aggression against independent Croatia. The triadic view, by contrast, focuses on the complex interplay of three overlapping and mutually intensifying processes: the nationalization of

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the Croatian incipient state (both before and after independence was formally declared); the increasing disaffection, and nationalist mobilization, of Serbs in the ethnic borderlands of Croatia; and the development of a radical and belligerent "homeland" stance in the incipient Serbian state, leading eventually to the intervention of the increasingly Serb-dominated Yugoslav army in Croatia on the side of plans to salvage a "Greater Serbia" from the rubble of the federation.

The dyadic view rightly sees the Croatian drive for autonomy and independence as responding, in significant part, to Serbian nationalist assertiveness. Milošević's use of nationalist rhetoric to usurp leadership of the Serbian Communist Party in September 1987 and to mobilize mass support thereafter—especially his emphasis on Serb victimization in overwhelmingly Albanian Kosovo and on the need to reassert Serbian control over it by curtailing its constitutionally guaranteed autonomy—represented a fundamental and destabilizing challenge to the precarious national equilibrium constructed by Tito. The key to that equilibrium lay in the institutional restraints on the power of Serbia, preventing the Serbs from reacquiring the political dominance they had exercised, to disastrous effect, in the interwar Yugoslav state. The Serbian push to reassert control of Kosovo (and of the likewise formally autonomous Serbian province of Vojvodina) directly challenged those constraints and the fragile equilibrium built on them. While the resurgent Croatian nationalism of the late 1980s certainly had deep historical roots, and in many respects could be seen as reenacting (though going beyond) the Croatian nationalist movement of 1967–1971, it was in crucial part a response to this destabilizing Serbian bid for hegemony within Yugoslavia.

While the dyadic view illuminates the causes and antecedents of the Croat drive for autonomy and independence, it obscures the nature and consequences of that drive. Construing it as a *secessionist* movement, the dyadic view obscures the extent to which it was also, and inseparably, a *nationalizing* movement—a movement to assert Croat "ownership" and control over the territory and institutions of Croatia, to make Croatia the state of and for the Croatian nation.

This was evident in the campaign rhetoric with which Franjo Tudjman, with strong financial backing from nationalist Croat

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émigrés, swept to victory in the spring 1990 elections, especially in his stress on the deep cultural differences between Serbs and Croats and the need to replace Serbs, heretofore overrepresented in key cultural, economic, and administrative positions in the republic, with Croats. It was evident in the iconography of the new regime, notably in the ubiquitous display of the red-and-white checkered armorial shield that had been an emblem of the medieval Croatian state but also of the murderous wartime Ustasha state (which the new leadership failed categorically and publicly to denounce). It was evident in the official "Croatization" of language and Romanization of script. It was evident in the rhetoric of the new Croatian constitution, which claimed "full state sovereignty" as the "historical right of the Croatian nation" and symbolically demoted Serbs from their previous status as co-"owners" of the Republic. And it was evident, perhaps most significantly, in a substantial purge, concentrated in the state administration but extending beyond it as well, in which many Serbs lost their jobs.[17]

The significance of these and similar events, discourses, and practices lay not in themselves but in the representations and reactions they evoked among Croatian Serbs—especially village and small-town Serbs of the Krajina region—and in Serbia. The dynamic of nationalization, though partial and incipient, was real—and troubling—enough. But through varying mixes of selective appropriation, exaggeration, distortion, and outright fabrication, Serb nationalist politicians in Croatia and in Serbia proper represented these nationalizing moves in a sinister light as heralding the establishment of an ultranationalist regime that threatened the liberties, livelihoods, and—if Croatia were to opt for full independence—even the lives of Croatian Serbs.

The cynical and opportunistic manipulation involved in the more extreme of these representations and misrepresentations, irresponsibly evoking the specter of the Ustasha regime to discredit every manifestation of Croatian nationalism, is often stressed. But the emphasis on elite manipulation cannot explain why representations of a prospectively independent Croatia as a dangerously nationalizing state were sufficiently resonant, and sufficiently plausible, among certain segments of the Krajina Serb population, to inspire genuine fear and induce militant mobilization, and eventually armed rebellion, against the Croatian regime.[18]

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While the dyadic view treats Croatian and particularly Krajina Serbs as passive dupes, vehicles, or objects of manipulative designs originating in Serbia, the triadic view sees them as active participants in the intensifying conflict and as political subjects in their own right, construing (and misconstruing) the dangers of the present in the light of the atrocities of the past. The complex process through which representations of Croatia as a dangerously nationalizing, even protofascist, state emerged, took root, and became hegemonic among Serbs in certain parts of Croatia's ethnic borderlands cannot be reduced to a story of outside manipulation. Efforts by nationalist radicals in Serbia to mobilize grievances and fears among Croatian Serbs were indeed an important part of the process. But the bulk of the work of mobilizing grievances and fears was undertaken locally by Croatian Serbs. And the grievances and fears were there to be mobilized. Although representations of wartime atrocities—often greatly exaggerated—were indeed widely propagated from Belgrade, memories of and stories about the murderous wartime Independent State of Croatia, and especially about the gruesome fate of many Croatian and Bosnian Serbs (Bosnia having been incorporated into the wartime Croatian state), were not imports. They were locally rooted, sustained within family and village circles, and transmitted to the postwar generations, especially in the ethnically mixed and partly Serb-majority borderland regions where (outside of Bosnia) most atrocities against Serb civilians had occurred, and where (again excluding Bosnia) the main Partisan as well as the few Chetnik strongholds in Croatia had been located. It was among village and small-town Serbs in just these regions—and not, for example, among the cosmopolitan Serbs of Zagreb—that encounters with the incipient Croatian nationalizing state, interpreted through the prism of revived representations of wartime trauma, generated intransigent opposition to Croatian independence.[19]

These mutually alienating encounters between the nationalizing and increasingly independent Croatian state and the fearful and increasingly radicalized Serb borderland minority thus had their own destabilizing logic; they were not orchestrated from Belgrade. But Serbian "homeland politics" was crucial to the overall relational nexus. Homeland stances—involving identification with, assertions of responsibility for, and demands to support or even "redeem" and

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incorporate ethnic Serbs outside Serbian state territory—have a long tradition in Serbian politics.[20] The relation between the expansionist "small Serbia" (established as an independent kingdom, though still under nominal Ottoman suzerainty, in 1829 and recognized as fully independent in 1878) and the large Serb communities in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires was a burning issue in the decades before World War I, and one that touched off the war when a Bosnian Serb nationalist revolutionary assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Habsburg throne, in Sarajevo. With the formation of a Serb-dominated South Slav state after the war, incorporating the great majority of former Habsburg and Ottoman Serbs, the problematic of homeland politics receded. Nor did it reemerge openly after World War II in Tito's reconstructed (and more nationally equilibrated) Yugoslavia. Just as Russians viewed the Soviet Union as a whole (and not just the Russian Republic) as "their" state, so Serbs viewed the Yugoslav state as a whole (and not just Serbia) as their own, regarding internal boundaries as insignificant or "merely administrative." Yet homeland politics revived in Serbia, and emerged in Russia, when the "nationalization" of constituent units of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union eroded Serbs' and Russians' sense of being "at home" throughout the state.

The revival of Serbian homeland politics—of politicized concern with Serbs outside Serbia—centered initially on Kosovo. Although it was formally part of the Serbian Republic, its constitutional promotion to near-republic status in 1974, together with its gradual but thoroughgoing "Albanianization" (through differential fertility, Serb outmigration, and preferential treatment in cultural and administrative positions), were perceived by Serb intellectuals as a "quiet secession" that had, in practice, stripped Serbia of its historic heartland.[21] The dwindling Serb community in Kosovo was represented as a physically and psychologically harassed national minority, forced increasingly to emigrate, subject to "genocide," in the scandalously hyperbolic language of the first major statement of the Serb nationalist revival.[22] Having again been "lost," Kosovo was in need of redemption, of reincorporation into a restored, strengthened, unitary Serbia—a program taken up, with great mobilizational success, by Milošević.

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As Slovenia, Croatia, and later Bosnia-Herzegovina moved toward independence, Serbian homeland politics—as articulated by Milošević, by his even more radically nationalist opponents, and by the state-controlled broadcast media—was extended to, and came to focus increasingly on, Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia. Through the prevalence in the media and public discourse of what one anthropologist has called "narratives of victimization and of threat, linking the present with the past and projecting onto the future,"[23] the plight of Kosovo Serbs was represented in generalized terms as a threat to Serbs in minority positions everywhere. After the election of Tudjman, this threat was seen as particularly acute in Croatia, which was increasingly represented as a protofascist successor to the wartime Ustasha state. Croatian claims to self-determination and sovereign statehood were met with counter-claims that Serbs, too, had the right to self-determination, the right to a state of their own—if not Yugoslavia, then an enlarged Serbia. The secession of Croatia, Milošević bluntly warned throughout 1990 and the first half of 1991, would require the redrawing of its boundaries. Croatia's borderland Serbs were encouraged to take a stand of intransigent opposition to the new Croatian regime and to its bid for independence, and, as the crisis intensified, were provided with arms and logistical support.

The increasingly ominous tenor of Serbian homeland politics was doubly destabilizing, provoking both the Croatian government and Croatian Serbs to adopt more intransigent stances. Just as the reassertion of central Serbian control over Kosovo, by upsetting the precarious national equilibrium in Yugoslavia, helped spark Croatian secessionism, so Serbian claims to speak for Croatian Serbs, by challenging Croatian sovereignty and reinforcing representations and fears of aggressive Serb hegemony, helped push the Croatian government toward a more uncompromising stance—toward the pursuit of full independence (rather than a restructured federal or confederal arrangement) and toward the more vigorous assertion of its authority in the rebellious borderlands (which occasioned armed clashes that led to the intervention of the army, initially as a peacekeeping force, but increasingly as an ally of local Serb forces). At the same time, the pan-Serb rhetoric, anti-Croat propaganda, and talk of border revisions emanating from Belgrade, together with the more uncompromising Croatian government stance, pushed

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Croatia's borderland Serbs toward greater intransigence—toward such steps as the formation of a "Serbian National Council" (July 1990), the holding of a referendum on autonomy for Croatian Serbs despite its prohibition by Croatian authorities (August 1990), the establishment of the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" (December 1990), and the proclamation of that region's "separation" from Croatia (February 1991).

It is not possible here to discuss in detail the interactive dynamic that led to the outbreak of a war pitting the heavily Serbianized "Yugoslav People's Army" and various Croatian Serb militias against the overmatched Croatian army, resulting in the occupation of nearly a third of Croatian territory (including parts in which Serbs had been only a small minority) and sealing the final dissolution of Yugoslavia before spreading, with still more devastating consequences, to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have had to limit my discussion to a general sketch of the interplay between the incipient Serb national minority in Croatia, the incipient Croatian nationalizing state, and the incipient Serbian homeland, locked in an intensifying spiral of mistrust, misrepresentation, and mutual fear. I have had to ignore not only the detailed interactive sequence of that interplay, but also the struggles among competing stances internal to the minority, nationalizing state, and homeland. Enough has perhaps been said, however, to suggest the potential fruitfulness of a relational, dynamic, interactive approach to nationalist conflict.

CONCLUSION

The fears and fault lines, the resentments and aspirations, the myths and memories that defined the national question in Yugoslavia have long been well known. But they did not foreordain the bloody breakup of the state. That was a contingent outcome of the interplay of mutually suspicious, mutually monitoring, mutually misrepresenting political elites in the incipient Croatian nationalizing state, the incipient Serb national minority in that state, and the incipient Serbian "homeland" state.

The relational and interactive perspective outlined in this essay, and illustrated with respect to the breakup of Yugoslavia, makes it possible to give due weight to both structure and contingency in the analysis of the national question in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet

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Eurasia. The relational field in which the national question arises is a highly structured one. In the post-Soviet case, for example, it was predictable—for historical and institutional reasons[24] as well as for conjunctural reasons linked to economic and political crisis—that nationalizing stances of *some* kind would prevail among successor state elites; that successor state Russians would tend to represent themselves as a national minority; and that Russian Federation elites would engage in "homeland" politics, asserting Russia's right, and obligation, to protect the interests of diaspora Russians. In the Yugoslav case, again for historical and institutional as well as conjunctural reasons, the emergence of nationalizing, minority, and homeland stances was similarly predictable. But what could not be predicted in these or other cases—and what cannot be retrospectively explained as structurally determined—was just what *kind* of nationalizing stance, what kind of minority self-understanding, what kind of homeland politics would prevail in the struggles among competing stances within these three relational fields, and just how the interplay between the three fields would develop. Here, social science and history must acknowledge, and theorize, the crucial causal significance of the contingency inherent in social and political action, without neglecting the powerful structuration of the relational fields in which action and struggle occur.[25]

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ENDNOTES

[1]By "nationalism" I mean a variety of "nation"-oriented practices and discourses. I place "nation" in quotation marks to signal that I am talking about practices and

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discourses oriented to a *putative* nation, or invoking the *category* nation, and to refrain from treating the putative notion of nationalist practice and discourse as a real entity, a substantial collectivity. See Rogers Brubaker, "Rethinking Nationhood: Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Category, Contingent Event," *Contention* 4 (1) (Fall 1994): 3–14. Cf. Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Sociology* 19 (1993): 211–39 and Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?," *Dædalus* 122 (3) (Summer 1993): 37–46.

[2]I give numbers in the text only as a very rough indicator of the orders of magnitude involved. The figures are invariably contested; indeed disputes concerning the size of putative nations and national minorities have long been central to nationalist politics. It is an illusion—even a dangerous illusion, and one that contributes to the prevalence of ethnic nationalism—to think that one could somehow arrive at objectively "correct" figures. Nationality is not a fixed, given, indelible, objectively ascertainable property of an individual. Even subjective, self-identified nationality is variable across time and context of elicitation, and therefore not measurable as if it were an enduring fact that needed only to be registered.

[3]In sheer numbers, Ukrainians—that is, those who identified their nationality as such in the 1989 Soviet census—in Soviet successor states other than Ukraine are, at more than six million, larger than any of the other minority groups except Russians. But the "groupness" suggested by this distinct statistical existence is, from a sociological point of view, largely illusory. Both in the Russian Federation, where over four million self-identified Ukrainians lived in 1989, and in other successor states, Ukrainians have tended to assimilate linguistically to, and intermarry with, Russians. Although some political entrepreneurs have tried to mobilize Ukrainians as a national minority, they are, in my view, unlikely to succeed.

[4]Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome," *World Politics* 23 (1) (October 1970): 665–83, which was called to my attention by Tibor Papp only as I was making the final revisions of this article for publication, comes closest to developing such an account, outlining a "syndrome" of predictably covarying characteristics typically found when an irredentist state confronts an anti-irredentist neighboring state in connection with a border-straddling ethnic group. The account offered here differs from Weiner's chiefly in three respects. First, Weiner is concerned only with irredentist claims and disputed borders, while I am concerned with the broader field of homeland politics, in which irredentism is a limiting case. Second, Weiner is concerned with all border-straddling ethnic groups associated with border disputes, while I consider only national minorities whose coethnics are numerically or politically dominant in another state that can, for this reason, be construed as their "external national homeland." Third, while Weiner specifies a "syndrome" of covarying characteristics, I emphasize the contingency and variability of the relations between national minorities, nationalizing states, and external national homelands—contingency and variability that follow from treating each of these three "elements" as fields of struggle among competing positions or stances, and from seeing the relations between these three fields as closely intertwined with relations internal to the fields. More recently, an emergent literature on diasporas in international politics (see Gabriel Sheffer, "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics," in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* [London and Sydney: Croon Helm, 1986], 1–16) has begun to explore the triadic diaspora-host state-

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home-state dynamic, but it focuses on migrant diasporas rather than consolidated national minorities, settled, in considerable part, in compact areas directly adjoining their respective national homelands.

[5]For sophisticated studies of the national question in interwar Europe, alert to this dynamic, see Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1974); Ronald M. Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938:* Volkstumspolitik *and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy* (Folkestone, England: Dawson, 1975); F. Gregory Campbell, *Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1975); C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); and C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences, 1919–1937* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

[6]This suggests why it is difficult to assert a status as national minority in states that do not have clear dominant ethnocultural nations (like the United States). If the nation that legitimates the state as a whole is not clearly an ethnocultural nation but a political nation open, in principle, to all, then the background condition against which the claim of national minority status makes sense is missing. Collective self-representation as a national minority presupposes a certain type of collective representation of the majority.

[7]Ronald M. Smelser, *The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938:* Volkstumspolitik *and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy.*

[8]For a particularly clear discussion of field, see Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 94ff.

[9]Although Bourdieu has not written on national minorities as such, his essay on regionalism (Pierre Bourdieu, "L'identité et la représentation: éléments pour une réflexion critique sur l'idée de région," *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* 35 [1980]) as well as a more general article on group-making (Pierre Bourdieu, "Social Space and the Genesis of Groups," *Theory and Society* 14 [1985]: 723–44) contain suggestive formulations about the importance of representational struggles in the effort to make and remake groups.

[10]At the 1989 census, some 11.4 million residents of Ukraine identified their "nationality" (*natsional'nost*) as Russian. A larger number—nearly 17 million—identified their native language as Russian. See Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po Statistike, *Natsional'nyi Sostav Naselenia SSSR* (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1991), 78. What is behind these numbers is hard to say. Clearly there are no fixed identities here, but rather a fluid field of competing identities and identifications. One should be skeptical of the illusion of bounded groupness created by the census, with its exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories. For an argument suggesting that divisions of language are more significant in postindependence Ukraine than divisions of ethnic nationality, see Dominique Arel, "Language and Group Boundaries in the Two Ukraines," paper prepared for a conference on "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe," Bellagio Study and Conference Center, Italy, 22–26 August 1994.

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[11]See Roman Szporluk, "Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood," *The Harriman Review* 7 (7–9) (1994): 1–10.

[12]A nationalizing state is precisely not a nation-state in the widely used sense of an ethnoculturally homogeneous state, the very large majority of whose citizens belong to the same ethnocultural nation. Quite the contrary. Although it does not *presuppose* ethnocultural heterogeneity (for nationalizing projects can be, and have been, advanced even in ethnoculturally homogeneous settings), nationalizing states are ordinarily ethnoculturally heterogeneous. A further reason for preferring the term "nationalizing state" to "nation-state" is that the latter implies an achieved or completed condition, while the former usefully implies that this completed condition has *not* been achieved. A nationalizing state is one conceived by its elites as a specifically *unfinished* state (cf. the German conception, current in the Bismarckian period, of the *unvollendete* or "incomplete" nation-state). For an extended discussion of the concept of nationalizing state, using interwar Poland as an example, see Rogers Brubaker, "Nationalizing States in the old New Europe—and the New," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., *Transitions to and From Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

[13]In the twentieth century, new states have been created in three great bursts—after World War I, when the territories of the great European and Eurasian multinational empires were divided and reconfigured; during mid-century decolonization, when new states were carved out from most of the overseas territories of the Western European colonial empires; and in the post-Cold War present, when, in a continuation of the process of the national reconfiguration of political space begun in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, incipient nation-states have been formed from the territories of the multinational Soviet and Yugoslav states and binational Czechoslovakia. All of these states have been conceived by their dominant political and cultural elites as nation-states and, in a very broad sense, as nationalizing states. But there is an important difference between the new states that succeeded to multinational territorial states at the beginning and end of the twentieth century on the one hand, and most of those that were carved out of overseas empires—especially in sub-Saharan Africa—on the other. Almost every one of the former was conceived and justified, in the nationalist movements preceding their independent statehood as well as after statehood was achieved, as the state of and for a particular ethnonational group, which, though in no case coincident with the entire state population, in almost all cases constituted the majority, and usually the substantial (though seldom the overwhelming) majority of the state population. *Why* this was the case would require a lengthy historical excursus; *that* it was and is the case is clear. By contrast, most states carved out of overseas colonial empires were not conceived in the same way—before or after independence—as the states of and for particular ethnonational groups. Of course, in practice, some states—or portions of the state apparatus, such as the army—did in practice come to "belong" to particular ethnonational groups (not always the same groups that had been favored by the colonial administrators). See Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985). But given the general discrepancy in scale between colonial units and ethnic groups, the rhetoric of anticolonial nationalism—the claims to nationhood made during anticolonial struggles—was framed in a territorial (and expressly supra-ethnic) rather than an ethnonational idiom. And leaders of newly independent states also framed their

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nationalizing projects in territorial and civic rather than ethnonational terms, hoping to build up a "modern" territorial national identity. See Anthony Smith, *State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). In fact, of course, politicized ethnicity has flourished at least as much in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere. But in large part because of the discrepancy in scale between political and ethnocultural units, state-backed nationalizing projects could not be as easily linked to one particular ethnonational group as was the case in the new states formed from the continental multinational empires. The point of this digressive footnote is to emphasize that nationalizing idioms—more precisely, idioms of *ethnic* or *ethnocultural* nationalization—were widely employed in the new states of interwar Europe, and they are widely employed in the new states of post-Cold War Europe.

[14]Rogers Brubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account," *Theory and Society* 23 (1) (February 1994): 47–78.

[15]This competitive field also includes stances that reject principles and programs of nationalization, for example, in favor of some form of cultural pluralism. But for the historical and institutional reasons alluded to above, successor state elites are strongly disposed to adopt nationalizing stances of one kind or another.

[16]For a sophisticated statement of this view, see Branka Magaš, *The Destruction of Yugoslavia* (London: Verso, 1993).

[17]See Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin, 1992), esp. 12–13, 77, 81–82; Leonard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 96–98, 208; Bette Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," *American Ethnologist* 21 (2) (1994): 377–81; Robert Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," *Slavic Review* 51 (4) (1992): 654–73; Eugene A. Hammel, "The Yugoslav Labyrinth," in Eugene Hammel, Irwin Wall, and Benjamin Ward, *Crisis in the Balkans* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1993), 16–17; and Bogdan Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 45.

[18]Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War,* 11; and Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide," 381.

[19]Denich, "Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide"; Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*; and Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia,* 33.

[20]Veljko Vujacic, "Nationalist Mobilization, Historical Legacies and Political Outcomes: A Comparison of Russia and Serbia," paper prepared for a conference on "National Minorities, Nationalizing States, and External National Homelands in the New Europe," Bellagio Study and Conference Center, Italy, 22–26 August 1994; and Ivo Lederer, "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs," in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo John Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1969).

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[21]Dennison Rusinow, "Nationalities Policy and the 'National Question,'" in Pedro Ramet, ed., *Yugoslavia in the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 146–47.

[22]This was the "Memorandum" of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, prepared in 1986. A French version has been published in *Le nettoyage ethnique: Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe,* ed. Mirko Grmek et al. (Paris: Fayard, 1993).

[23]Bette Denich, "Unmaking Multi-Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 11 (1–2) (1993): 51.

[24]Brubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account."

[25]On contingency see especially William H. Sewell, "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in Terrence J. McDonald, ed., *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming) and Andrew Abbott, "From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism," *Sociological Methods and Research* 20 (1992): 428–55.

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Chris Hann

Subverting Strong States: The Dialectics of Social Engineering in Hungary and Turkey

STRONG STATES ARE GOING OUT OF FASHION, or so it would seem in some parts of the world. But increased awareness among academics of what Susan Strange terms "the hollowness of the state" is overshadowed by disillusionment with the exercise of public power among much larger constituencies. Low turnouts in general elections may be an indication that voters have recognized the increasing irrelevance of politics at the national level; but turnouts are lower still in elections to the European parliament. Those who do vote seem disenchanted and cynical about their governments. In the United States the mid-term elections of 1994 were widely interpreted as a protest. Voters seemed enthusiastic about reducing the size and powers of government, and the outcome was seen by some commentators as a vindication of an eighteenth-century constitution based on the separation of powers. Does this make for a weak state? Internally the president is unable to carry through his policies, and the political elites stink of corruption. Externally, however, the state appears strong; the United States demonstrated its unique military prowess in the Gulf War.

In Western Europe the socialist tradition has been the main proponent in modern times of the strong state, but the old agendas for expanding public ownership and welfare provision have been largely abandoned. Radical conservatives, notably Margaret Thatcher, have promoted the "free market" policies that hasten hollowness. They have also fostered a "little England" nationalism and protested about the "democratic deficit" in the European Union, while at the same time creating a range of new bureaucracies ("quangos") with

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less democratic accountability than in the past. The ethical standards of legislators and statesmen are being called into question as never before. There is a not very subtle collusion between politicians and voters, with the latter apparently seduced by the promises of lower taxes and less government. Yet opinion surveys in Britain reveal that attachments to the state as the main provider of welfare and social security are actually becoming stronger: at 63 percent of the adults interviewed, support for increased taxes to fund spending on health, education, and social benefits has almost doubled over the last ten years.[1]

Our understanding of these processes is very limited. The complexity of what is happening in the world economy and the interplay between the realities of global integration and the rhetoric of national detachment pose formidable tasks for investigators. Moreover, the intellectual baggage of subcultures in the academy is poorly adapted for understanding modern states. For some philosophers and political theorists the subject is not states in the plural but the state, an essentially timeless entity. This allows them to theorize about industrial states in the late twentieth century in much the same way as their eighteenth-century predecessors theorized about preindustrial states. One model that has considerable contemporary popularity, though it is in fact rather less sophisticated than some of the eighteenth-century models, sets up a stark opposition between a "strong" state and something called "civil society." We have seen a good deal of this sort of thing in Eastern Europe recently. Until the collapse of communism the Soviet bloc was painted uniformly as "totalitarian." For many Westerners it exemplified the unacceptable features of strong states, with centrally planned economies that failed completely to satisfy the needs and expectations of their citizens. Both state and society were taken to be dominated by the ruling Communist Party. To my mind these representations are oversimplified, even mythical. They locate communism in the lineage of the enemies of Rome, of Western Christian culture in its entirety. In Karl Wittfogel's classic account, communism is the successor to the most repressive agrarian empires, characterized like them by "the absence of effective social checks."[2] Such models, hegemonic in Western public opinion, have undoubtedly influenced East Europeans' perceptions of their own governments under the previous regimes; whether they bear much relation

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to reality is another matter altogether. According to Jan Gross's persuasive account, the Soviet Union in the period when Stalin's terror was at its peak should actually be seen as a *weak* state, unable to implement the control to which it aspired, and forced instead to "spoil" the actions of other agents.[3] This analysis is based on wartime evidence and may have some validity for the Stalinist years generally, but it will surely not suffice for the later decades of communist practice, when power was exercised in quite different ways. What are we to make of a country such as Poland, where very strong social networks in the later socialist period played a major role in the toppling of communist power? Many Polish people wanted a stronger rather than a weaker state, a preference that the communists exploited with some success in their search for legitimacy.[4] As more and more countries of the region return ex-communists to power in democratic, multiparty elections, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain distorted, ahistorical representations of "the state-society relationship" in the communist period. The two are not so easily disentangled in practice as theoreticians like to imagine.

More constructive and satisfying are the approaches of those social scientists and historians who take account of the impact of new systems of production and administration and grasp the importance of social and cultural variation through time. Thus, in the context of Eastern Europe, I value the work of historians such as Joseph Rothschild, who, even before the demise of communism in 1989–1990, drew attention to the diversity of Eastern Europe and exposed the inadequacy of the blanket "totalitarian" stereotypes.[5] Historical changes on a far broader scale are analyzed by Michael Mann in his monumental study of power.[6] One of Mann's achievements is the demonstration that modern states, as they developed in Western Europe, differed radically from their predecessors in the extent to which they penetrated all areas of social life. Once these new conditions have been recognized, it is much harder to maintain a sharp opposition between state and society. Others have begun, in a similar vein, to "deconstruct" the state, drawing significant distinctions not only between different types of states but also between the various levels of bureaucracy and kinds of "agency" that we subsume under this term.[7]

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However skillful the deconstruction and however sensitive the analysis of change, the accounts of historical sociologists and political scientists fail to tell us much about life as it is lived in these new social systems. This deficiency can be made good through anthropological approaches, particularly those based upon firsthand observation through fieldwork. Anthropologists have been particularly successful in demonstrating how the new social forces of capitalism and colonialism can be resisted through complex strategies that draw on preexisting cultural ideas and practices.[8] They are also well placed to assess changing perceptions of states. If people reveal in their everyday language an awareness of the encroachment of the power of "the state" into their lives, then whatever the trends toward hollowness and the need for deconstruction, anthropologists will still wish to take that folk concept seriously. They usually seek to grasp both central semantic fields and the changing material contexts in which concepts are deployed, approaching states from many different perspectives, ranging from archaeology to development studies, from ecology to poetics. Some will focus upon the rhetoric and symbols used by states. However, local experience of the state and resistance to it cannot be limited to the imaginative experience of representations: attention must also be paid to the very concrete material consequences of the actions of states for local populations. I emphasize this point only because I think the pendulum has swung a little too far towards idealism in recent years, and not only in anthropology. Perhaps this is because when state-society relations have acquired such complexity that simple dichotomous models are patently inadequate scholars feel constrained to probe less tangible factors. Power is resisted in the realm of symbols and discourse, or through "hidden transcripts."[9] Sometimes these are so subtle that no one seems to notice, and the consequences of the resistance are slight or nil. In a notable study from contemporary Britain, the alienation produced by the modern state can be overcome on the housing estate through the cultural patterning of consumption.[10] Such "appropriations" may be the only subversion strategy available in many of the world's most developed countries, but it is not clear how they constitute a challenge to powerholders. Similar themes emerge in other, "postmodernist" studies of the very intensively administered societies of the contemporary world.

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In other contexts, however, older, pre-Foucauldian agendas may still be useful, and even the frameworks of Western philosophers and political economists may still have considerable validity. Thus, in certain parts of the Middle East, as in places in postcolonial Africa, it may seem reasonable to contrast state and society in much the same way that they were contrasted in Europe in an earlier period.[11] Here the penetration has not yet taken place. Such states may appear to control a large apparatus and to wield power in extreme, often very violent ways. Yet, Keith Hart is surely right to argue that these, too, are essentially *weak* states, lacking the infrastructure and the revenue base to establish the kind of society forged in Europe in the wake of industrialism.[12]

The cases I wish to explore in this essay do not exhibit the hollowness either of the most developed Western states or of the postcolonial states of the "third world." Both Hungary and Turkey are often reported to have enjoyed "strong" state traditions, though neither approximated its modern "nation-state" form until after World War I. For most of the twentieth century they have struggled to modernize their predominantly agrarian societies in very different political contexts. Hungary experienced four decades of communist domination, scarred by the revolution of 1956. In this same period, the Turkish political scene was characterized by multiparty competition, interrupted by three military coups. Focusing on topics central to my fieldwork projects in these two countries, I want to consider local experiences of the state, and whether or not these reflect the apparently decisive contrasts in political organization. My general argument is that these allegedly strong states have both been rather unsuccessful in implementing their goals. In both cases, specific groups of citizens have subverted state objectives, with deleterious consequences for the wider interests of society. The reputed strength of these states may be little more than a construction of Western analysts, who have demonized the states of the Orient and of communist Eastern Europe in order to highlight by contrast the virtues of their own systems of government.

THE *TANYA* QUESTION IN HUNGARY

In Hungarian the term *tanya* describes a number of types of farm buildings whose main characteristic is that they are isolated from

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the nucleated settlements of villages or towns.[13] On the Great Plain the medieval village settlement network was seriously disrupted by the Ottoman occupation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Many villages disappeared, but the towns survived and even flourished. Their inhabitants made use of *tanyas* to facilitate agriculture and the pasturing of animals on the towns' extensive hinterlands. Following the Ottoman retreat, some areas of the Great Plain, including the zone of my own fieldwork, were systematically resettled through the social engineering of the Habsburg "absolutist" state. In the nineteenth century increased demographic pressures were associated with the gradual and very uneven spread of a capitalist mode of production. The large estates of absentee landlords were increasingly split and sold as parcels of private property. *Tanyas*, which had formerly served as temporary summer shelters for farmers with urban homes, were now increasingly occupied year round, sometimes by their owners, but often by laborers or farm servants (*cseléd*). Even in these changed circumstances, with the spread of new forms of stratification and property ownership, most families retained their integral links with a town. Only during the period when they were most active in production did people reside on the *tanyas*: in old age they would move back to the town.

By the interwar period of the present century there was tremendous local and regional variation in the circumstances of the *tanya* population. In many areas, large numbers of people were living out their whole lives on very isolated farmsteads. Many did not enjoy regular, "civilizing" contact with towns and subsisted on very small plots of poor quality land in conditions of the direst poverty. When left-of-center, "populist" sociographers and ethnographers began to document these conditions in the 1930s, the effect was to induce a sort of moral panic among wide sections of the Hungarian intelligentsia. According to the consensus that emerged, the problem of the *tanyas* required urgent remedial action by the state, primarily through the creation of new centers that would extend to *tanya* dwellers the kind of infrastructure available to rural village settlements.

One voice spoke out against this consensus. Ferenc Erdei (1912–1973), a leading figure in the radical populist movement of the 1930s, is widely regarded as one of the most acute analysts of twentieth-century Hungarian society.[14] Based on his own ethno-

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graphic observations, Erdei developed a sophisticated sociological theory of the distortions of Hungarian social structure. He argued that only the radical transformation of the encompassing structures could ease the problems of rural society. Born, raised, and educated in the agrotowns of the Great Plain, Erdei had a particular personal interest in the *tanya* question. Although the details of his position changed in his various publications on the subject, his general stance was consistent. Erdei argued that the vast majority of *tanya* dwellers, even in modern conditions, had maintained their close links to the towns. He called for priority to be given to facilitating rural-urban communications. This would enable *tanya* dwellers to market their produce more efficiently. Even more importantly, it would facilitate their cultural ties to the towns. Erdei was strongly opposed to the creation of new villages (or "*tanya* centers," as they were called) except in areas where no historic links to a town existed; he believed such areas to be highly exceptional. For him, the village was an oppressive social institution, easily dominated by the old feudal elites and suffused with a closed, narrow mentality. *Tanya* dwellers, on the other hand, exemplified the open, entrepreneurial spirit which Erdei believed to be vital to the successful modernization and *embourgeoisement* of the whole society.

Erdei played a prominent role in national politics from 1945 until his death in 1973. Throughout this period he maintained a particular interest in questions of agricultural policy, but the early decades of socialism were as traumatic for him and his vision of a modern, more humane rural society as they were for the millions of rural people who experienced the force of Stalinist state policies. Erdei was the Minister of Agriculture, responsible for launching the collectivization drives in 1949. He was also unable to prevent the socialist state from attempting to solve the *tanya* question according to earlier blueprints. The state promoted the creation of new "centers" and the elimination of those *tanyas* that were still isolated or impeding the progress of large-scale, collectivized agriculture. However, it seems that Erdei also played some role in ensuring that collectivization was implemented in a much more flexible and pragmatic way in Hungary than was possible elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Particularly after the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1968, small-scale farming was actively encouraged by Kádár's state. Some farmers utilized lands they continued to own

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privately, while others drew on some form of "private plot" allocated to them by a cooperative; in either case, the success of the small-scale farmers was encouraged and facilitated by socialist institutions. Agricultural markets were generously supported by the state. Some forces in the Communist Party argued that rural incomes were expanding too rapidly in the early 1970s, but when price subsidies from the state were cut back and farmers responded immediately by cutting back production, the state quickly gave way and increased its support prices. In this way, a mutually beneficial relationship between small-scale producers and the large socialist institutions continued to prosper. This was consistent with the course urged by Erdei, whose call for rural *embourgeoisement* was paradoxically fulfilled in the conditions of mature socialism. He examined some of these trends in his very last book, in which he returned to his old theme of the symbiotic relations between the *tanya* dwellers and the town.[15]

The mature socialist state was also prepared by the mid-1970s to allow a Western anthropologist to investigate this rural transformation.[16] Before going to Hungary to begin this research in 1975, my acquaintance with the *tanya* issues was restricted to a few articles in geographical journals. Budapest ethnographers directed me towards the western zone of the Great Plain, where a uniquely flexible form of cooperative had emerged as a direct consequence of the *tanya* settlement pattern and its associated productive systems. I had no difficulty in obtaining authorization for this project since the key official in the state institution that administered my scholarship had himself trained as an ethnographer and was interested in these issues; he had changed jobs in order to earn a higher salary, but his state responsibilities had evidently not obliterated his earlier professional identity.

The "village" where I went to live in 1976 qualified as one of Erdei's exceptions, since most of its inhabitants had no integral links with any nearby town. Their grandparents or great-grandparents had come to live in Tázlár because it seemed to offer them more promising economic opportunities than their communities of origin. The great majority of these new immigrants built *tanyas* on their parcels of private property. In spite of some administrative, educational, and ecclesiastical consolidation in two hamlets, this territory had relatively little in the way of a nuclear settlement when

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the socialists came to power. Many *tanyas* were abandoned in the 1950s when their occupants moved to the new centers of industrial accumulation, notably Budapest. However, large numbers still remained at the time of mass collectivization (1959–1961). The authorities seem at this point to have realized that the creation of large fields in this region would have meant not only the physical destruction of many dwellings, but also the loss of the high-value crops, particularly vines, associated with them. A compromise was struck. The members of the "specialist cooperatives" lost their full private property rights, but they were allowed to carry on living on their *tanyas* and, unlike the members of ordinary, *kolkhoz* style cooperatives, they were able to continue farming their own lands in more or less the traditional manner. This was only intended to be a temporary solution. A commitment to eventual implementation of the standard collectivization package was retained for the long run. The family-run farms were expected to be gradually replaced by socialist cooperatives farming much larger fields; and the *tanya* dwellers were expected to want to build new, modern houses in the lower hamlet that was selected for consolidation as the village's center.

In comparison with other socialist states, it might be argued that by agreeing to this compromise at the inception of collectivization the Hungarian state betrayed its essential weakness. In fact, it was far from supine, and many *tanya* dwellers experienced unwelcome interventions. Some of the poorest and most isolated *tanyas* (along with a *tanya* school that dated back to the first generation of moral panic) were bulldozed to make room for State Farm vineyards in the 1960s. As late as 1977, during my fieldwork, several people were removed from their *tanyas* against their will to enable the local cooperative to consolidate a similar investment. Alternative *tanya* accommodation was found by the local council for one man who absolutely refused relocation to the village center. However, government policies that forbade electrification and fresh building outside the village center combined with the rapid rate of industrialization to result in a further decline in the *tanya* population.

All this still fell short of fulfilling the socialist state's declared intention of eliminating the *tanyas* once and for all. From the mid-1960s onwards, although the state remained very active in its support of the agricultural sector, the will to implement radical

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social engineering was in decline. Central committees were effectively lobbied by provincial groups, and the officials of this *tanya* zone (based in Kecskemét) were particularly influential in persuading the central state bodies to facilitate more flexible forms of cooperative organization and settlement. The economic incentives to small-scale farmers were steadily increased, and one of the main advantages of the *tanya* was its proximity to the fields and vineyards. In the 1970s it became possible for *tanya* dwellers to receive electricity: all one had to do was slip the appropriate bribe to the state's chief representative in the village, the veteran communist, who served as chairman of the local council. Similarly, it became quite common to demolish an old *tanya* and build something much more imposing on the same site. Provided some tiny fragment of the older structure was left intact, the state's inspectors would classify the result as a refurbishment rather than as a new building.

In theory, the economic logic supporting the survival of the *tanyas* should be still more compelling today as the country completes the complex process of decollectivization and seeks to promote a modern structure of capitalist family farming.[17] The realities are not so simple. The ideal of private property ownership is still extremely strong among people who were never comfortable with the ideology of communism. People are struggling to regain full private title to the specific plots with which their families were associated in the past, in some cases even when these plots are not the most advantageous from an economic point of view.[18] The general economic outlook is bleak. The fragmentation of the new ownership structure suggests that the basis for a modernized agriculture is hardly stronger today than it was in the overpopulated *tanya* areas of previous generations. Few *tanya* dwellers are well placed to become dynamic commercial farmers in the new market conditions. And some of those who invested in their *tanyas* in the later socialist period now regret those decisions; the withdrawal of many state supports has jeopardized the continued viability of Hungary's previously highly successful agricultural sector.[19]

In these new conditions the *tanyas* are once again becoming a major social problem. Many of the people who continue to live in these isolated places do so not because of the economic rationality of family farming, nor because they value the spiritual freedom of the *puszta*, but simply because they have no practical alternative.

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Many *tanyas* provide useful bases for quasi-legal or illegal business activities, or simply serve as warehouses for urban-based "mafias." Many *tanya* residents have an alcohol problem, partly because of the illicit distilling of *pálinka*, a specialty of the *tanyas*. Some have moved to *tanyas* from overcrowded cities. Unemployed people are attracted because they can buy an old *tanya* very cheaply. They imagine a life of romantic self-provisioning that will lead in time to some successful entrepreneurial venture. In fact, given the present economic climate and the lack of state support for agriculture, it leads to new rural slums. Such families are now prominent among those who apply for emergency aid to the representatives of the new, democratic village councils. But these councils have limited budgets, and there is little willingness to extend charity to poor *tanya* dwellers, who are generally thought to be fully responsible for their own predicaments.

The history of the *tanya* question in twentieth-century Hungary cannot be reduced to a narrative of how a strong state imposes its will on a recalcitrant society. From the diagnosis of the problem in the presocialist period, through the various attempts at concerted intervention, to the compromises of recent decades, this is a complex story of conflicting and contradictory political and economic forces. State policies toward more flexible forms of cooperatives, as well as toward the isolated farms, have been shaped and implemented through continuous social interaction. Policies have certainly been modified by local and regional pressure groups, and they have also been influenced by outstanding intellectuals such as Ferenc Erdei (often behind the scenes, through "informal channels"). They have also been affected by the actions of millions of people who live in the countryside. Their story can be presented as an unfolding of popular, "everyday" resistance to the state (though this may be a trifle grandiose).[20] The life chances of many, probably most, but by no means all, *tanya* dwellers improved significantly under communism. This trend has been reversed in the immediate postcommunist years. A full understanding of the *tanya* question also requires a knowledge of the unique history of the Great Plain, the uneven spread of capitalism in this region, and the intellectual and ideological politics of both the socialist state and its predecessors. Moral concerns have gradually given way to pragmatic adaptations of policy. But today some of the reasons for the original moral con-

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cerns, along with some new ones, are again in evidence on the *tanyas*; and Erdei's vision of town-*tanya* integration seems, if anything, even more utopian now than it did during his lifetime.

TEA IN TURKEY

The multiparty democracy of modern Turkey is successor to the Ottoman empire in Anatolia, and thereby to a "strong state tradition."[21] Again we are faced with the problem of defining what is meant by "strong." The Ottoman state possessed for a time a formidable military machine. It can be caricatured as an "Oriental Despotism," but the peasantry of Anatolia farmed with a substantial degree of independence and freedom in comparison with peasants in most other parts of Europe. Perhaps the most realistic element in the "Oriental Despotism" model was the relative absence of state intervention inside the communities in which the great majority of the population resided. The early republican state, vanquisher of Greek armies, was not yet a strong state in terms of its internal reach and social penetration. Poor communications and the predominance of a technologically primitive agriculture in the national economy ensured that the gulf between center and periphery remained as wide during the first republican generation as it had been during the preceding centuries of Ottoman rule.

Most experts argue, and I broadly accept, that 1950 marks a watershed in the transformation of the politics and society of Turkey.[22] This was the year when Menderes's Democratic Party assumed power after the country's first multiparty elections. It embarked on ambitious modernization programs, which, for the first time, brought Atatürk's social engineering into the everyday lives of the villagers of Anatolia.[23] This presented a paradox. The Democratic Party was committed to dismantling the structures of a one-party state. It gained mass support through promising to open up new social opportunities for independent entrepreneurs and farmers. Yet, this same party was responsible for bringing the agencies of the state far more prominently into the lives of its citizens (under agencies of the state I include a very wide range of production and service activities, including health and education as well as administration and law and order). This paradoxical "citizenization,"[24] which in material ways reduced the independence and freedom of

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the Anatolian peasantry, was consolidated in later decades by the Justice Party, the Motherland Party, and, most recently, the True Path Party. Occasional modifications of policy and interludes of military rule have not altered the basic pattern.[25]

In the area where I have conducted fieldwork, this transformation has followed a distinctive course, but one which reflects many of the central features of citizenization within a new state framework.[26] Following the success of scientific experiments it had encouraged since the 1920s, the central authorities by 1950 had become convinced of the potential of tea to bring about a radical improvement in the living conditions of the inhabitants of the Rize region (Northeast Anatolia). This was a very backward area, with high rates of disease, malnutrition, and out-migration. The new cash crop was given strong support in the 1950s and 1960s, both in terms of extension services and price subsidies. Prices were set well above world market levels, but the protectionism of the strong state enabled the new industry to ignore any threat from import competition. The policies could, perhaps, be justified in terms of the foreign exchange saved and released for other purposes. The long-term success in altering public taste in favor of tea certainly reduced the need to import coffee, Turkey's more traditional beverage, which cannot be produced domestically.

As a result of these policies, hundreds of thousands of farmers converted their subsistence plots and/or hazelnut gardens to tea bushes. The new crop rapidly acquired the characteristics of a monoculture. It brought considerable prosperity to a region which had formerly experienced very heavy outflows of male migrant labor. Established gender divisions were reinforced, since women continued to provide the bulk of field labor. But there were new jobs for men in the tea processing factories that the state built throughout the region, and there were spinoffs for other sectors of the regional economy, particularly construction. Many other state interventions have also been welcomed unambiguously. Communications were revolutionized through road-building schemes, from the main coastal highway to the arteries that are still being extended to reach even the most isolated households in the mountains. Hospitals, health centers, and schools have greatly extended the welfare and civil rights of all the inhabitants of this region. Many tea growers replaced their wooden houses with modern buildings of

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brick and concrete. The state attempted to regulate private construction, even in rural areas. As in Hungary, the Turkish state preferred that people give up their traditional scattered settlement pattern and build in nucleated centers with access to modern facilities (to facilitate "surveillance," some would say). However, as in the Hungarian case, these preferences were never effectively enforced, and settlement in most parts of this region has remained predominantly scattered.

The pace of these modernization processes began to slacken in the 1970s, when instability was accentuated throughout the country by damaging forms of party political competition. The consequences for the tea growers of Rize were severe. To attract votes, each of the leading political parties would offer the producers of the major agricultural commodities generous hikes in state purchasing prices. These policies, of course, accelerated the inflation rate. Some growers may have been partially deceived into believing that they were being made better-off, but most recognized that the real value of their product was significantly below what it had been in the 1950s and 1960s when they had made their initial decisions to invest in tea. Since tea bushes take years to reach maturity and have a long life, the growers were unable to switch out of tea from one year to the next; and given the distinctive ecology of the region there was no obvious alternative for them to switch into.

The rational reaction of the growers to the situation which developed in the 1970s was to flout the quality controls officially laid down by the state-owned Tea Corporation, the monopoly buyer of their leaf. Through the use of a new type of shears, the growers could save greatly on labor time, increase the weight of the leaf they marketed, and thereby increase their remuneration. This method necessarily meant the delivery of more than the "two leaves and a bud" from which tea of high quality could be produced. The "experts" whose job it was to enforce this quality norm at the collection points were on the lowest rung of the Tea Corporation's administrative hierarchy; they were pensionable servants of the state. But since they were themselves likely to be growers and recognized the force of the argument concerning the decline in real incomes, they turned a blind eye. In consequence, the Tea Corporation found itself paying out large additional sums of money for quantities of leaf which exceeded the processing capacity of its

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factories (the surplus was dumped into the Black Sea). Moreover, consumers throughout the country, for whom, in the space of little more than a generation, tea had become the national beverage, complained about the inferior quality of the product.

The military coup in 1980 led to a sharp change in the policies of the Tea Corporation in the 1981 season. During this exceptional interlude of strong central government, growers were required to observe the quality norm and to pluck by hand only. They were also limited to a daily quota at peak periods, the level of which was related to the size of their gardens, as officially registered at the state's factories. A drastic fall in production ensued, though by 1983, when my fieldwork began, output was already recovering strongly. There was still much frustration among the growers, but Tea Corporation officials were adamant about the need to maintain their strong controls.

In the autumn of 1983, soon after the completion of my first spell of fieldwork in the Rize region, the Motherland Party was elected by a substantial majority. This new political organization emphasized free market economic policies and the need to roll back an overly bureaucratic and interventionist state. But like the Democratic Party in the 1950s, its actions did not always match its rhetoric. The Motherland Party has performed consistently well in the Rize area; one of the local deputies, Mesut Yılmaz, became party leader and prime minister in the early 1990s. It stopped short of privatizing the Tea Corporation, but in 1985 it did lift the state's monopoly over the processing and marketing of tea, thereby allowing private sector operators to enter the industry. Many did, though the dominance of the state-owned corporation has not been significantly challenged. The price paid to growers is still, in effect, determined each spring by the state. Growers were quite enthusiastic about these reforms, if only because they were freed from having to worry about quota restrictions and could now use the shears again, legally. Few private operators paid much attention to the quality of the leaf they purchased. With only a few exceptions (notably an investment by the transnational Unilever, which led to the production of a Turkish version of "Liptons Yellow Label"), most of the new companies were small and they competed at the lowest end of the market, where quality was almost irrelevant.

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The initial popularity of the private firms was short-lived. Within a few years, many of the firms went bankrupt. Local people insist that a high proportion of these bankruptcies was artificial: the factory owners made substantial profits from their (sometimes state supported) investments and then allowed their businesses to fold with heavy unpaid debts to their leaf suppliers. Even the largest of the private factories (including the "English factory") were extremely slow in making their payments to growers. (Delays of a year were not unusual.) These developments, combined with the opening of the state border and the sudden influx of thousands of petty traders and prostitutes from the former Soviet Union, produced a general disillusionment with the policies of "laissez-faire." Virtually all tea growers preferred to sell their product to the Tea Corporation, the only institution they could trust to pay them in full, and reasonably promptly.

In 1991 the Motherland Party was voted out of office in the national elections. It still won convincingly in Rize, and many attributed this to the personal prestige of Prime Minister Yılmaz. Some explained the strong Motherland vote as a reward for what the party had tried to do for the region. It was also, perhaps, an expression of the hope that a powerful national figure would be able to do more for his own region in the future. The new coalition government immediately set about using the Tea Corporation in the time-honored way. It appointed a new General Director and added large numbers of superfluous workers to the factory payrolls, mostly according to lists drawn up by the local political parties. Everyone agreed that this policy was ridiculous from an economic point of view, but many maintained that it was the duty of the state to provide jobs. Since the Motherland Party had used the Tea Corporation in precisely the same way on behalf of its own supporters in the 1980s, it was in no position to criticize.

There has been no serious effort in recent years to maintain the quality of the leaf. In spite of the efforts of the Tea Corporation's conscientious scientific staff, there is still no stipulated standard for the product that reaches the consumer. Consequently, Turkish tea is uncompetitive on international tea markets. If the remaining customs barriers were lifted and foreign teas were more readily available, the industry on which the modernization of the Rize region was founded would likely collapse. As we have noted, if the

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criteria of the international marketplace had been applied strictly, the new agro-industry would probably never have been launched. As the country lurches from one crisis to another and the inflation rate soars again, a crisis worse than that of the late 1970s could be imminent. Local elections in the Rize area in 1994 were won mostly by the *Refâh Partisi* (the religious party), which benefited from a wave of moral panic created by the influx of prostitutes from Georgia. This party may well be the main beneficiary of current frustrations at the next national elections in 1995. Control over the modernizing state would then pass to the most vocal enemies of "modernity," though it is not yet clear what policies this party would adopt to promote the needs and livelihoods of the people of Rize.

CONCLUSION

When understanding of macro (global) processes remains very limited, as is the case concerning the contemporary roles of states, a focus on particular cases and micro levels can be illuminating. The preceding case studies of local subversion of central power in states on the periphery of the West suggest a number of conclusions. First, they undermine some commonly held stereotypes about the polities of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The Hungarian regime that liberalized steadily throughout the Kádár period cannot be dismissed as illegitimate just because of the ugly circumstances in which it was installed in 1956. The popularity of the statesman under whose leadership many *tanya* dwellers and villagers experienced *embourgeoisement* and were integrated for the first time into the national society had much to do with the rather puritanical lifestyle he espoused, in sharp contrast to the statesmen of the modern West. Similarly, the Turkish state is regularly and justifiably condemned for its "human rights" abuses and its military repression of Kurdish "terrorists," but other questions of citizenization and liberty are comprehensively ignored by those who write in this way.

In fact, these states are not the ogres that the West imagines them to be. Anthropological investigations can expose this type of stereotyping, which has passed relatively unremarked in the more general critique of Orientalism. Resistance to state power has been effectively carried through, perhaps more effectively than is possible in

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the Western democracies, where the sources of power are too thoroughly disguised and the reach of state administration is so much greater. The changes of recent years—urbanization, marketization, and the internationalization of the economy, and in particular of the media—may have brought both Hungary and Turkey closer to the West in this respect. But I do not believe this is the "end of history," and there is little doubt that the citizens of these countries will continue to pursue their many sectional goals and—rightly or wrongly—to perceive their national states as key agents in their struggles. So long as they are perceived in this way, advancing hollowness in terms of economic globalization should not lead us to underestimate the continued political significance of the state.

We should not be surprised that those associated with the social engineering projects of modernizing states should cultivate an image of the state as strong. How else could they hope to achieve the promised transformations, the utopia of Western-style modernity? Nor should we be surprised that citizens remain emotionally and ideologically attached to traditional cultural ideas, such as those associated with private property and Islam. The modernizers' programs invariably threaten to transform too much. These generalities apply equally to communism throughout Eastern Europe and to Kemalist secularism in Turkey. Hence, it is not difficult for fieldworkers to elicit comments about alien and remote powerholders that would appear to echo the sharp binary models of the political philosophers.[27]

But social anthropologists are interested in more than representations and rhetoric. They offer more than the "cultural studies" industry, because they seek also to document, understand, and explain concrete processes of change through the study of grass roots social interaction. From this vantage point, the recent experiences of Hungarian and Turkish villagers, though on opposite sides in the "Cold War," turn out to be distinctly comparable. Both the Hungarian communist state's program to liquidate its scattered farms and the policies of the Turkish state to introduce and maintain adequate control over a new cash crop are interventions (each far more complex than I have been able to show in a brief space here) by apparently strong states. In each case the modernizing state seemed to enjoy conspicuous initial success, but over the long run it

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was subverted "from below" by particular groups in the society. The states were, as I have phrased it in a more detailed analysis of the Turkish case, "domesticated."[28] My use of this concept differs from that of Ralf Dahrendorf, a self-proclaimed "unreconstructed eighteenth century liberal."[29] For him, the domestication of power is about the extension of democracy and representative government, as these themes have been explored by generations of Western political theorists.[30] For me, the domestication of the state is about the practical activity of implementing and resisting political agendas, in which the stakes are the full range of modern citizenship rights: welfare, civil and spiritual, as well as political and material. In modern conditions it is both desirable and necessary to move beyond the rhetoric of state versus society. It is not sufficient to supplement the penetration metaphor with metaphors of subversion and infiltration: this arid dichotomization must be replaced by more realistic models of complexity.

But I admit that for some purposes I do still find the old philosophical contrast between the particular and the universal to be useful. We need strong political authorities (ultimately a world state) to express and implement the latter principle. Did the benefits won by the farmers of one Turkish region in one historical period entitle them to contravene state regulations and supply the rest of the country with an inferior product in the following period? Did the benefits won by some small-scale farmers in Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s give them not only a powerful market position but also an unfair advantage over other social groups at the time? Some might be inclined to argue that the state never had any business intervening in either of the cases I have described, that both *tanya* settlements on the Great Plain and the agricultural potential of Rize would have been better served by market forces alone. I disagree. In light of the moral and material squalor associated with the remaining *tanyas* in postcommunist Hungary and the uncertain prospects faced now by tea growers in Turkey, it is the ease with which subversion has been accomplished that should disturb. Already, many people regret that the social engineers of these modernizing states lacked the courage to stick more closely to their original convictions.

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ENDNOTES

[1]David Lipsey, "Do We Really Want More Public Spending?" in R. Jowell et al., eds., *British Social Attitudes: 11th Report* (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1994).

[2]Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957).

[3]Jan Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[4]Cf. Jan Kubik, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 261.

[5]Joseph Rothschild, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[6]Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, 1986; vol. 2, 1993).

[7]For a recent example of such deconstruction see Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1992).

[8]Among the best examples are June Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Jean Comaroff, *Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance: The Culture and History of a South African People* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1985); and Aihwa Ong, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987).

[9]James Scott, *Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).

[10]Daniel Miller, "Appropriating the State on the Council Estate," *Man* 23 (2) (1988): 353–72.

[11]Cf. Augustus Richard Norton, ed., *Civil Society in the Middle East*, vol.1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994); and Jean-Francois Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa," in Patrick Chabal, ed., *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[12]Keith Hart, *The Political Economy of West African Agriculture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); cf. Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[13]For an English language introduction to the *tanya* issues see C. M. Hann, *Tázlár: A Village in Hungary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Recent scholarship in Hungary is presented in Ferenc Pölöskei and György Szabad, eds., *A Magyar Tanyarendszer Múltja; tanulmányok* (Studies in the History of the Hungarian Tanya System) (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1980).

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[14]Tibor Huszár, *Ferenc Erdei: Selected Writings* (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1988). Erdei's work on the *tanya* issues is discussed by Iván Zoltán Dénes in Pölöskei and Szabad, eds., *A Magyar Tanyarendszer Múltja; tanulmányok*, 313–38. See also C. M. Hann, "Ferenc Erdei, Antal Vermes and the Struggle for Balance in Rural Hungary," in David A. Kideckel, ed., *East-Central European Communities: The Struggle for Balance in Turbulent Times* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).

[15]Ferenc Erdei, *Város és Vidék* (Town and Country) (Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1971).

[16]Hann, *Tázlár: A Village in Hungary*.

[17]Pál Romány, "Menetközben—magyar falvak és tanyák a XXI század elött" ("On the Way—Hungarian Villages and Scattered Farms before the Twenty-first Century"), *Társadalomkutatás* 4 (1992): 57–67.

[18]András Vágvölgyi, *The Effect of Agrarian Policy on Rural Society in the Hungary of the Nineties* (Budapest: Institute for Social Conflict Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, typescript, 1994).

[19]C. M. Hann, "From Production to Property: Decollectivization and the Family-Land Relationship in Contemporary Hungary," *Man* 28 (2) (1993): 299–320.

[20]Iván Szelényi, *Socialist Entrepreneurs: Embourgeoisement in Rural Hungary* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988).

[21]Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverley: Eothen, 1985).

[22]For example, Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London: Verso, 1987).

[23]Paul Stirling, "Social Change and Social Control in Republican Turkey," *Türkiye İş Bankası: Papers and Discussions: International Symposium on Atatürk 1981* (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publications, 1982), 565–600.

[24]This is the term of Sylvia Walby, "Women and Nation," in A. D. Smith, ed., *Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).

[25]Cf. Ernest Gellner, "The New Circle of Equity," in C. M. Hann, ed., *When History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity and Creativity* (London: Athlone, 1994), 229–37.

[26]C. M. Hann, *Tea and the Domestication of the Turkish State* (SOAS Occasional Papers in Modern Turkish Studies 1) (Huntingdon: Eothen, 1990).

[27]Ethnographers have often reported local sarcasm concerning state decreed holidays and public ritual generally; for Turkey see Paul Magnarella, *Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town* (Rochester, Vt.: Schenkman Books, 1974), 138; for Romania, see David A. Kideckel, *The Solitude of Collectivism: Romanian Villagers to the Revolution and Beyond* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 194–96.

[28]Hann, *Tea and the Domestication of the Turkish State*.

[29]Ralf Dahrendorf, *Law and Order* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985), XI.

[30]Ralf Dahrendorf, *Life Chances: Approaches to Social and Political Theory* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), 125.

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It was the job of the liberal territorial state to add more positive liberties, and for this purpose it enlarged its territories and jurisdictions. It may be that the lesson of both development and terrorism is that such jurisdictions and the forms that go with them now need more substantial modification than we think. And if we resist the kind of projective consideration these require and cling to more modest solutions, it might be useful to recall Marx's comment that

> "the more powerful a state and hence the *more political* a nation, the less inclined it is to explain the *general* principle governing *social* ills and to seek out their causes by looking at the *principle of the state,* i.e., at the *actual organization* of society of which the state is the active, self-conscious and official expression. *Political* understanding is just *political* understanding because its thought does not transcend the limits of politics. The sharper and livelier it is the more incapable is it of comprehending social problems."

David E. Apter

From "Notes on the Underground: Left Violence and the National State"
Dædalus 108 (4) (Fall 1979)

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Geoff Eley

War and the Twentieth-Century State

THERE ARE MANY WAYS TO ENTER this discussion, and many ways for twentieth-century developments to be narrated. This paper might be situated theoretically, considering the extensive discussions of state theory since the late 1960s in sociology and political science, or, for that matter, within Marxism. Or it might dwell on a range of cognate discussions questioning the value of that state theory in its given forms, including most notably the post-Foucauldian theorizings of power, which explore the transference, or perhaps displacement, of political domination from institutional centers of government onto a wider social field. Then again, we might proceed from the more monographically historical literatures on the state in particular countries. There is an extensive literature in historical sociology, too, on state formation and comparative political development, which could lend itself for the framing of a paper like this. Other starting points, which would emphasize the first term of my title ("war," as opposed to "state"), would entail a similar repertoire of possible approaches.[1]

My own approach, therefore, has no claim to being comprehensive, self-sufficient, or even primary, but offers itself as just one of a large number of possible ways of constructing a field of questions. In this essay I am responding to an invitation to write about war and the state per se, and this provides my theme; I am not concerned with the state in some more comprehensive sense. Moreover, the essay's perspective is deep-historical, concerned with some broad questions of state formation and democratization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a whole, rather than with the immediate

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present or the era since 1945. Finally, my framework is avowedly Eurocentric, with little directly or empirically to say about the non-Western world, although I hope some of my arguments may fruitfully be explored elsewhere.

THREE LOGICS OF INQUIRY

What I would like to propose is a threefold conceptual framework, highlighting somewhat different logics of inquiry (different questions, literatures, disciplinary inputs) in each case: *1)* specific institutional processes of state formation that expand or enhance the claims of the state on society; *2)* processes of democratization that qualify rather than strengthen those claims; and *3)* logics of cultural inquiry that complicate the boundaries and encourage us to rethink the presence of the state—or the meanings of politics and the possible bases and modalities of power—in society. This framework does not map necessarily onto some other approaches—like discussions of strong and weak states—and presumes a mobile or eclectic interdisciplinarity, in which discussion of "the state" is certainly removed from its most familiar political science location. It also requires an important mobility of context, in which discussion moves freely between a variety of conventional "levels" of analysis, including not just the usual primary context of the territorial and institutionally bounded nation-state, but also the international state system and the micropolitical contexts of social relations, locality, and the everyday.

State Formation

Some notion of an expanding state is the most common narrative principle organizing current (since the late 1960s) discussions of the state in the twentieth century.[2] Institutional processes of state formation are usually presented as processes that *strengthen* the state in relation to society, whether via the centralizing of competence and decision-making; the concentration of functions; the adding of jurisdictions; the expansion of extractive claims on society via taxation, military service, and other obligations; the increase of police powers and general disciplinary surveillance; the growth of military capability; the systematic mobilization of resources and people; or the overall heightening of the nationalization logics, which during

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the nineteenth century still remained very indeterminate, but which have since increasingly standardized citizen-state relations, flattened regional differences, and secured the strongly centered territorial state as the primary context of political consciousness and action. Such arguments have also been linked to theories of the economy and its stages of development, whether Marxist (monopoly or late capitalism) or non-Marxist (organized or corporate capitalism), and to Weberian and other theories of modernity. Keynesianism and related systems of national economic management, linked to planning institutions, the growth of the public sector, and national taxation, form a more specific context of such analysis, as does corporatism and the prioritizing of industrial relations. Theories of the welfare state are another strand of the same kind, stressing the expansion of old state functions and the production of new.

In general, such arguments stress not only the expansion of the national state in the institutionally centered sense, but also the increased penetration of the state apparatuses *into* society. A commonplace of contemporary state discussions has accordingly become the blurring of earlier distinctions between the public and the private, as first the economy and then the family and personal life—the domains of modern society thought to be free of direct control by the state, in liberal notations—have become subject to regulative and politicizing interventions by the public power. Family, procreation, sexuality, the integrity of the body, domesticity, "privacy issues," and aspects of personhood thought to be protected from the state have all become main objects of government attention during the twentieth century. We may argue over the degree to which these matters have *ever* been part of a cleanly demarcated private sphere. Furthermore, even the more classic privacies, such as freedom of conscience or religious belief, have usually endured in patriarchally structured familial forms, with clear articulations to systems of social power, state-sanctioned authority, and the public good via notions of household, inheritance, sexual norms, and moral responsibility. It may well be, therefore, that the effective exclusion of such privacies from the state's claims or aspirations has been a specific and transitory historical phenomenon, one attaching principally to the formalistics of one kind of strong, liberal-democratic polity and constitutional regime, in which the more civil-libertarian impulse within liberalism seemed to acquire some ascen-

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dancy. But even here the demarcation of a protected private sphere has been realized more in rhetoric than in practice, far more a matter of abstract claims, deriving from the advocacy of philosophers, jurists, and political theorists, than an instituted set of observed practices and guarantees, for which liberal-democratic states have actually shown respect.

Even then, there is a big difference between the negative liberty associated with the state's abstention from intervention, its willingness not to interfere in aspects of private life, which, of course, can also mean tolerance for liberty-infringing and oppressive behaviors (like sexual abuse and domestic violence), and, on the other hand, the positive protections associated with the rights claims of the late twentieth century (as in the removal of legal restrictions on sexual orientation). However we specify the *actual* relation of the public and the private in the twentieth century, it should be clear that the discursive construction of this distinction has been full of fissures and contradictions, through which one kind of intervention or another has been able to slip—and not just as voyeurism, eavesdropping, or meddling, but often as an open and conscious strategy, one that sutures the privacies of individual conscience (whether in religion, parenthood, or sexuality) to the purposes of the nation, within an ideology, that is, of national citizenship.[3] At all events, the strong liberal argument for the protections of privacy, or for the private sphere's immunity to state control or intervention, has always been flawed, has certainly been contested, and has usually enjoyed indifferent support. Despite the gains apparently registered for such ideas since the 1960s, for instance, by the 1980s they were becoming much harder to sustain.

Thus the question of the growth of the state, its strengthening over and against society, can only partly be judged by quantitative measures—by charting the growth of budgets, the expansion of state personnel, the proliferation of agencies, the accumulation of legislation, and so on. It is also a matter of boundaries, of the areas of life to which the state's claims are thought to apply, and of political contestation around those definitions. In these terms, discussion of the state requires more than an institutional perspective; it needs some attention to questions of culture and ideology, whether via theories of domination and legitimacy, via Foucauldian notions of power and governmentality, and so on.

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In this connection, there is a pervasive sense in our own times that the state has been passing increasingly beyond accountability, whether we see this in traditional liberal-constitutional terms, or with reference to stronger notions of popular-democratic empowerment, to libertarian anxieties about big government, or simply to the diffuse (and remarkably widely diffused) populist assumption that power has become essentially remote and removed from the people—invisible, anonymous, mysterious, and beyond the normal modalities of democratic political control. Quite aside from the growing indifference of the US and British electorates to the latest corruption scandals (for instance, the intense ethical engagement of ordinary people over the Watergate revelations and the shoulder-shrugging cynicism surrounding the fiscal and security scandals of the Reagan-Bush era), popular culture has become shot through with assumptions about the inevitability of corruption and the essential dirtiness of political life. There seems little popular confidence that traditional forms of political mobilization, whether through parties or social movements, can make any difference at all, and in the countless televisual and cinematic dramatizations of the 1980s, whether focusing on national security and secrecy issues or some social problem or a miscarriage of justice or simply a crime, in which the arrogance and opacity of state bureaucracies are matched by the ineffectuality of constitutional controls and the malevolence and incompetence of law enforcement, it is only heroic individualism and the lone vigilante that save the day. Power's receding intelligibility in this sense has a varied representational repertoire in contemporary popular culture, but the most compelling of its forms is perhaps the technological dystopia so familiar from the fictions and cinema of the 1980s. State power has become impersonal and arbitrary, working through technologies of domination that are not explained, that possess no accountability, that destroy or efface citizenship, that subsist on secrecy, invisibilities, and logics of alienation and inhumanity.[4]

We can see this too in some shifting theoretical preoccupations, such as the difference between the Gramsci reception of the late 1970s and the Foucault reception that gathered momentum into the next decade. (Here I am interested less in the value of the thinkers themselves or their ideas than in the purposes and logics their influence helped to sustain.) The turning to Gramsci by large num-

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bers of people working in the areas we have come to call cultural studies was moved by the desire to distinguish consent from force or coercion in the constitution of authority and the stability and cohesion of political order, so that a space could be conceptualized not only for differences of interest and ideology, but also for strategic contestations and for the possibilities of resistance to state power via the autonomies that the capitalist state in particular seemed structurally to allow. In this way the twentieth-century strengthening of the state was acknowledged, while sites were sought out where new forms of political contestation could nonetheless occur, and the issue of democracy was inserted into the story of the expanding state through the concepts of hegemony and counterhegemony.

With the reception of Foucault, on the other hand, we are back to a more pessimistic reading of political process, in which (contrary to many interpretations) resistance can certainly be conceptualized, but where its forms and possibilities are continuously displaced from the conventionally regarded institutional centers of the state and the political system to one type of micropolitical context or another. In Foucault we encounter more the difficulties of resistance because of the much greater diffusion of the forms of power than the earlier state-theoretical discussion (though not the reception of Gramsci) had been ready to see. For post-Foucauldian reasonings, the state, in the centralized national and institutional sense, recedes as the primary means of conceptualizing the sources, modalities, and forms of organization of power, and the cultural construction of domination, in dispersed and localized ways, takes its place. It is power's pervasiveness and invisible capillary forms that receive attention, rather than the manifest and identifiable institutional demarcations. Power in the state centralized sense acquires protection, becomes immune, is screened against democratic visibility precisely because power in the Foucauldian sense is doing its work.

Democratization

Mentioning Gramsci nudges us towards the second of my themes, namely the question of democracy and the restraining of the state, and here the main axis of discussion shifts to society and citizenship, to the creation of democratic political capacities as opposed to

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the expansion of the state and *its* institutional claims. In this respect we need to begin with the constitutional question in the strictest sense—that is, with the legal and constitutionally formalized and secured conditions of democracy—and the first point to make concerns the extremely modest degrees of democracy attained in political systems anywhere before 1914.[5] By any strict criteria (popular sovereignty and democratic government on the basis of free, universal, secret, adult, and equal suffrage, complemented by legal freedoms of speech, conscience, assembly, association, the press, and no arrest without trial), democracy had become established in only three peripheral societies of the world system, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway, together with certain states and provinces of the western United States and Canada (interestingly, all frontier societies, in one way or another). If we relax the stringency of the definition along a major dimension, removing the requirement for female suffrage, then France and Switzerland may be added to the list. In this full sense, in other words, it is only after 1918 that democracy acquires any general currency as a normal type of polity or system of government (and then only very uncertainly and provisionally, as the 1920s were to reveal), receiving a further vital increment in its international diffusion after 1945—two dates that immediately emphasize the importance of our grand thematics, concerning the dynamics of war and the state.

Moving beyond the more strictly juridical definition of democracy, though, we need ways of theorizing the circumstances in which democratic gains can realistically occur. That is, we have to encompass the dynamics of democracy's emergence and the messier contingency of democracy's recorded eventuations, the complex histories of its actually existing forms. And here we will need to focus not only on the obvious political arenas of struggle for parliamentary representative institutions and citizenship rights guaranteed by the law, but on a wider series of contexts, which in the twentieth century would include at least the following: *1)* the ambitious conceptions of social rights implied by the rise of the welfare state; *2)* the enlargement of citizenship capacities via processes that may or may not receive explicit ratification on the national stage of politics or become institutionalized under law; *3)* the mobility of distinctions between the public and the private in fields of regulation and intervention oriented towards issues of personhood and

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the social body; and *4)* the variegated political space of an increasingly mass-mediated public sphere. Here, incidentally, I am taking the gendered nature of the processes concerned to be axiomatic, in the sense not only of their necessarily gendered dimension (in the fundamental sense pioneered by contemporary feminist theory and popularized among historians by, for example, Joan Scott), but as a vital term of democratic realization per se.[6] In other words, the assessment of the credentials or efficacy of a particular democratic advance, its relationship to the ordering of sexual difference, and to the operative constructions of what it means to be a woman or a man, becomes a key priority, just as the specific issue of the degree of inclusion of women in democratic gains becomes a vital (but previously largely neglected) substantive concern of its own. Moreover, it is worth noting the size of the discrepancy between the expanded definition of democracy (*dynamic* as opposed to *formal* or *juridical* conditions of possibility) and the highly formalistic understandings currently operating in the predominant discourse of contemporary democratic transition in relation to Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and other parts of the world, where the broader context of determination conceded appears to be one defined by the market in economistic or philosophical ways.

Once we approach the question of democracy in this way, once we begin historicizing the circumstances under which democratic forms were/are/can be proposed and secured, the insufficiency (though certainly not the irrelevance) of a purely formal or juridical definitional approach becomes clear. This is most evident, perhaps, (focusing now on the earlier twentieth century) with those limited liberal conceptions that identify the forms of realization of democratic politics with the achievement of parliamentary constitutions of the classic pre-1914 type, which won general European currency in the period beginning in the 1860s, because the actual field of contention surrounding the new constitution-making breakthroughs of 1918 was far broader. It issued from a period of general societal crisis and political breakdown via conditions of popular insurrectionary turbulence and produced strengthened republican constitutions going way beyond the modest constitutionalisms of the years before 1914, incorporating all the elements indicated in my expanded definition of democracy. This is even more true of the next

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transnational moment of European constitution-making in 1945–1949.

Of course, struggles over parliamentary sovereignty and the integrity of the electoral process—the core practical forms of the juridical democratic idea—remained central to popular democratic mobilizations after 1914, and where the Left neglected or dismissed their value, despising rather than acknowledging their insufficiencies, as most obviously in the communist, but also in the Western ultra-Left, traditions, democracy suffered disastrously. But, there are other dimensions of democratization that exceed this limited frame. The impact of social movements on the terms of the democratic settlements in 1918–1923 and 1945–1949, from trade unions to women's movements and moral crusades, forms one major instance of democracy's larger dynamics, requiring the grounding of juridical definitions of a democratic polity in some developed conception of *civil society,* arguably the necessary complement to such definitions. Similarly, the formation of the welfare state—the making social of democracy, as one might call it, whose contradictory terms were pioneered in a wide variety of labor movement, progressivist, managerial-technocratic, and moralizing contexts after the 1880s—supplies a second big instance. Yet a third instance would be the popular mobilizations of the radical *Right* in the same period, explicitly *anti*-democratic in conscious or formal orientations, but practically expanding the bounds of participation within the public sphere, in ways symbiotically related to the production of new democratic capacities and extremely important for democracy's future dynamics. Lastly, the direct democratic and community-based forms of participatory politics, most commonly associated with the Soviets and workers' councils but assuming a wide variety of additional forms, which were so crucial to the specificities of the popular democratic upsurge in Europe after 1917, also need to be brought in.

In relation to our grand thematics, there are perhaps two general points arising from this discussion of democracy. The first is that the major increments of general European democracy earlier in the twentieth century depended on the prior conditions of societal breakdown or transformation produced by war—and produced, it should be said, by war of a particular kind, namely *total war,* or warfare requiring general societal mobilization over several years,

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bringing big expansions of the state's presence in and demands upon society, its resources and territorial population.[7] The earlier generalized moments of Europe-wide constitution-making—the successful ones of 1776–1815 and 1859–1871, not the failed ones of 1830 and 1848–1851—also involved political crises related to warfare, if not in the dramatic and comprehensive manner of 1917–1923 and 1945–1949. On the other hand, the most recent of these constitution-making conjunctures, that of 1989–1992, was not produced by such a war-generated societal crisis, unless one substitutes a model of societal peacetime militarization, for which some have certainly made a strong case.[8]

The second general point arising from this discussion of democracy is to state the implicit argument of my comments so far and concerns their central paradox, namely the dependence of large-scale democratic breakthroughs on processes and conjunctures that massively *strengthen* state power. On the one hand, during the two world wars we had the production of new democratic capacities, which became organized into an impressive postwar legal, institutional, and political settlement, codified into mainly republican constitutions and grounded in the negotiation of a large-scale social compromise, a system of fundamental reforms linked to popular agency, which qualified and limited the construction and exercise of public authority, rendering the latter formally and practically accountable. On the other hand, we have the emergence—partly improvised, partly elaborated into strategic designs, and generally borne by logics of unprecedented societal mobilization—of an immeasurably more demanding state, whose centralized claims, insidiousness, and forms of distributed authority and power seem ever less susceptible to effective accountability and control.

One way of dealing with this paradox is to remember an important first principle: war is essentially destructive in its immediate material effects. During both wartime and the building and securing of postwar settlements, war also leads to the destabilizing and weakening, even the complete dissolution, of existing state structures and forms. The difference is between winners and losers: World War I may have effected a general strengthening of the state during the war, but by 1917–1918 it had also brought a catastrophic weakening of those states that turned out to be losers, mainly the Russian, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and German multinational

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Empires, but also Italy, which was technically on the winning side. At the same time, the victor societies—Britain, France, but also Belgium and by extension the Netherlands—also experienced a powerful increment of democracy after 1918 without the vacuum of the East Central European political collapse.

The paradox may best be explained by some notion of social contract or historic compromise, which was common to most combatant societies in the high conjuncture of wartime mobilization, but whose specific terms or forms of negotiation varied with the political conditions accompanying the war's end. At its center was the cashing in of the patriotic check—the popular expectation of substantial social and political reform in return for the sacrifices required by the wartime mobilization, whether generalized in relation to food shortages and other privations and forms of social discipline, or more specifically in relation to trade-union incorporation, the modification of labor practices, and the reordering of the economy. Where political authorities collapsed in the midst of military defeat (e.g., Germany and the Habsburg monarchy), the resultant settlement was linked to more radical measures of political democratization and a stronger version of the welfare state; where they remained intact, enhanced by the prestige of military victory (Britain and France) the settlement was more modest on both accounts, namely a less complete extension of the franchise and a heavily compromised social deal. The long-term record was in any case mixed. On the one hand, the Europe-wide process of democratic constitution-making produced a dramatically transformed set of polities and international systems: the new successor states were all equipped with constitutions that were originally strongly democratic, linked to impressive projects of social reform, further challenged and incited by the direct democracy of the Soviets. On the other hand, by the end of the 1920s, in European terms, very little of this settlement was left and few of the new democratic capacities were able to survive the postwar decade.

Logics of Cultural Inquiry

The instabilities and impermanence of the democratic settlements fashioned after World War I have many explanations, but one important distinction concerns the difference between *constitution-making* and *culture building*. At one level the political breakdowns

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of the 1920s and 1930s reflected the thinness of the emergent societal consensus and the fragility of democratic values. And to make sense of the latter (and to conceptualize the basis on which stable democratic cultures can emerge) we need some developed conception of the *public sphere*. The toughening of civil society through the enhancement of the public sphere—all the ways in which the self-organization of society (through collective organization and action of all kinds, the formation of political identities, the expression of opinion, the circulation of ideas, and so on) acquired legitimacy and a legally protected public space—is a vital aspect of the postwar political settlements in 1918 and 1945 and should be part of any discussion of the twentieth-century state.

Again, this question can certainly be pursued constitutionally as a matter of legal innovation and institutional change, and during the two worlds wars we can find the same contradictory dualism between, so to speak, the state-enhancing and state-qualifying developments. In one way, wartime conditions severely cramped and damaged this aspect of the state/society order: the militarization of public life and the latter's heavy limitation via censorship, suspension of debate, surveillance, emergency legislation, and states of siege do not exactly conduce to the opening up of the public sphere in democratic ways, but rather make the latter more difficult. At the same time, the conditions of wartime mobilization and the terms of the associated patriotic discourse also legitimized the voice of all those groups willing to situate themselves inside the consensus. *This* process certainly helped bring new groups into the recognized political nation—most obviously the organized working class, but also groups with less of an established collective history, such as women and other social categories now available for political address, including youth and the ordinary soldier. In that sense (speaking still of World War I), the real concern is the weakness of the succeeding democratic consensus in the new states produced by the Central European military collapse and the failure of the post-1918 leaderships to organize the emergent democratic capacities into a sufficiently broad and resilient political culture.

The field of interaction between legal conditions, institutional growth, and political culture is extremely important here. In one aggregate dimension the various measures of post-1918 democratization (republican sovereignty and the new discourse of citizenship,

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the strengthening of parliamentary government, protections for the press, expansion of workers' rights under the law, corporative recognition of trade unions, growth of civil liberties, graduation of social legislation into the welfare state, and so on) translated into a new kind of public sphere, particularly where (as in the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires) public freedoms had been cramped and harassed before 1914. Without this benefit of an expanded and legally protected national or society-wide public sphere—which for popular democratic purposes is arguably a sine qua non and is at all events a huge strategic gain—social movements would remain confined to their own defensive and self-referential, largely ghettoized subcultural space. Under the least promising situations, after all, subcultural self-organization is possible in this more inward-looking sense. But without the secure access to a wider public domain such achievements are severely limited in their efficacy: They are deprived of the necessary access to possible coalitions and therefore to the supports of a broad enough societal consensus. More fundamentally, in fact, they lack either the national-popular credibility of a plausible counterhegemonic claim—the necessary moral-political capital for governing—or effective resistances against antidemocratic or counterrevolutionary repression should it arrive.

The experience of the Warsaw Ghetto between 1939 and 1942 illustrates this point; it is an extreme example of the subcultural effect. Despite the most extreme forms of violent, repressive, and coercive domination, which effectively excluded consensual forms of political negotiation between rulers and ruled and reduced the subordinate population's freedoms and autonomies to a minimum, room was still found for forms of collective self-organization. The most extraordinary forms of creativity were displayed in the miniscule space the Nazis left, so that beneath the level of the *Judenrat*'s official governance and the larger public sector grouped around the Jewish Social Assistance there functioned a comprehensive network of House Committees composing the Ghetto's real associational fabric, together with an impressive undergrowth of religious, educational, and other cultural activities, including (crucially, one might say) the record-keeping mission of the Oneg Shabbat Archive assembled by Emmanuel Ringelblum. Such creativity also had its political dimension because all political factions and tendencies were present and active in Ghetto life—conservatives, right and left-

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wing Zionists, Revisionists, Bundist-Socialists, Communists, and especially the youth movements of these various groups. This political culture of the Ghetto also sustained an underground press.[9] But on the other hand, of course, this remarkable subcultural creativity made no difference at all once the Nazis began clearing the Ghetto in July 1942, despite the heroic contribution of the Jewish Fighting Organization's activists to the Ghetto Rising of 1943 and the constitutive importance of their legacies for the structuring of Israeli political culture later on. Subcultural vitality without the wider arena of a nationally organized and legally guaranteed public sphere, a field of effectivity beyond itself, however impressive its defensive supports at a level of survival, could only secure the limited integrity of a vulnerable and subordinated public.[10]

Post-1945 Britain provides an excellent illustration of the counter case—one involving the production of a democratically centered or inflected societal consensus, organized around a strongly liberal public sphere with its concomitant legalities, fashioned from the popular democratic momentum of a wartime social mobilization, linked to the social contract of a postwar settlement, and with a consequent set of powerful popular identifications with the state in question. The institutional features of the British version of the Keynesian welfare-state synthesis—social security "from the cradle to the grave," the National Health Service, the Butler Education Act, progressive taxation, strong public-sector policies, corporative economic management, strong ideals of trade-union recognition and social citizenship—are familiar enough, and for the legitimizing narratives of popular memory surrounding this achievement both the founding rigors of the postwar Labour Government and the normalizing complacencies of the succeeding Conservative administrations held an important place. But the lasting stability of this consensus, which endured into the 1970s, also depended on a larger cultural script linking the 1930s and 1940s, for which the national-popular intelligibility of the British state during World War II became the key.

In this narrative, the poverty of the 1930s has been a sign for the difference and desirability of the present.[11] From the vantage point of the 1950s, the 1930s signified a massive failure of the system—the "wasted years," the "devil's decade," the "low, dishonest decade," in the familiar phrases of the day. The imagery of dismal

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

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

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hardships, mass unemployment, and hunger marches described an unacceptable past not to be repeated, a societal misery requiring collective action and public responsibility. World War II, accordingly, was a good war, not just because of its antifascist character (the quality usually cited), but because the egalitarianism and social solidarities needed for victory also made an irrefutable case for equitable social policies in the peacetime to come. The breadth of the post-1945 consensus for the welfare state rested rhetorically on this suturing of the depression and the war, of patriotism and social need, national interest and common good. In popular memory this rendition of the 1930s and 1940s became an especially effective and resonant narrative holding together a coherent sense of Britishness after the war. The late Dennis Potter, the least sentimental of cultural critics, said:

> . . .we were, at that time, both a brave and a steadfast people, and we shared an aim, a condition, a political aspiration if you like, which was shown immediately in the 1945 General Election, and then one of the great governments of British history—those five, six years of creating what is now being so brutally and wantonly and callously dismantled was actually a period to be proud of, and I'm proud of it.[12]

The important point is less the historical accuracy of this description (the forms national unity may actually have assumed during the 1940s, the actual record of the postwar Labour Government, and so on) than its plausibility for a particular set of generations (including such voices as Dennis Potter, who, after all, was simultaneously the most unrelenting and acerbic of critics of the establishmentarian integument of postwar British political culture). In other words, we can only fully engage this question of war and the state by also exploring its cultural dimension, by exploring the fields of popular political identification the wartime experience brought into being, the complicated ways in which they became articulated to a postwar system of politics or the postwar settlement, the forms of legitimation they provided for the postwar state, and the supports they delivered for one kind of politics or another. The forms of cohesion and stability in a society—and the conditions under which the latter are able to be renewed and reproduced—depend crucially on the forms of identification forged in popular memory and popular culture with that society's political institutions (with its state),

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and in the twentieth century in this respect the European transnational constitution-making conjunctures associated with the aftermath of the two world wars have undoubtedly been key. How far the current moment of constitution-making, framed by the East European Revolutions of 1989 and the Single Europe legislation of 1992, proves to be of comparable importance is perhaps a subject for another discussion.

CONCLUSION

This essay has focused on a specific set of questions within the state/society field, namely, questions concerning democratization. More exactly: what are the circumstances under which structural gains of democratization have been registered or achieved in twentieth-century Europe; and what are the conditions under which democratic political capacities have been produced? The broadening of perspective from the juridical and constitutional terms of definition to a more dynamic and historicized understanding of how democracies are made is crucial. In this respect, the two principal moments of Europe-wide democratization in the twentieth century (in the sense of a fundamental restructuring of the continent's political landscape) were the political settlements produced by the end of the two world wars; this suggests an important paradox, namely that the two moments of the twentieth century that produced the most imposing accretions or concentrations of state power, that radically *expanded* the claims of the state *on* society, were also the moments that generated the successful drives for democratization.

The state's popular legitimacy, the cultural aspects of the state, consists of everything that states undertake to ensure their own reproducibility and the stability and cohesion of society; or everything that needs to happen if the state as a particular institutional complex, as an organized concentration of public authority, is to be reproduced. This question of popular legitimacy is enormously complicated and far exceeds the realistic bounds of what I can deal with here. But one way of approaching it is certainly via the issues of memory and history. By memory I mean an entire dimension of politics, one involving conscious and unconscious capacities, resources, and interventions—that is, an apparatus of remembering (and forgetting), a complex of media and sites (film, television,

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song, photographs, advertisements, museums, commemoration, tourist spots, fictions, ceremonial, history, political speeches, and so forth), a collective common sense, a whole repertoire of cultural scripts that are given to us, become memorized, are subject to all sorts of political contest and dispute, and by these complicated processes allow coherent understandings to be secured. The two world wars have been enormously important in shaping the dominant cultural narratives crucial to the legitimacy of European states; and it has only been fairly recently (since the 1970s) that these dominant forms of legitimacy have become subject to change.

The catastrophic nature of the two world wars—the scale of the fighting, the massive demands of states on their societies, the unprecedented popular mobilizations involved in conscript armies and on the home front, the extraordinary numbers of casualties, and the unprecedented pervasiveness of the violence and the death—produced a new awareness in the postwar electorates of just how far governments were willing and able to go. This worked powerfully with the grain of another popular memory store, focused on the shame of the 1930s—the misery of mass unemployment, the ineffectiveness of existing governments, and the discrediting of old elites, based on their failure to resist the rise of fascism and their subsequent propensity to collaboration in the wartime years of Nazi occupation—to mobilize popular expectations after 1945 behind a vision of reconstruction incorporating strong ideals of democratic citizenship, egalitarianism, and social justice. Of course, the rapid reprocessing of those desires under the impact of the Cold War quickly reduced the more radical potentials, but powerful traces of the popular script still remained, embedded in a broad consensus concerning the collective good—certain default assumptions about what the state could be expected to provide, that is, and a popular confidence in the efficacy of state action especially of the welfare-statist and corporative kinds. It is the terms of this script—common to most European societies, but in varying forms—that are now being revised. Given the growing importance of the European Union and other transnational decision-making structures and jurisdictions and the consequences of globalization for the territorialized sovereignties of nation-states, it remains to be seen how democratic political capacities can be recreated within a new and convincing narrative of popular empowerment, if at all. The sobering

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course of the post-1989 histories of Eastern Europe, in which the democratic potentials of the revolutionary events themselves have become, to a great extent, dissipated in the marketizing logics of the longer-term transition, is a particular case of this dilemma. The unstoppable claims of the market are a striking instance of what I referred to as the receding intelligibility of power.

Finally, we can only conceptualize the question of twentieth-century state formation (whether in relation to war or more generally) by moving out from the more familiar ground of discussion (a set of mainly institutional perspectives, in the established thematics of the war economy and the welfare state, in disciplinary contexts of comparative social science and monographic historical research), in substantive and interdiscipinary ways, to situate the problematic of the state in a series of wider and more eclectic analytical fields. Putting it simply, and without abandoning or disavowing existing approaches (a key proviso this), we need to move away from studying the state in a mainly national-institutional sense to seeing it more imaginatively in its relationship to society and culture. Shifting the focus in such a manner also means entering other disciplinary fields, and most notably cultural studies. In particular, we need ways of transcending the increasingly tiresome confrontational polemics which keep work in cultural studies and (for want of a better description) materialist social science apart. A series of conceptual terms provided in this essay—civil society, public sphere, political culture—might provide the productive ground for such an exchange.

ENDNOTES

[1]Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), is the best general guide to recent discussions. See also Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989), and *Models of Democracy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987); Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1990* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); and Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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[2]I use the term "narrative" here loosely to indicate developmental or dynamic accounts of state formation, although my usage is certainly informed by literary theory.

[3]For some brilliant reflections on this complex of issues, see the work of Lauren Berlant, especially "The Theory of Infantile Citizenship," *Public Culture* 5 (1993): 395–410, and an unpublished paper, "Live Sex Acts," presented to the CSST (Program for the Comparative Study of Social Transformations) Conference on Culture, University of Michigan, 7–9 October 1994.

[4]In making this point about power's receding intelligibility, I am not suggesting that power was previously transparent, or that mechanisms of democratic accountability were previously unproblematic. Nonetheless, there is a contemporary crisis of democratic credibility, especially marked in the United States, that requires some specific formulation.

[5]My discussion here follows Göran Therborn, "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," *New Left Review* 103 (May-June 1977): 3–42.

[6]Here see especially: Carole Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy," in Carole Pateman, *The Disorder of Women* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 118–40, and "The Fraternal Social Contract," in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (London: Verso, 1988), 101–27; Nancy Fraser, "What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender," and "Struggle over Needs: Outline of a Socialist-Feminist Critical Theory of Late Capitalist Political Culture," in Nancy Fraser, *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 113–43, and 161–87; Mary Dietz, "Context is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship," in Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (London: Verso, 1992), 63–85; and Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

[7]Here I am talking in specifically European terms, in a delimited Eurocentric but transnational or Europeanwide sense.

[8]The best recent statement of this view is by Michael Geyer, "The Militarization of Europe, 1914–1945," in John R. Gillis, ed., *The Militarization of the Western World* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 65–102. In a more limited way, the destabilizing domestic consequences of Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan functioned analogously to the two world wars, helping generate the political urgencies of the Gorbachev era, and feeding indirectly into the Eastern European crisis of 1989. I am grateful to Vincent Cable for reminding me of this point.

[9]Evidence survives in Warsaw of an astonishing forty-seven separate newspapers between early 1940 and the summer of 1942.

[10]This paragraph is based on Yisrael Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1982), esp. 119–54.

[11]Since the later 1970s the coordinates of this juxtaposition have changed (have been radically attacked and transformed, in fact), and under the impact of Thatcherism's retelling of the story the "present" of the 1980s became funda-

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mentally different from the "present" that previously prevailed. This reimagining of the past—a powerful reworking of popular memory with decisive effects on how recent history could be remembered—became a central feature of the public rhetorics, pedagogy, and popular culture of the 1980s. I have discussed aspects of this process in Geoff Eley, "Distant Voices, Still Lives. The Family is a Dangerous Place: Memory, Gender, and the Image of the Working Class," in Robert Rosenstone, ed., *Revisioning History: Film and the Construction of the Past* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). See also Roger Bromley, *Lost Narratives: Popular Fictions, Politics and Recent History* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[12]Dennis Potter, *Seeing the Blossom: Two Interviews and a Lecture* (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), 9.

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Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr.

The Insecure State: Reflections on "the State" and "Security" in a Changing World

COLLECTOR'S ITEM

IN THE HEYDAY OF THE COLD WAR, students of the once popular, American-inspired discipline of "strategic studies" could both amaze and appall their friends with a small, seemingly innocuous plastic device known to the cognoscenti as the "RAND Bomb Damage Effect Calculator."[1] By turning a series of concentric dials and aligning such esoteric inputs as "bomb yield" and "single shot probability," one could calculate with apparent precision the devastation that would result from the explosion of a nuclear weapon. In its self-contained simplicity, its diabolical elegance (to employ a rhetorical flourish appropriate to the age), the device was a metaphor for the bloodless, pseudoscientific calculus of the Cold War. Equipped with a bomb damage effect calculator, the strategic studies devotee could gaze upon the world secure in the knowledge that in his hands lay the essence of the international security problematique.

There are no longer any such devices. If one were to exist today, it would undoubtedly confound its user with its Rube Goldbergesque complexity. To the grim factors that once combined to create the nuclear threat would have to be added, or so it is argued, an almost endless array of interconnected inputs that would challenge the capabilities of even the most advanced microchip. In the deceptively profound words of a former American ambassador when asked his views on post-Cold War developments, "everything is related to everything else, only more so now than ever."[2]

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It is the very abundance and intricacy of these interrelationships that have posed the greatest obstacle to those now seeking to identify and reify the essence of security. Despite the daunting nature of the task, there has been no shortage of would-be "damage effect calculator makers" who have attempted to redefine security in ways that do not lend themselves to the simple alignment of a few plastic dials. Asserting that security is something more than "the study of the threat, use and control of military force,"[3] an eclectic cadre of new thinkers has promoted such nonmilitary phenomena as environmental degradation, migration, narcotics trafficking, AIDS, and global population growth as worthy subjects for inclusion within a new, broader conception of the field. In response to this conceptual and, for those whose livelihoods have been at stake, practical challenge, the "strict constructionist" school has argued that such a redefinition of security threatens to destroy the field's "intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these [other] important problems."[4] As the dust begins to settle from the epochal changes of 1989–1990 (without a trace of radioactivity, it should be gratefully acknowledged), some have maintained that the more traditional agenda has reasserted its primacy with a strength and vigor that hearken "back to the future."[5]

At the heart of the debate over the evolving nature of security is a familiar, albeit mercurial, entity: "the state." The revisionists, in their rejection of the well-defined Ptolemaic order of the Cold War, in which security revolved around the state, have sought to shift the focus of attention to the borderless realm of humanity and its fragile habitat. Dismissing attempts to change the referent object of security as heretical or even dangerous, the keepers of the faith maintain that, in a world still dominated by the force of arms, the locus of security remains, and must remain, the state.

What, then, are we to make of the conceptual disarray that has accompanied the end of the Cold War? What lessons have we learned since the fall of the Berlin Wall? Have we now entered, as then CIA Director James Woolsey warned, "a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes,"[6] or, having witnessed the demise of the dragon that defined the chief security threat for the past forty years, have we again been presented with an opportunity—indeed, some would argue, a duty—to remake the world, and in the

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words of UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "to secure justice and human rights, promote social progress. . .meet successfully threats to common security"?[7]

In an attempt to shed light on some of the key underlying themes that bind these concerns together, I will argue in this essay that behind the lack of conceptual clarity surrounding post-Cold War definitions of "security" is a basic misunderstanding about the changing role of the state in a changing world. Clearly, this is not the whole story; once meaningful concepts of aggression, threat, intervention, and the like also await reconceptualization. But the inability of scholars and policymakers to fully comprehend the transformations taking place in the contemporary state is, I would contend, a major factor contributing to the clouded perception of security in the final decade of this eventful and often tumultuous century.

DEFINITIONAL DISORDER

For the intellectual progeny of Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, and Hegel, giving substance to the term "the state" has long been a daunting practical and theoretical challenge that, nonetheless, has been willingly and exhaustively pursued. From the "realist" conception of an independent, territorially-bounded political entity driven by an unquenchable thirst for power, to alternative approaches focused on ruling class interests or the impersonal "apparatus of government," the state has been cast in many forms. After conducting an extensive literature search of the subject, political scientist James Rosenau bemoaned:

> I remain disconcerted by the wavering, multiple uses and elusive formulations of the concept [of the state], not to mention intimidated by an inability to reconcile such unqualified observers as those who assert that "the state is not a thing. . .it does not, as such, exist" with those who argue that "nothing is more real in this world of ours than states."[8]

It is easy to become disconcerted—if at the same time impressed—by the sheer volume and variety of criteria that have been presented as determinants of statehood. To the core elements of a "defined territory, permament population, government and capacity to enter

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into relations with other states,"[9] have been added such requisites as the provision of a minimum standard of social and economic welfare, maintenance of law and order, establishment of property rights, and, more recently, protection of human rights. Despite the many attempts at semantic precision and the ubiquity of the subject matter, there remains no single characterization of the state that is universally recognized. Even one of the most widely-acknowledged definitions, Max Weber's classic formulation of an entity "capable of sustaining the claim to the legitimate monopoly of control of the means of violence within a given territory,"[10] has been found lacking by those who question its applicability in the face of the widespread delegitimation of authority and absence of "law and order" in the modern world. That such intellectual challenges are even made is testament both to the recondite—some might even say irrelevant—character of the discourse surrounding the state and to the persistent lack of consensus about its essential nature. Each of the social sciences appears to have developed its own idiosyncratic notion of statehood, which, while serving certain narrowly-defined ends, is largely nontransferable across disciplinary boundaries. There are even multiple definitions of the state employed within different branches of the same discipline, most notably political science. Compounding the confusion is a presumption among those employing the term that others subscribe to a particular definition, when something quite different is often understood.

Notwithstanding the "dialogue of the deaf" that characterizes much of the discourse about the state, the search for an immutable core within this wavering entity continues to engage the attention of scholars. In his tripartite analysis of the state, British political scientist Barry Buzan[11] suggests why such searches have invariably proved inconclusive. In addition to the commonly-cited material and institutional determinants of statehood, Buzan views "the idea of the state" as vital to its existence. While giving equal prominence to the more tangible elements of the state, his acknowledgment of the subjective, ideational dimension of statehood is an important corrective to the ostensibly objective criteria that have been offered in other definitions. Buzan's bow to subjectivity lends support to the proposition that the state is, in some important respects, an abstraction, an entity existing "chiefly in the hearts and minds of people."[12] By conceding that statehood ultimately depends as much on what

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people think about the state as on its more tangible assets, Buzan's notion helps bridge the conceptual divide between those who believe "it is not a thing" and those who believe that "nothing is more real."

CHIPPING AWAY AT THE EDIFICE

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts to reconceptualize the state have proliferated anew. Much of this work has focused on the alleged deficiencies of the contemporary state when compared to its earlier incarnations. There has been a growing literature in recent years on fundamental shifts in political and economic power to such entities as "The Catalytic State,"[13] "The Region State,"[14] and "The Soft-Edged State"[15] that portend the gradual irrelevance of statehood as we know it. Indeed, this issue of *Dædalus* as well as its 1993 precursor are, in part, contributors to this movement. Complementing and encouraging this line of inquiry has been a proliferation of academic conferences and "policy dialogues" with such titles as "Beyond the State" (recalling Ernst Haas's 1964 book of the same title), "The End of the State?" (both in the interrogatory and declarative forms), "The Future of the State," and the felicitously titled, "W[h]ither the State?"

The basic questions that have recently been raised about the ability of the state to function as a coherent and viable actor in an increasingly complex and interdependent world are not new; they echo those voiced decades ago by such keen observers of the world scene as Hedley Bull, Charles Kindleberger, Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Falk, George Kegley, and (despite his notoriety as a state-centric grandmaster of realpolitik) Henry Kissinger, among many others.[16] What distinguishes today's debate from earlier versions, however, is the radically changed geopolitical environment, in which the contingent nature of statehood has never *seemed* so apparent. The accelerated globalization of the world economy, revolutionary advances in communications and transport, secessionist pressures, and environmental, health, and demographic trends are all viewed as undermining the state's "traditional" capabilities and authority as never before. Contributing to this phenomenon are such diverse and increasingly powerful nonstate actors as transnational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, religious movements, drug

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cartels, and other global phenomena that fall outside of state control. In a world dominated by the overriding imperatives of the market and the unstoppable diffusion of information, territorial boundaries are viewed by some as largely meaningless. Internally, the state is seen as increasingly incapable of providing for the general welfare and asserting its claim to be the moral arbiter of its citizens' lives. Such developments have been used to buttress earlier claims of the state's withering competence that focused on its inability to protect its citizens from attack by hostile foreigners (perhaps the most vaunted of its traditional functions).

In conceding that some of the state's capabilities have been undermined, its adherents contend that no more effective form of political organization has yet been found to replace it. Despite myriad challenges, the state remains the primary actor on the world stage. Its preeminent role in military matters, its macrolevel regulatory authority, its penetration of society, its control over natural and human resources, its formidable ability to rally citizens around a common goal, are all given as reasons to support this claim. One need only ask the Kurds, Quebecois, Tutsi, Karen, or Tibetans to what form of political organization they aspire to see that the notion of statehood continues to have great resonance. In response to those who question the continued relevance of the state's territorial bonds, it can be argued that the doctrine of nonintervention as enshrined in ARTICLE 2 of the UN Charter and the informal but widely-held norm recognizing the validity of existing international borders have ensured that many preexisting states that once might have been swallowed up or dismembered by stronger neighbors are able to survive with their territorial autonomy and independence intact.[17] To arguments that supranational entities such as the European Community are subverting the authority of its constitutent units, the point is made that the end product of the pooling of sovereignty is an even larger, more efficient state. It is further maintained that in a world made smaller, and in some ways more homogeneous, by the relentless advance of technology, the state (especially the "nation-state") provides the most effective means of expressing a particular people's sense of identity and uniqueness and satisfying what Benedict Anderson has evocatively referred to as its "metaphysical yearnings."[18]

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FALLACY OF A DOUBLE ABSTRACTION

If there is no common agreement among scholars about what constitutes "the state" in the modern world, if its abstract and variegated qualities render it immune to definitive explication, how then is its competence to be judged? Curiously, if we examine closely the arguments of those who claim that the state is a teetering colossus and those who maintain that it retains much of its historic preeminence, a common flaw is evident. Both are based largely on the assumption that the state has either receded from or remained essentially level with a high-water mark of statehood that purportedly existed at some point in the past. This is not to contend that either critics or adherents would deny, for example, that the power possessed by Louis XIV's France was far different in quality and quantity from that possessed by many states today. Rather, it is to say that there is general agreement that within the historic context of the seventeenth century, France's claim to statehood was quite secure in relation to other states on the international scene. Those who argue that the contemporary state is a pale shadow of its former self would contend that many late twentieth-century states are, in relative terms, far less "stately" than was seventeenth-century France. Others would point out that the relative standing of many states today is no less—and in some cases is even more—imposing than it was three centuries ago.

Regardless of the perspective, a close analysis of the historical record indicates that the traditional competencies of the state were never quite as they are now sometimes imagined to have been. To take only one of many examples, state control over economic matters, as Stephen Krasner[19] has documented, was much less comprehensive throughout most of the presumed heyday of the territorial state than it is for many today. In each of the key areas in which state authority has supposedly been eroded—including its control over communications, its role in ensuring economic prosperity, and its ability to protect its territorial integrity—history provides ample evidence that the state's capabilities have always been highly contingent and variable. Rather than serving as a hermetic seal, the borders of the state have long been a permeable membrane through which armies, immigrants, contraband, pathogens, and ideas have passed with relative ease. More comprehensive and convincing

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evidence of the state's embellished résumé can be extracted from the vast body of scholarship by historians, political scientists, and sociologists chronicling the life cycle of this relative newcomer to the world stage. The reader will search in vain for any period in history in which the state matched the idealized conception that has too often served as the standard against which many of both its contemporary critics and adherents have assessed its competence.

While the conceptual confusion surrounding the basic nature of the state can be attributed, at least in part, to its abstract qualities reflected "chiefly in the hearts and minds of people," the historical record suggests that both the case against the state's continued preeminence as well as arguments in defense of its traditional role are directed towards a mythical entity that has become the object of a widely and deeply held sense of false nostalgia. This flawed perception, or fallacy of a double abstraction, as it might be called, compounds the original conceptual challenge and frames much of the often confusing, unintelligible, and unproductive debate over the role and nature of the contemporary state.

The lack of scholarly consensus about the state may seem surprising, if not counterintuitive, to the readers of *The New York Times, The Economist,* or *Asahi Shimbun,* to say nothing of those who practice the art of statecraft in the United Nations or in foreign ministries. There were, after all, nearly 190 officially recognized states at the beginning of 1995; their interplay is the very stuff of international affairs. How the generic notion of the state is defined would seem moot or irrelevant in the face of the entity's unequivocal empirical standing. And yet, I would argue that even those who consider the state as a given, as an immutable fixture of modern life, do not have a clear grasp of what it is they are referring to beyond a certain crudely drawn caricature. This persistent inability to understand the true nature of statehood, to mistakenly apply the outmoded notions of the past to contemporary affairs, is at the heart of the conceptual muddle surrounding the meaning of security in the post-Cold War world. It is this muddle to which I now turn.

BY ANY OTHER NAME

When the renowned post-World War II analyst of international affairs, Arnold Wolfers,[20] referred to security as an "ambiguous

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symbol," he acknowledged the semantic and conceptual imprecision long associated with the term. Traditionally, security has had two primary meanings:[21] *1)* freedom from risk or danger and *2)* freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear. It derives from the Latin *securitas,* which is a variation of *securas,* meaning "without care."

For most of the past four hundred years, security has been intimately associated with the state. It has long (though not exclusively) meant "protection from organized violence caused by armed foreigners." Since "foreign" implies a person who is "not like us," and since territorially-based states (or nation-states) emerged in Europe after 1648 as the dominant organizing principle for separating "us from them," security's identification with the state is not surprising. Throughout history, it was the consolidation of the state's military capabilities, and the bureaucratization this engendered, that accelerated the consolidation of the state itself. As its violence capability (both defensive and offensive) developed in tandem, the state became not only the chief provider of security, but also its chief interpreter; for much of history, "security" simply meant what the rulers said it meant.

Despite the state's appropriation of the term to serve a distinct and seemingly narrow set of military-based objectives, more nuanced conceptions of security have made their way into political discourse. As the historian Ernest May has noted, security, when defined in "national" (state) terms "has always been understood as having both external and domestic components. . . .Thus Washington could argue in 1791 for more spending on the Post Office and post roads on the ground of their 'instrumentality in diffusing a knowledge of the laws and proceedings of the Government, which. . .contributes to the security of the people.'"[22] The preamble to the American Constitution—with its avowal to "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty"—was only the first of what was later to become a thick compilation of official documentation linking the internal and external aspects of security.

The peculiarly American notion of "national security"—a term reportedly first used by James Forrestal, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy and later Truman's Secretary of Defense, in testimony before the Senate in the mid-1940s—was codified in the much cited 1950 policy document known as NSC-68, which called for "a rapid and

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sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength"[23] of the United States. This new approach was later reflected in such "security"-related legislation as the 1950s National Defense Highway Act (which funded the construction of forty thousand miles of new highways) and the post-Sputnik National Defense Education Act (which supported the training of a generation of American scientists and engineers).[24] Entire industries, such as those concerned with aeronautics and space exploration, were called into being during the Cold War under a national security guise that provided a ready rationale for "cutting through the logjam of domestic politics."[25]

Although, as its name implies, "national security" was unabashedly state-centric in its orientation, a growing number of intellectual challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy boldly suggested that security could not be so easily contained within the narrow confines of any one state. In light of his standing as former Secretary of Defense and one of the chief architects of America's involvement in the Vietnam War, Robert McNamara's[26] apostasy in 1968 regarding the nature of security was one of the more prominent and surprising examples of this new way of thinking. In his book, *The Essence of Security,* McNamara articulated an expansive notion of the field that included the promotion of economic, political, and social development in "poor nations" (anticipating his subsequent appointment as President of the World Bank) as a means of "preventing conflict" and preserving a minimal measure of global "order and stability."

Even McNamara's more eclectic approach to security viewed its ultimate objective in essentially traditional terms; nonmilitary aspects were important to the extent that they afforded "protection from organized violence." More significantly, his grasp of the nonmilitary aspects remained vague. There was little sense of how policies could be developed that acknowledged and responded to his account of security's myriad dimensions. At the height of the Vietnam War, with the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the missiles of Communist China, set for launch on a hair trigger, no amount of philosophizing (or, less charitably, contrition for previous sins) by a retiring Secretary of Defense could be expected to have much of an effect on the deeply entrenched views of the more traditional security establishment.

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During the 1960s and continuing into the next decade, various commentators on the fate of the earth attempted to identify phenomena that were deemed highly dangerous *in and of themselves.* Rather than serving primarily to undermine international "order and stability," phenomena such as ecological degradation and population growth joined nuclear war as presenting an existential threat to human survival and the earth's ecosystem, not just to survival of the state or the state system. A diverse group of "scholar activists," including Rachel Carson, Barry Commonor, Jacques Cousteau, Paul Erlich, Buckminster Fuller, Garrett Hardin, and Margaret Mead, among others, preached the new gospel of saving the planet. While each emphasized a different aspect of the problem, the urgency that drove their separate appeals was enshrined in the best-selling 1972 Club of Rome study, *The Limits of Growth,* which painted an unremittingly grim picture of a future in which the world's economic system was destined to collapse as a result of unchecked population and industrial growth.

It was, ironically, the dire warnings of inescapable disaster that ultimately undermined the political impact of *The Limits of Growth* and other similarly alarmist tracts. The more shrill the cries for attention, the less they were taken seriously. Despite growing recognition of the fragility of "spaceship earth" and such public demonstrations of environmental awareness as Earth Day in 1970 (held, as its critics duly noted, on Lenin's Birthday), the abstruse and often infeasible policy prescriptions advanced to save the planet had as little resonance among most of the celebrated "silent majority" as among the practitioners of "high politics" in the White House, State Department, and Pentagon. Moreover, in their quest for relevance, the scholar activists failed to explicitly link nonmilitary phenomena to a prevailing notion of security still largely perceived in more conventional terms.

Among the first to make this conceptual linkage was WorldWatch Institute President Lester Brown,[27] who anticipated the debate to follow in his 1977 paper on "Redefining National Security," which described a long litany of "security threats," including climate change, soil erosion, food shortages, and deforestation. But the appeal of Brown's argument—regardless of its merits—was limited by his role as one of America's leading environmentalists. He was, in many respects, preaching to the converted. More damaging to his

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cause was the lack of attention he gave those issues—from the aggressive designs of certain governments beyond the West, to the nationalism that still drove inter- and intrastate relations—which continued to figure prominently in the security calculus of the "powers that be." Incapable of concealing his prominently displayed environmental prejudices and of integrating the "new" security agenda with the old, his case—like those of the scholar activists preceding him—was largely ignored by both policymakers and the public.

To reach, if not convert, the nonbelievers, the case had to be made by someone who was not so easily identified with the environmental cause and who could speak the language of the foreign affairs establishment. In a 1983 piece in the military-oriented academic journal, *International Security,* entitled "Redefining Security," Princeton University political scientist Richard Ullman[28] attempted to take up this advocacy role by adding such nonmilitary phenomena as epidemics, floods, droughts, and earthquakes to many of the "security" threats cited earlier by Brown. Notably, Ullman also promoted the shift in focus away from concerns about the state, arguing that mankind shared a destiny that transcended national borders. Despite its lack of environmental bombast and its acknowledgment of the continuing salience of the old security agenda, Ullman's appeal also made hardly a ripple in an entrenched security establishment still preoccupied with the more traditional imperatives of war and peace. Although hailed as a seminal essay more than a decade after it first appeared, the article's most significant achievement at the time was that its subject matter was deemed to be a valid and appropriate topic for further discussion among some of the limited, though sometimes influential, readership of *International Security* and other esoteric journals of its kind. It was only later in the 1980s, when the cracks began to widen in the geopolitical edifice of the Cold War, that the arguments advanced by Ullman would reach a broader audience.

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS

When the Cold War ended, there came to be even more reason to consider "security" as an "essentially contested subject"[29] unfettered to the state. With the nuclear standoff between the superpow-

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ers no longer dictating the principle terms of the security debate, a new spate of revisionist analysis appeared on the scene. The tone was set by World Resources Institute Vice President Jessica Matthews[30] in her 1989 *Foreign Affairs* update of Ullman's article "Redefining Security." Matthew's piece, which served as an archetype for a number of similarly themed essays, established a far-ranging agenda of security concerns that expanded on earlier warnings that "mankind is rapidly altering the basic physiology of the planet." It also suggested fundamental changes in governmental and intergovernmental policies. Although, like Lester Brown, Matthews represented an institution associated primarily with environmental concerns, the radically changed geopolitical climate made her appeal—voiced in an eminently mainstream publication—more palatable and accessible than earlier efforts.

In the ensuing years, the intellectual floodgates were flung open and it was the more traditional security adherents in academia and the Washington think tanks (many of whom scrambled to redefine their own job qualifications) who were now on the defensive. What was once a cottage industry in redefining security rapidly assumed the characteristics of a mature and booming enterprise. In addition to the analyses of the changing security environment by such establishment stalwarts[31] as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Stanley Hoffmann, Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger, and Theodore Sorenson, there now appeared the works of a younger and diverse group of new "security" analysts,[32] including Peter Gleick, Michael Klare, Ronnie Lipshutz, and Joseph Romm, among many others, who challenged the traditional orthodoxies and mind-sets.

A common thread in much of the security-related analyses during this period was the recognition that any attempt to redefine the field must entail a clear articulation of both the object and scope of the inquiry. For example, while acknowledging the salience of nonmilitary aspects of security, some insisted that "the danger of war"[33] should still be the field's primary concern, while others argued that an expanded dialogue on security "among [scholars] of widely differing views," should not "obscure the centrality of the discipline of political science"[34] to the field. Anxious to articulate the object and scope of the inquiry was a new breed of thinkers who had little patience with the conceptual strictures of established doctrine and insisted, to paraphrase Georges Clemenceau, that security was too

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important to be left to the political scientists. These specialists, representing diverse disciplines, sought to get at the essence of security by cutting through the Gordian Knot that had sheathed international relations theory for so long. Rejecting the terms of the traditional debate, Cambridge University's Gwyn Prins, for example, declared in 1989 the establishment of a new field of security in which the key referent object was the entire globe rather than the state:

> Global Security is about survival. It is the next step beyond national and international security studies. It grapples with the transition from a world where decisive power was uncontroversially interpreted as military force wielded by states to one where, increasingly, individuals and communities face threats without enemies; where many of the familiar forces and political ideas of the last two centuries cannot safeguard security.[35]

Numerous variations on this theme were advanced in the early post-Cold War years with such labels as "World Security,"[36] "Common Security,"[37] and, perhaps most ambitiously (as well as pretentiously), "Ultimate Security."[38] Each of these new formulations, while taking a distinct approach to the subject, called for a fundamental change in thinking that linked security to the well-being of the earth and the existential needs of its human and nonhuman inhabitants. Building on the conceptual insights of James Lovelocks's "Gaia Hypothesis"[39] (which describes a world in which all elements, including human beings, are inextricably interconnected by powerful "feedback loops" that sustain a fragile global equilibrium), the new apostles of security also emphasized the critical interrelationships among some of the most daunting threats to human survival—poverty, environmental degradation, and rapid demographic change.

Although such concerns were dismissed by many traditionally-minded "realists" as "globaloney," "wooly do-goodery and piously impractical one worldism,"[40] they were, in fact, less starry-eyed than their most ardent critics maintained. The inflated and, at times, pretentious rhetoric of the "new thinkers" often masked a deeper, more "realistic" concern for some important, and underappreciated, dimensions of the evolving international system. A central critique of the new conceptions of security was that they

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moved the concept away from its roots in the fundamental notion of "protection from organized violence." But this is less of a problem than it might appear. Why is organized violence something to be protected against? Because, as seems obvious, it can cause harm to human, material, and natural resources on a potentially large and disruptive scale. If, in addition to the arsenals of the world's armies, there were factors emerging in the nonmilitary realm capable of causing comparable harm, then it does not seem unreasonable to have also considered these factors as security threats (or "risks," as they are termed in NATO's new "Strategy Concept"). The myriad forms of environmental degradation, for example, may not be able to elicit the same kind of widespread visceral reaction that was once embodied in the searing image of the nuclear mushroom cloud, and they may lack the certainty and perceived imminence that marked the nuclear threat, but they will increasingly demand our attention. Even in terms of more narrow conceptions of security, it may be true, as Gwyn Prins has put it, that "you can't shoot an ozone hole,"[41] but even realists should be reassured by the fact that you can still shoot—or, more probably, exert some other form of pressure on—the state or nonstate actor whose behavior exacerbates the problem.

Clearly, the basic philosophical underpinnings of the new gospel of security were not new—their origins could be traced to classical ethics and the teachings of the major religions. What was new, and what distinguished them from similar sounding appeals made decades earlier, was their pretension for filling the conceptual vacuum left in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet threat and the end of the Cold War. The immediate post-Cold War years were marked by an almost psychological revulsion against the perceived excesses of the preexisting orthodoxy. On the eve of the United Nation's military response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, President Bush proclaimed a "New World Order" in which enlightened multilateral cooperation would take the place of a paralyzing nuclear standoff. During this period, talk of bomb yields and throw weights—despite the existence of a former adversary still "planted thick with nuclear missiles"[42] and a would-be regional hegemon armed with intermediate-range missile capabilities—became anathema in certain fashionable academic and even policy circles. The nonmilitary agenda of the revisionists was now winning favor with those in

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search of the essence of security. "Geoeconomics"[43] was seen by some as a natural successor to geopolitics in a world in which the force of arms was not only bad for humanity, it was also bad for business. Absent the practical and intellectual constraints of the preceding years, there was growing receptivity to the notion that a new paradigm was needed to replace the outmoded Cold War standard.

Despite this receptivity and the more "palatable and accessible" aspects of many of the new reconceptualizations of security, a singular, widely-accepted new paradigm did not emerge. Instead, scores of competing paradigms or quasi-paradigms appeared on the scene, none capable of capturing the imagination or support of either scholars or policymakers, to say nothing of the public at large. An additive "laundry list" approach to security became commonplace; a series of emerging (or more evident) threats—from drug trafficking to global warming—were appended to a steadily increasing inventory that was once primarily limited to military concerns. The cumulative product, largely devoid of any coherent, overarching framework, became the basis for a raft of dimly remembered and rarely consulted academic and "policy-relevant" pieces that, for the most part, gathered dust on library shelves.

THE ROLE OF FOUNDATIONS

Many of the early efforts to reconceptualize post-Cold War security were supported by American foundations. As Stanley Hoffmann pointed out in a characteristically trenchant 1977 contribution to *Dædalus*, among the most important reasons that the field of international relations was largely an American creation was the unprecedented role played by the network of these foundations serving as "dumbwaiters" between the "kitchens of power and the academic salons."[44] Just as in an earlier era foundations such as The Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation had encouraged the growth of the branch of international affairs known as security studies, so, too, did private philanthropy after 1989 attempt to foster the development of new, expanded approaches to the subject that put particular emphasis on interdisciplinary cooperation and nonmilitary phenomena. Contributing to a wider trend, foundation support in this area was also largely geared toward efforts that

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challenged the primacy of the state in security affairs. Increasingly, state-centric "realists" were treated with suspicion, if they were treated at all. Grant-making by Carnegie, Ford, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and The Pew Charitable Trusts (building on its earlier efforts to promote the study of economics and national security), among others, continued and accelerated the trend begun in 1984 by the MacArthur Foundation's program on International Peace and Security, which sought to "infuse a field of study and policy arena with new perspectives."[45]

The results of this support by American foundations have been mixed—certainly in comparison to their championing of the field of security studies during the Cold War. In the early 1990s, several ambitious efforts, aimed at establishing a consensus on the emerging security environment that could, ultimately, if not readily, be translated into policy, were launched in the United States. For example, with funding from The Pew Charitable Trusts, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) convened a group of foreign affairs experts in 1991 chaired by former Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger to examine "America's Task in a Changed World." At about the same time, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also convened a group of experts (some of whom served double duty on the CFR project) to address this theme under the direction of former American Ambassador to China (currently the Clinton administration's Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) Winston Lord. A third example in this genre was a similar group organized by the political scientist Samuel Huntington (also a participant in the CFR project) at Harvard University's Olin Institute on "The Changing Security Environment and American National Security."

Critics of these projects pointed to the superabundance of establishment figures who had once dominated foreign affairs policymaking during the Cold War. Given the background and expertise of the participants, there was no shortage of sober and learned discussion in the respective project sessions. However, the impact of these deliberations was difficult to discern. Although the CFR effort generated some insightful analyses of the nonmilitary aspects of security,[46] it was unable to meet its more ambitious objectives and was halted after one year of what was to have been a three-year undertaking. The ostensibly more successful Carnegie Endowment

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project culminated in the publication of an eye-catching and concisely worded publication, *Changing Our Ways*,[47] which summarized the various strands of conventional wisdom on a wide range of issues linking foreign and domestic affairs. However, it was the predictability and lack of imagination in much of this wisdom, including its anticlimactic call for yet another blue-ribbon commission on America's new role in the world, that ultimately limited the publication's impact and appeal. Huntington's less publicized endeavor, although subject to some of the same structural defects as the others, at least generated some thought-provoking commentary on the emerging security environment, particularly from its redoubtable chairman, attracting widespread attention among foreign affairs mavens in the United States and abroad. (Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?"[48] essay, written in 1992 under the auspices of the Harvard project, was a lightning rod for controversy after it appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in the summer of 1993.) Despite the eloquence of many of the project's participants, none of these efforts established a durable framework for building a new and widely held conception of security.

In retrospect, each of these attempts at making sense of the emerging security environment can be seen as having been based on an unrealistic premise: that the contours of the emerging international order could be perceived if not redrawn. It is perhaps a cliché to say that the world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, but it has changed even more since the end of World War II when earlier groups of "wise men" sat down to chart a new course for America and the West. The security challenge faced by the post-World War II foreign affairs experts, as daunting as it was, was more comprehensible and, in some important ways, more manageable than that faced by their post-Cold War successors. The emerging communist menace concentrated attention in a way that could not be replicated forty-five years hence. For much of the Cold War, despite the appeals of the revisionists, there was little disagreement about what was ultimately meant by security. A "clear and present danger" existed, largely devoid of the "symbolic ambiguity" that Wolfers once attributed to the term. With the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers held in check by a seemingly precarious doctrine of "mutually assured destruction," "security" had a distinct and unequivocal meaning for much of humanity. There was

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also little confusion surrounding the concept of the state and its preeminent role in maintaining security; the entire globe may have been vulnerable to nuclear destruction, but it was still a few potent states whose actions could determine the fate of the earth.

Thus, it is not surprising that the latter day wise men, when confronted with the myriad and far-ranging challenges of the immediate post-Cold War years, could not mount a more effective response. While the monuments of the old regime were still literally and figuratively crashing down in the erstwhile Soviet empire—the dust they stirred up as yet unsettled—it was premature to begin designing a new security architecture. Given the uniquely complex nature of the world in the early 1990s, and the accelerated interactions among many of the new and preexisting security threats, it is doubtful that any group, however diverse and talented, could have accomplished much more.

There is another point to be made, reflecting a larger lesson from these unsuccessful early efforts at redefining security: they all can be seen as necessary, but insufficient, exercises in "loosening the intellectual bolts" of some of the foreign affairs establishment's most influential figures. By exposing the representatives of the ancien régime to the new gospel of security, and making a few converts in the process, the projects described above—along with numerous other efforts in this general category—helped legitimize and, in some cases, accelerate its acceptance within the foreign affairs mainstream. Definitive evidence of such causality is, of course, difficult, if not impossible, to measure. There were, however, certain "trace elements" whose subsequent appearance in the halls of power suggested that all might not have been in vain.

TRACE ELEMENTS

The first of these trace elements appeared after the presidential election of 1992. When the Clinton administration took office, the conceptual ground beneath security had been sufficiently softened to allow for certain institutional changes to take root that would have been deemed radical or even unnecessary only a few years earlier. The establishment of the office of the Under Secretary for "Global Affairs" within the State Department, dealing with such issues as population, the environment, and biodiversity, and similar

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institutional changes at the White House and the Pentagon, reflected a new willingness to address a more eclectic approach to security. Although some of these changes took hold better than others—for example, the Pentagon's initial reorganization plan was eventually scrapped in favor of a more "traditional" design, and Global Affairs is still having difficulties becoming fully integrated into the State Department's Byzantine hierarchy—such early actions as the administration's reversal of the Reagan-era "Mexico City Policy," which had prevented the United States from taking a leadership position on world population issues, and support for the Biodiversity Treaty, can be seen as further evidence that the foreign affairs establishment's intellectual bolts have, indeed, been loosened.

At the same time, however, there were still potent elements within the establishment who saw a more apt metaphor in the notion of "loose screws" among the country's leadership in regard to its alleged disregard of some of the bedrock concerns of more traditional notions of security—particularly those that stressed the importance of protecting the American state rather than the entire planet. For example, reductions in the US force structure mandated by the administration's assessment of America's defense needs in its 1993 "Bottom-Up Review"[49] were deemed by some to be perilously shortsighted and dangerous. Notwithstanding this judgment, the lack of consensus around the nature of the post-Cold War security challenge can be illustrated by the equally vehement charges that the proposed changes were woefully inadequate and reflective of an antiquated Cold War mind-set.

The dilemma that this lack of consensus presents policymakers is graphically reflected in the July 1994 "National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,"[50] which opens with a solemn pledge by President Clinton that "protecting our nation's security—our people, our territory, our way of life—is my Administration's foremost mission and constitutional duty." What follows is a précis of the various strands of post-Cold War security reconceptualizing leavened with a seemingly incongruous bow to the "old" security agenda. The dissonance of the document's carefully wrought prose is evident in the juxtaposition of such nontraditional security concerns as "promoting democracy," "strengthening macroeconomic coordination," and "preserving the environment," with the more conventionally aligned goal of preparing military forces "to win

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nearly two simultaneous major regional conflicts." A convincing rationale for the state-centric objectives of the latter, in a world seemingly driven by the global imperatives of the former, is nowhere to be found. In the end, the administration's strategy report is a catchall policy document that attempts to address all contingencies by hedging America's bets in the face of wildly uncertain odds and conditions. Whatever its political merits, such an approach remains a poor substitute for a focused and coherent strategic vision.

For their part, political opponents of the administration's security strategy are not immune from their own post-Cold War induced bewilderment. In criticizing President Clinton for creating a "hollow military," the new Republican majority's "Contract with America" calls for a National Security Restoration Act[51] to "reverse the downward spiral" in the military. Eschewing the administration's more eclectic and globalist conception of security, the Act would limit defense funding to a more traditional roster, including increased spending on troops, weapons, and research and a renewed "Star Wars" missile defense effort. No longer would funds earmarked for the Pentagon be used for "nondefense" programs such as defense conversion, peacekeeping, and environmental cleanup of military bases. But since the budgetary impact of these "nondefense" programs is relatively small (peacekeeping expenses amounted to only 1 percent, and conversion and environmental cleanup each less than 2 percent, of the Defense Department's 1993 budget[52]) it is unclear where the money will come from to finance this "restoration" in an age of fiscal austerity and public opposition to increased government spending. Moreover, while adhering to a "strict constructionist" definition of security, the Republicans are unable to offer a convincing rationale for why such a "back to the future" approach is necessary even if funding were available. Like the administration, the Republicans appear stymied by a world in which old paradigms do not seem to fit and new ones are not yet operable.

INTO THE POST-POST-COLD WAR WORLD

Only five years after British Member of Parliament George Robinson coined the phrase "Bonfire of the Certainties"[53] to describe the abrupt demise of the bipolar system that had dominated interna-

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tional affairs since 1945, we seem to be witnessing another type of conflagration; this time of the new "certainties" propounded in the heady euphoria that marked the immediate end of the Cold War. Such highly-touted concepts as "peace dividend," "assertive multilateralism," and even the "triumph of democracy" have moved in and out of the vernacular with alarming rapidity. (Who now can even remember when the term "New World Order" was not an object of derision?) In the words of *The New York Times* corespondent Thomas Friedman,[54] we have now entered the "Post-Post Cold War World," a world in which the existential realities of life on a still discordant planet have tempered the unbridled optimism that was a staple of political and public discourse only a few short years ago.

In the midst of this jarring realization that there is no "end of history" and that the world is still a nasty and brutish place, a new type of pessimism has emerged that combines the apocalyptic rhetoric of the 1960s and 1970s with a postmodern twist. In the post-post-Cold War era, old structures and institutions are being "deconstructed" before our eyes. Chief among them is "the state." The state—or, more accurately, a certain type of state—is now seen by some as the primary cause of insecurity. In the words of US Agency for International Development administrator J. Brian Atwood, "disintegrating societies and failed states. . .have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability. Increasingly, we are confronted by [states] without leadership, without order, without governance itself."[55] Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency launched a project in late 1994 to develop a set of quantitative indicators of failed states that can provide early warnings of impending crises.

That states are now considered to be "failing" and that this failure is now deemed the cause of many of the world's problems reveals as much about the ethical considerations driving the contemporary debate about the nature of security as it does about the conceptual confusion surrounding the meaning of statehood. As former National Security Council staffer Jeremy Rosner has pointed out, such a world view "does not pass judgment on the actions of states and individuals [within those states]. Violence is an inevitable response of people plagued by poverty and overcrowding. Evil plays no role. The question of individual responsibility never arises."[56]

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This notion of the state as passive victim, rather than active agent, suffuses much of the contemporary commentary about the emerging security agenda. This has perhaps best been exemplified by journalist Robert Kaplan in "The Coming Anarchy."[57] In this article, which was widely cited in speeches by President Clinton and other administration officials, Kaplan painted a ghoulish picture of the assorted demographic, environmental, and societal stresses afflicting the states of West Africa, which he held up as a harbinger of a future world of "ever-mutating. . .chaos." Kaplan's description of a land of Dickensian squalor marked by "the withering away of central governments. . .the rise of tribal and regional domains" recalls political scientist Robert Jackson's[58] earlier disquisition on "quasi-states"—political entities possessing juridical statehood but having only a tenuous empirical claim to such status (what John Stewart Mill in the nineteenth century called "ramshackle states").

Like Kaplan's West African states, Jackson's quasi-states "lack the institutional features of the traditional. . .state [including]. . .the means to meet most of the socio-economic needs of the people." As discussed previously, the vaunted capabilities of the "traditional state" are less than commonly imagined. But disregarding for the moment the ambiguous nature of this fabled entity, both Kaplan and Jackson are still guilty of applying a standard "to far off countries, in far off places" where the Western notion of statehood does not correspond to reality. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there has never been a there, there. Typically, socioeconomic needs have been met at the clan, tribe, or village levels far removed from the purview of any central "state" authority. With little heed given to these historically-developed coping mechanisms, these states are now judged to be "quasi" or "failed" to the extent that they do not conform to a Western archetype established in a different time and place under very different circumstances.

The perils of applying Western standards to non-Western subjects were highlighted in the late 1950s by John Herz.[59] Herz's analysis of "The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State" underscored the futility of equating postcolonial nation-building with the experience of existing European nation-states that endured centuries of wars and other traumatic growing pains before solidifying their own claims to statehood. With their artificially-established borders that ignored ethnic and tribal claims and their lack of

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administrative control and cohesion, it was unrealistic to attempt to create these newly independent entities in the image of a Western ideal. This logic, however, was never fully absorbed by some of the leading architects of development aid who proceeded to construct "the outward paraphernalia of [Western] statehood"[60] on a decidedly non-Western social, political, and economic base, and to channel billions of dollars of assistance through contrived and largely ineffectual, or worse, "state" governments. The failure of developmental assistance efforts to reach their lofty goals is only one example of the very real and often lamentable consequences of the conceptual imprecision surrounding what a state is or should be. When security is defined in terms that reflect a narrow, Eurocentric conception of statehood, the world is bound to appear to be a very insecure place. In such a world, "security"—in its myriad forms—will often be provided by actors other than states. Attempts to make the world more secure that rely on outmoded and inapplicable standards are, thus, likely to fall victim to unrealistic expectations about how security can best be achieved.

WHAT IS THE USE OF TRYING?

Corollaries of the policymakers' newfound fixation with "failed states" and "ever-mutating. . .chaos" are the increasing number of gloomy prognostications about the world we are about to inherit. Emerging problems are not only daunting, they are unprecedented. "Global life," commented James Rosenau in his most recent analysis of international politics, "may have [now] entered a period of turbulence the likes of which it has not known. . .and the outcomes of which are still far from clear."[61] In reviewing the recent literature on this subject, from Paul Kennedy's[62] unsettling analysis of global trends on the eve of the twenty-first century to Norman Myers's[63] doleful assessment of the human condition, and the scores of similarly-themed journal articles and speeches by government officials, one is struck by the repeated usage of the same grim statistics. Time and again we are told, for example, that the world's population has increased more in the past forty years than in the preceding forty centuries. Even the most optimistic demographic data portend a frightening world where the quality of life—already near or below subsistence level for many—will degenerate even more.

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Striking yet another disconcerting chord, some Western analysts have pointed out that since 95 percent of the increase in global population is taking place in the developing world, the proportion of humanity considered "children of the Enlightenment" (i.e., of European ancestry) will soon be perilously small. With the inevitable decline of a widely shared sense of respect for liberalism, individual rights, and modernity itself, implied by this development, it is little wonder, according to these analysts, that the world is increasingly riven with strife[64] (as if, somehow, four hundred years of European-inspired strife counted for naught). Such concern for the presumed marginalization of a once-dominant ideology, however, misses a larger, though less obvious, point. Demographers predict that children will soon *literally* comprise the largest proportion of the human population. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that historical memories might someday extend back only a few years. Seen in this light, Huntington's[65] provocative argument about the coming "Clash of Civilizations," in which the most important security fault lines lie between the broad cultural agglomerations of "the West and the rest," would seem almost moot. "Civilization," after all, implies an uninterrupted link with the past, to customs, mores, and institutions forged over centuries.

If the predicament we face is as grave as the experts insist—and there is little reason for the concerned layperson to doubt its plausibility—then what is, perhaps, most troubling is the perceived mismatch between the immense problems afflicting the world and the meager institutional responses that have been proposed to address them. Even the ambitious and far-ranging "Program of Action"[66] agreed to in Cairo at the United Nations' September 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), involving an interrelated strategy of massive family planning efforts combined with increased educational and economic opportunities for women and improved maternal and child health care, would seem capable only of postponing the world's day of reckoning rather than preventing it.

Although the vocabulary may have changed, and the specific objects of attention may be new, there is a disturbingly familiar quality—as well as danger—to the most recent bombast about the grim future that awaits us. Like their predecessors, the new scholar activists have overstated their case, and in the process have run the

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risk of undermining support for policies—like those of the ICPD—that might actually help address the myriad problems afflicting the world. But unlike their predecessors, who were never able to gain acceptance among the dominant foreign affairs establishment, these new purveyors of gloom appear to have found a receptive audience among an influential segment of the contemporary foreign policy elite. There has been, however, a problem with the processing of the message. As reflected in the Clinton administration's recent strategy document, referred to above, and in the rhetoric of National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department officials, there is a profound discontinuity between "national security" policies designed to defend the state and "global security" policies designed to protect the planet. The exaggerated claims of the doomsayers have exacerbated this discontinuity by distracting policymakers from doing what they must to achieve the feasible. And what is feasible often involves relatively modest objectives that begin with the actions of individual states working alone or in concert. For all the intense, albeit short-lived, media attention given the ICPD's "Program of Action," for example, it will require sustained financial support from a wide range of states before it can be implemented. Scare tactics that inure the public against believing in the efficacy of any government response to the threat posed by the coming chaos are bound to be counterproductive. They only lessen the chances for winning the political support needed to soberly and realistically meet a broad range of challenges that, although appearing insuperable in the aggregate, are far less daunting when addressed one by one.

How to achieve such "sober and realistic" policy-making? A good place to start would be to clear away the conceptual cobwebs that obscure the true nature of the still prevalent constituent units of the beleaguered international system. Thus far, however, even some of the most prodigious of thinkers appear not to have a firm grasp of the primary object of their analysis.

THE PERILS OF TAXONOMY

In his 1994 retrospective on the last four hundred years of statecraft, Henry Kissinger[67] described three principal types of contemporary "states that call themselves nations," that lack many of the

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attributes of the "traditional nation-states" (which he defines rather sparingly as states with "a common language and culture" that gradually emerged between the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the Treaty of Versailles in 1919). These are: "the ethnic splinters of disintegrating empires," such as the remnants of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union; the "post-colonial" states, primarily in Africa, such as Zambia and Nigeria, with bequeathed administrative borders; and finally, and most significantly for Kissinger, the "continental nation-states," in which category he places such diverse entities as India, the United States, and the Russian Republic, which he confidently predicts will dominate the world scene.

Would that the new taxonomy of states were so simple. Kissinger's tripartite division, with its echoes of the familiar first, second, and third world categorization of the Cold War, does not adequately reflect the bewildering heterogeneity of the contemporary "family of nations." Where do Hong Kong, Singapore, or Haiti fit into this arrangement? Does the "continental nation-state" of India really have more in common with its putative associate Japan, not to mention the United States, than it does with "post-colonial" Nigeria? Would an independent Quebec—presumably, a candidate for "ethnic splinter" status—bear any meaningful resemblance to Bosnia-Herzegovina or Azerbaijan? The political reality of the contemporary world, in some important ways, more closely resembles the pre-Westphalian order that was characterized by an admixture of political units possessing widely varying forms and capabilities (what Hedley Bull referred to as "neo-medieval"[68] in its modern incarnation). Rather than being limited to the three species identified by Kissinger, or the "quasi" and "non-quasi" categories implied by Jackson and Kaplan, the state exhibits a form of political biodiversity that prevents it from being captured in narrow definitional confines.

THE ONCE AND FUTURE STATE

In an attempt to find a way out of this conceptual maze and to move toward an understanding of the state that is both more comprehensible and serviceable, and can more easily be reconciled with emerging conceptions of security, an approach must be taken that reflects the world as it is rather than how it is imagined or

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hoped to be. When Jean Bodin wrote his classic treatise on state sovereignty, *Six Livres de le République,* he was responding to a specific historical experience, the religious wars that ravaged France in the mid sixteenth century. Similarly, Thomas Hobbes penned his *Leviathan* almost seventy-five years later in response to the anarchy that reigned in Central Europe during the Thirty Years War. Throughout history, statesmen and theoreticians have proposed new political orders—from "liberty, equality, and brotherhood" to "the self-determination of peoples"—to respond to the exigencies of a particular era wrought by war.

It was no different at the end of the Cold War when the profound and unexpected geopolitical changes that had taken place stimulated yet another intellectual debate about how best to reorder the global polity and find a new role for its principal constituent unit, the state. But as described above, this debate has been hampered by a lack of conceptual clarity and the sobering realization that while much has changed since 1989, much remains the same. Despite the withering of communism, and the presumptive ascendancy of market-based democracy, there is still poverty and injustice in the world, there is still ethnic and racial enmity, and there are still armed and dangerous warlords who threaten peace and stability at every turn.

What is needed is a new definition of the state that fully reflects its dynamic qualities and liberates it from the metaphysical time warp in which it has too long been caged. Such a definition must acknowledge both its empirically grounded reality and its abstract existence. It must be expansive enough to accommodate the full range of political entities that have attained juridical statehood, however deficient or undeserving they might appear. Most importantly, it must take into account the unprecedented, and often poorly understood, changes taking place in the world—from technological innovations to new forms of political, economic, and social interaction. Rather than undermining or repudiating the concept of the state, such phenomena must be seen as an integral part of its fundamental nature. Only then can its proper role in the world be appreciated and effectively acted upon.

As it has since its inception over four hundred years ago, the state continues to evolve—or, to use Michael Mann's term, "mature."[69] But contrary to Mann's notion that the state has reached its devel-

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opmental limits, the maturing process (at least in the foreseeable future) has no predetermined end and is occurring at varying rates both across and within different states. This is more than just a semantic point; it underscores the fact that we have now entered yet another phase in the unfolding history of the state. It is a transitional phase in which new states have emerged from the remnants of former empires and are attempting to establish their place and ensure their viability in a diverse world of preexisting states and nonstate actors. However they accomplish this end, whether they decide to seek closer ties with neighboring or distant states once the heady experience of attaining independence has worn off, whether they attempt to consolidate their new-found status in relative isolation, or whether they are themselves the victims of secessionist pressures or internal strife, they will still be states. Other states and nonstate actors may impinge on their range of action or may even assist them in achieving their goals, but their essential identity as states should not be in question—neither, for that matter, should the identity of those preexisting states whose economic and political viability may seem in jeopardy, or the more advantaged states who may be ceding whole swatches of authority to higher or lower entities but still provide the most vivid coloration to the multihued tapestry of the global polity.

Notwithstanding the premature judgments of those who predict (and even yearn for) a stateless future, the state will continue to provide a crucial frame of reference for the confusing array of problems on the emerging security agenda. Since these problems are usefully considered in terms of their consequences within, across, and between state borders, the state must still play a role—however circumscribed—in the search for solutions to these problems. But given the nature of this protean entity, these solutions are unlikely to follow any predetermined pattern linked to the past. They will not be found in the bomb damage effect calculators of an earlier age, nor in the infeasible nostrums of the new alarmists. In the post-post-Cold War era, and that which succeeds it, the meanings of "the state" and "security" must change as inevitably and unpredictably as the world itself.

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ENDNOTES

[1]I wish to thank Jeremy Azrael of the RAND Corporation for lending this collector's item to me. I had last used it in the early 1980s as a graduate student concentrating in strategic studies.

[2]This quote has been attributed to former US Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, who confirmed that the statement was his in a telephone conversation with the author on 21 November 1994.

[3]Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, as quoted in Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* (1991): 212.

[4]Ibid., 213.

[5]John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* (Summer 1990): 5–56.

[6]James Woolsey, as quoted in John Prados, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (6 July 1993): 33–38.

[7]Boutros-Boutros Ghali, *Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations Report, 1992), 1, 2, 5.

[8]James Rosenau, "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics," in James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 25.

[9]Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights* (Philadelphia, Pa.: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 15–16.

[10]Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987), 18.

[11]Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983).

[12]Joseph Strayer, quoted in Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 38.

[13]Michael Lind, "The Catalytic State," *The National Interest* (Spring 1992): 3–12.

[14]Kenichi Ohmae, "The Rise of the Region State," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992–1993): 78–87.

[15]Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1993).

[16]See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Richard Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985); and Henry Kissinger, as quoted in Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics.*

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[17]For a trenchant analysis of this phenomenon in the post-Cold War era, see Robert H. Jackson, "Continuity and Change," in Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, eds., *States in a Changing World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

[18]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

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[20]Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 10.

[21]*American Heritage Dictionary* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), 1173.

[22]Ernest May, "National Security in American History," in Graham Allison and Gregory Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond the Cold War to the New World Order* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 104.

[23]"United States Objectives and Proposals for National Security," Report to the National Security Council, 14 April 1950.

[24]Joseph Romm, *Defining National Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 5.

[25]G. John Ikenberry, "Theories of International Political Economy," graduate seminar lecture, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, 1 December 1994.

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[29]Buzan, *People, States and Fear.*

[30]Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1989): 162–77.

[31]See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Cold War and its Aftermath," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1992): 31–49; Henry Kissinger et al., "East-West Relations," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1989): 1–20; Stanley Hoffmann, "A World Transformed," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1990): 115–22; James Schlesinger, "New Instabilities, New Priorities," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1991–1992): 3–24; and Theodore C. Sorenson, "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1990): 1.

[32]See Ibid; Michael Clare, *World Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Peter Glieck, *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,* April 1991; Ronnie Lipshutz, "Reconstructing Security: Discursive Practices, Material Changes, and Policy Consequences," address delivered at the 1992 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill., September 1992; and Romm, *Defining National Security.*

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[33]Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies."

[34]David Baldwin, "National Security Studies: Whence and Whither?," unpublished paper, Columbia University, Institute of War and Peace Studies, 1991.

[35]Gwyn Prins, quoted in "The Global Security Programme: A Key Emerging Initiative in the Campaign for Cambridge," Cambridge University Global Security Programme Document, 1992.

[36]Clare, *World Security.*

[37]"The Common Security Forum Population and Security" program of the Center for History and Economics, Kings College, Cambridge University, and the Center for Population and Development Studies, Harvard University.

[38]Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993).

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[42]Sorenson, "Rethinking National Security," 1.

[43]Edward N. Luttwack, "From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics," *National Interest* (Summer 1990).

[44]Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Dædalus* 106 (3) (Summer 1977): 41–61.

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[47]Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992).

[48]Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993): 22–49.

[49]"The Bottom-up Review," report by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, 19 October 1993.

[50]"A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," The White House, July 1994.

[51]Jon Lottman, "Pentagon Passions," *The Nation,* 12 December 1994, 713. As this essay was going to press, the Republicans were beginning to moderate their earlier demands. See "House Panel Softens Defense Bill," *The Washington Post,* 1 February 1995, A1.

[52]Ibid.

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[53]Quoted at the Wingspread Conference on the New International Security Environment, Racine, Wisconsin, June 1991; original statement made in the summer of 1990.

[54]Thomas Friedman, "Post-Post Cold War," *The New York Times,* 13 July 1994, A12.

[55]J. Brian Atwood, "Suddenly Chaos," *The Washington Post,* 31 July 1994. For a longer analysis of the implications of failed states see Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1992): 3–30.

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[57]Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly,* February 1994, 44–76.

[58]Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[59]John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); and John Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1976).

[60]Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World.*

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[64]This view is reflected in Nicholas Eberstadt, "Population Change and National Security," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1991): 121.

[65]Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

[66]"Program of Action," A United Nations Document, The United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, September 1994.

[67]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

[68]Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* 274.

[69]Michael Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying," *Dædalus* 122 (3) (Summer 1993): 115–40.

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Success often punishes people, and usually punishes ideas: with success come practice and notoriety, and from these emerge public knowledge of incapacity, incompetence, and contradiction. If Richard Nixon had lost one more election, his half-decent mediocrity would perhaps have survived; if Lenin had been promptly shot at the Finland station, romantic admiration for him and for Marxism might have flourished and endured; if equality had remained a radical ideal, many more of us could remain innocently committed to it. It is not of course imagined that equality has succeeded in actual practice, but we have come to an era in which we can hardly discuss government and the state without thinking about equality and the prospect of its application to practice.

Douglas Rae

From "The Egalitarian State: Notes on a System of Contradictory Ideals"
Dædalus 108 (4) (Fall 1979)

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Daniel Deudney

Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the *Real*-State

THE STATE AND THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION

As the twentieth century draws to a close, conventional wisdom holds the state to be the dominant form of political organization in the world, particularly regarding security and violence. The number of states who are members of the United Nations has swollen to nearly 190. The last of the great territorial empires, the Soviet Union, has broken apart into a new set of states. In Africa, the state borders inherited from colonialism have held, almost completely unchanged, and the greatest aspiration of stateless peoples such as the Kurds and the Chechens is a state of their own. Not surprisingly, the state is equally well-ensconced as hegemonic among theorists of world politics, where the Realist school continues to dominate. Assaults by prophets of "the withering away of the state" seem to have been confounded by these events. Of all the challenges that the state has weathered, the development of nuclear weapons has been one of the most vital: the absolute violence potential of nuclear explosives cuts to the heart of the state as a war-making entity capable of securing itself.

The year 1995 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the first explosions of nuclear weapons, a timely juncture to take stock of what "the bomb" has meant to the state. In an age when the term "revolution" is used indiscriminately, few have hesitated to use such language with full seriousness to describe the impact of nuclear weapons upon the state-centered world security order. This sense of

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the revolutionary stems from certain awesome facts that are beyond controversy: nuclear science and technology have given us the capability to wreak violence at an unprecedented scale and speed. To find historical analogies for a full-scale nuclear war one must look to great cataclysms like the Fall of Rome, the Mongol Invasions, the Black Plague, the European Invasion of the Americas, and the world wars and imagine several of them occurring at once and greatly compressed in time, perhaps into a single afternoon.

Beyond this fact, there is great controversy over its implication for the state and its traditionally paramount role as a security institution. Do these capabilities pose a revolutionary challenge to the state and its role as provider of security? Or can these new realities be accommodated with relatively insignificant institutional adjustment? What criteria should be used to judge whether institutions have adjusted to nuclear security imperatives? Has world politics adjusted to this new reality through "deterrence" and "arms control"? And if so, have the state and the state system been fundamentally changed? If world politics has not already adjusted to the nuclear reality, what form might an appropriate adjustment take? What type of institution can constrain this capability over the longer term? These questions are broader in scope than those concerning specific weapons deployments and policies that have animated security specialists, but they are narrower than those pondered by theologians and others about the "fate of the earth."

Political scientists differ profoundly in their answers to these questions. Even among those who call themselves "Realists,"[1] members of an ancient and heterogeneous tradition centrally concerned with security, violence, and states, the gulf of opinion has been wide. At the risk of some simplification, the answers of the Realists fall into three categories: *war strategism, deterrence statism,* and *nuclear one worldism.* Each was first advanced at the very beginning of the nuclear era, and has been elaborated on by prominent Realist theorists. War strategists, most notably William Borden, Herman Kahn, Paul Nitze, and Colin Gray, hold that nuclear weapons pose no particularly novel or fundamental challenges for international relations.[2] Alternatively, the deterrence statists, most notably Bernard Brodie, Robert Jervis, and Kenneth Waltz, hold that the state system has solved the nuclear problem with deterrence policies.[3] Regarding interstate arms control, war strategists see no value and

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deterrence statists see little value. Over the last thirty years the clash between these two schools has dominated the American discussion of the nuclear revolution.

The third Realist school, nuclear one worldism, is by far the most radical in its view on the implications of the bomb for the state and the state system. It holds that the state and the state system are inviable and that only a globally consolidated security institution (usually a world state) can solve the problem. During the early years of the nuclear age, nuclear one worldism was the most widely held interpretation of the nuclear situation, among leaders, citizens, and theorists. In the shadow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the inevitable trajectory of nuclear politics seemed to be either "one world or none." Hans Morgenthau, the dean of American post-World War II Realists, made the case in characteristically forceful terms:

> Instead of trying in vain to assimilate nuclear power to the purposes and instrumentalities of the nation-state, we ought to have tried to adapt these purposes and instrumentalities to the potentialities of nuclear power. We have refrained from doing so in earnest, because to do so successfully requires a radical transformation—psychologically painful and politically risky—of traditional moral values, modes of thoughts, and habits of action. But short of such a transformation, there will be no escape from the paradoxes of nuclear strategy and the dangers attending them.[4]

Nuclear one worldism reached its theoretical apogee in 1960 in the works of John Herz and Kenneth Boulding.[5] But over the last three decades most international relations theorists, particularly Realist ones, have rejected the nuclear one worldist argument, and it has almost completely disappeared from the security studies field.[6] Such ideas, however, have continued to enjoy a strong but indistinct presence in the field of "peace studies" and in the citizen peace movement, where typically they are mixed and linked with ethical critiques of war, militarism, and oppression that go far beyond the simple nuclear one world argument.

Of all the Realist views of the nuclear revolution, nuclear one worldism is arguably the simplest and most straightforwardly Realist. Nuclear one worlders simply extrapolated into the nuclear age the process of state formation that had been operating previously in world security politics. Building on the bedrock Realist assumptions

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that power—particularly material violence capability—drives political outcomes, and that the state was the paradigmatic security institution, they simply projected that nuclear weapons were the impetus for the continuation of this state-building process on a larger, worldwide scale. As such, nuclear one worldism provides the best baseline against which to assess the full implications of the nuclear revolution for the state.

These radical views deserve attention because they were publicly embraced by both Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev at crucial junctures in Soviet-US relations during the late 1980s.[7] Although rejected by security analysts in both countries, the close association between the views of leaders and the actual end of the Cold War warrants taking them seriously.

RETHINKING NUCLEAR ONE WORLDISM

At first glance, nuclear one worldism appears to be the least plausible Realist nuclear view. No world state has emerged, nuclear war has not occurred, and the state seems to be proliferating rather than fading or dying. But a closer look at the analytic core of nuclear one worldism produces a very different picture.

It is true that most early nuclear one worlders misestimated the *rate* at which either a nuclear war would occur or a world state or government would emerge. It is difficult to sustain apocalyptic expectations, and as each year passed without a nuclear war, their credibility weakened. However, the psychology of apocalyptic fears and the actual probability of a nuclear war are at most distantly related. World politics would certainly be different if the bomb that exploded in the basement of the World Trade Center in New York had been a nuclear device, or if Saddam Hussein had acquired nuclear weapons and used them against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or some major American military asset. Nuclear use, when or if it does occur, could have a catalytic effect upon the rate of international institution-building for nuclear control. The current near consensus among international relations theorists that the state has weathered the nuclear revolution could turn out to be as far off the mark as the widely held view, proclaimed by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1986, that the US-Soviet rivalry was "an effectively permanent feature of world politics."[8] In short, the simplest nuclear one world scenario of

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"after the deluge, the covenant" retains a residual credibility that forbids us from ever completely dismissing it.

The value of the nuclear one world case against the viability of the state in the nuclear era will grow considerably if some of its arguments are sharpened and refined. One of the consequences, however, of the decline of theoretical work in the nuclear one worldist vein is that this theory has not had the advantage of the sort of adjustment and improvement that theories commonly experience when they are employed over an extended period of time.

THE *REAL*-STATE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

When the traditional image of the state is compared to the reality of security governance during the nuclear era, it becomes evident that the state form of providing security is incompatible with nuclear weapons. Most observers see the state triumphant, but the solidity of the state is partially deceptive, and its waning has been obscured by shifting definitions of what it means to be a state. To the extent that the state remains paramount in nuclear security governance, this may be as much a mark of the incompleteness of the nuclear revolution as of the state's survival through it.

What is a state? Here clarity in definitions is essential. As James Rosenau has astutely noted, whether one sees the state as withering, weathering change, or widening its competence depends upon which image one has of the state.[9] Some hold the state to be simply an authoritative political order or polity, a formulation so broad and empty as to be analytically useless. Others, particularly students of comparative politics, see the state as a type of centralized coercive governmental structure, whose relations to other states and its own citizens can take many forms. Or the state may be understood as a country, a package of a people, a coercive governmental apparatus, and a particular territorial space.

Largely lost, but foundational to nuclear one worldism, is the old Realist image of the state as a protection providing entity whose existence is shaped by military viability. In this view, states are not simply existing units, but ones that pursue security in certain ways. In order to provide a distinctive label for this Realist idea, and in deference to the rhetoric of Realism, this type of state should be referred to as the *real*-state. This image of the state as a *real*-state,

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as a "protection mode," was central to modern European state theory, and was given classic formulation by Thomas Hobbes, Leopold von Ranke, Heinrich von Trietschke, and Max Weber. This understanding of the *real*-state centers upon the role of military viability and effective mastery of the means of violence, both internally and externally.

The concept of the state that reigns supreme in Realist theory is quite different from the one that once held sway. The state may be everywhere and unproblematic in contemporary Realism, but it is also largely emptied of stateness. Contemporary Realists operate with an increasingly bloodless and abstracted state. The substantive features previously central to Realist understandings of the state have been replaced by the state as a rational actor, a facsimile of the *homo economicus* borrowed from neoclassical economics. While Realists have resisted the efforts of Marxists and Liberals to turn the state into an *arena* in which competing forces meet, or a *register* for the interests of different parts of society, their emphasis upon the state as an autonomous *actor* has left behind the state as a distinctive security practice, or way of relating violence to territorial space, and the institutional structures needed to carry out this practice.

Against this sharpened traditional Realist image of the state as the *real*-state, the impact of nuclear explosives can be gauged more clearly. Nuclear weapons fundamentally challenge the *real*-state because they deny the possibility that a political order of less than universal scope can monopolize violence capability within its territory. Prior to the advent of nuclear explosives, the scale requirements of military viability dictated that an entity be of approximately continental scale, as the two world wars demonstrated. With the advent of nuclear explosives, an entity must encompass the entire globe, or else monopolize all nuclear capability (in which case one state would be secure, and all the rest insecure). Nuclear weapons are to the *real*-state what gunpowder was to the medieval fief: a technology that renders it militarily inviable.

Support for the proposition that the *real*-state has been fundamentally compromised by nuclear explosives can be found by comparing the security-related definitions of the *real*-state provided by Hobbes, Ranke, and Weber with the nuclear era situation. The advent of nuclear weapons makes the interstate system similar to

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Hobbes' "state of nature" because it is possible for political collectivities to suffer a sudden and comprehensive death. Nuclear weapons greatly weaken the gradation between the larger powers and the smaller ones. In a world with abundant nuclear weapons, it is possible for even the largest human collectivities to be quickly and completely destroyed. Nuclear weapons have also created a condition of essential equality with regard to survival. Once a state apparatus or human organization, no matter how otherwise lacking in assets, acquires a certain number and type of nuclear weapons, it becomes the peer of the largest state in the sense that the small state can effectively "kill" the large one.

Because of the nuclear revolution the greatest of the state sovereigns have fallen back into a state of nature vis-à-vis one another. At the end of World War II, the greatest sovereign states were in a Hobbesian "state of war" with each other, but since they were not capable of killing one another they were not in a "state of nature" with each other. Now that their military viability has been pulled out from under them, they are, in the most essential respects, more like men in the "state of nature" than sovereigns in the "state of war." Thus, as several Hobbes scholars have pointed out,[10] the logic of Hobbes' argument applied to the nuclear era points toward the creation of a world sovereign.

The German historian Leopold von Ranke's definition of a "Great Power" provides a second indicator that nuclear weapons have fundamentally challenged the state mode of protection. In his classic analysis of European power politics, Ranke defined a Great Power as ". . .a power capable of standing alone in war against a coalition of other Great Powers and surviving."[11] Because not even the United States and the Soviet Union could have stood alone against each other in a war and survived, they were not, by Ranke's definition, Great Powers. If sheer magnitude of power were the measure, or if power relative to all other states were the measure, then the United States and the Soviet Union would surely have qualified for special status.[12] Ranke's definition, however, centers upon neither absolute quantity of power nor simple relative power, but is about the capability of states to achieve an absolute value or condition—survival in war—against other similarly-capable powers. In the nuclear era, the last of the Great Powers have been abolished by the superpowers in the sense of nuclear supercapabilities,

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but this abolition has been obscured by the tendency to speak of political collectivities as well as capabilities as superpowers. In a backhanded register of this strange new situation, many Realist theorists have retreated from the demanding criteria for Great Power status laid down by the classical Realists and instead postulated that Great Powers are defined by the quantity of power assets held by states relative to others in the system.

Weber's classic definition of the state also points to the fundamental challenge posed by nuclear explosives. Many of the institutions which today claim to be states have legitimate capacities for violence only within their territories; they do not have the ability to prevent other state apparatuses from sending military forces into their territories. And, because nuclear weapons can be hurled or dropped, more or less at will, from anywhere on the planet, there is no institution which has the monopoly of violence in any particular territory. The invasion of territory and nuclear bombardment may not constitute legitimate uses of violence, but they can occur nevertheless. Institutions claiming to be states have the only legitimate capacities for violence in all territories, but none has the monopoly of violence in any territory. "States" today have a monopoly on the ability to *legitimize* violence, but they do not have the ability to *monopolize* violence.

In short, in the apparently innocent process of "redefining" the state, theorists have spoilt the appropriate metric for assessing the actual impact of the bomb on the state. Held to account by the traditional standard, the hollowness and fragility of the state in the nuclear era is clear.

THE KALISHNIKOV REVOLUTION

There is a second limitation of early nuclear one worldism with direct impact on the prospects for the state. Early nuclear one worlders had an extremely simple and unidimensional image of violence capability shaped almost wholly by nuclear weapons, but the reality of the contemporary world is more complicated. The composition of power at the lower end of the spectrum of violence capability has changed over the last half century. The diffusion of easy-to-operate automatic weapons and other conventional weaponry has made conquest and assimilation vastly more expensive

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than before. Territory inhabited by extensive populations is very difficult to conquer and nearly impossible to absorb. As a general rule, a potential conqueror has two choices: on-the-ground exchanges with local populations in which the defenders have an advantage and can extract high casualties, or the application of enough violence to annihilate the populations. In both Vietnam and Afghanistan the outside powers, frustrated by the inability of their superior conventional force to achieve results, drifted into a strategy of obliterating concentrations of civil populations and infrastructure without subduing military resistance. The point is not that nuclear weapons protect against conquest, but that simultaneous developments in conventional forces make conquest and absorption very costly.[13]

This shifting composition and diffusion of power at the lower end of the spectrum of violence has produced in the post-World War II era a succession of failures by Great Powers to maintain or impose control on restive populations—the French in Indochina, the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. *National liberation,* not *supernational integration*, has been the dominant trend, producing an increasingly fragmented territorial state system. So important and deep-seated is this "Kalishnikov Revolution" that it must be listed along with the "nuclear fact" as a basic feature of the composition of power in the present era that can be expected to shape world politics.

Thus the core argument of the nuclear one worlders on the increasing scale of military viability is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. Their diagnosis is correct, as far as it goes. But their prediction of territorial consolidation into a world state failed to materialize because of the simultaneous presence of another, seemingly contradictory, trend in the relationship between violence capability and territorial security from conquest. The contemporary composition of the powers of destruction and protection are bifurcated: *annihilation is easy*; *conquest is difficult.* It is nearly impossible to protect territory from annihilation; but it is easier than ever to prevent conquest. This means that territorial control and the upper reaches of destructive capability have, after millennia of close connection, largely parted company. The bifurcation of contemporary violence capability reinforces the viability of state territorial security units in some ways, while compromising them in other

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ways. Material forces simultaneously pull the world order in opposite directions—away from centralized territorial control but towards the consolidated management of territory-negating nuclear capability.

BEYOND THE STATE

The third limitation of early nuclear one worldism is, ironically, its inability to think past the state. Early nuclear one worldism was radical in its indictment of the multistate system, but was largely uncritical of the state as an institutional form. Most in effect proclaimed, "the states are dead, long live the world state!" In actuality nuclear weapons pose an even more radical challenge, calling into question the *real*-state itself, rather than the scale at which such institutions can successfully operate.

Historically, the *real*-state was an adaptation, a roughly workable response to the conditions of violence as they long existed. As Charles Tilly has summed it up, "the state made war, and war made the state."[14] But with war between major states now either ended or catastrophic, the *real*-state ceases to be necessary.

Speaking in very broad terms, the advent of nuclear weapons has reversed the security problem as it presented itself throughout almost all of human history. Two fundamental features of the world—the velocity and the volume of violence—shape the appropriate type of security-providing institution. In the past both were low. Consequently, relative differences had a large effect on security. Mobilization was arduous and slow; polities had to struggle to achieve enough violence capability. The survival of security units was greatly enhanced by attention to the external distribution of power, and polities with states capable of balancing (i.e., counteracting against outside threats) were benefited. A premium was placed on security-providing institutions that had concentrated and autonomous violence capabilities. *Real*-states were the most suitable means for providing security in this environment, and so came to be the predominant security institution.

In the nuclear world, the old problems that the *real*-state needed to solve largely have been solved, while new problems have emerged for which the *real*-state is ill-suited. The material context within which security must be pursued has now become hyperpowered. In

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a world dominated by nuclear explosives, ballistic missiles, and planet-spanning information systems, the volume of violence has reached the absolute, and the velocity of violence nears the instantaneous. Effective distance has been almost completely eliminated. In this situation, mobilization and balancing are easy, and the power concentrated in the executive of the state has become far greater than ever before. In short, the superabundance of violence brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons has rendered the *real*-state superfluous by largely solving the problems for which it was a solution.

At the same time, nuclear weapons pose security threats for which other, non-*real*-state approaches are better suited. Security institutions must strive to separate, slow, and deconcentrate nuclear power. In a nuclear world, security derives from the paralysis of states rather than from the exercise of state power, and from the acceptance of the impossibility of territorial violence monopolization rather than from its pursuit.

The combination of the nuclear and the Kalishnikov revolutions creates a novel configuration of security threats and possibilities for governance structures. Neither a world state nor the simple multistate system are appropriate for the nuclear era. The old problem of aggression is now much less acute; peace can be kept without elaborate or powerful international institutions to prevent interstate aggression. As this problem has declined, the solution of collective security has declined in relevance and appeal. But the high costs of conquest do not eliminate the threat of annihilation posed by nuclear explosives. This threat, however, can be addressed without creating a government structure that aggregates territories (and thus populations) worldwide. By sidestepping the aggregation of territories, the need to address the many other intractable problems afflicting peoples and the differences dividing them is lessened or avoided. This points to the possibility for an institution that contains and paralyzes nuclear capability but does not aggregate all territory into one state. The disposition of territory-negating capabilities (which are distinctive and specialized in character) rather than checks upon territory-aggregating capabilities becomes the central, but circumscribed, problem for interstate security institutions. Instead of a world state, it is more appropriate to expect the territorial state system to be augmented by an institution for the comprehensive

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containment of nuclear capability. Because the prevention of territorial conquest is no longer an acute problem, the separation of territorial control and nuclear protection has become much more possible. The most appropriate outcome or adjustment would be one in which the state mode of protection would be confined to the territorial sphere and supplemented with a non-statist mode of protection (otherwise unspecified).

In effect, most nuclear one worlders proposed to solve the security crisis of the multistate system by creating an omnistate. In this outcome nuclear capability is *concentrated* and then *employed* to maintain peace between the disarmed or dismantled states. This solution is logical if nuclear explosives are seen as culminating the trend for technology to facilitate interstate aggression and conquest. A more nuanced diagnosis suggests a more complicated and less developed image of a world order in adjustment to nuclear realities, in which the state system is augmented (rather than replaced) by a nuclear containment system: nuclear capability is *separated* from state control and *paralyzed*. This image of adjustment is implicit in the architecture of the Baruch Plan and has been kept alive (but never given adequate theoretical critical mass) by Leonard Beaton, John Barton, and Jonathan Schell.[15] Conceptualizing a major institutional center of gravity between the states that is not itself a state is difficult in the largely statist vocabulary of international relations. But this image of adjustment is extrapolated from the observed elements of state adjustment to date.

REPUBLICS AND POWER CONSTRAINT

If we accept that the *real*-state is misfitted to the security constraints and opportunities of the nuclear era and has slowly but surely begun to wane, we are still left with the vital question, "what is the *real*-state to be replaced by?" I suggest that the simplest, most accurate, and most useful way to think about sustainable nuclear governance is as a type of *republic*. To understand this fundamental alternative to *real*-statist security governance, we must briefly step back and reflect upon institutions and practices of power constraint.

Even more than the term "state," the term "republic" has come to be used in so many ways as to mean little or nothing. Few terms

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are as widely used, theoretically significant, and vaguely defined as "republic" and its cognates. John Adams, second president of the United States and author of a major theoretical exposition on the Constitution, despaired of the term meaning "anything, everything or nothing."[16] Today republic is often used to denote democracies with participating and virtuous citizens, kingless political orders, or self-governing polities. Such terms are used to label a bewildering diversity of phenomena: Plato's picture of a small city-state ruled by a philosopher-king, popular government in city-states, Rome after the Kings and before the Caesars, the European state system, and many contemporary political regimes—from the United States and the People's Republic of China to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Republic and its cognates appear in two-thirds of the official names of states.[17]

Given this great diversity, definitional clarity and conceptual taxonomy are vital. Unfortunately, there is no common core that unites or can unite all the uses to which this family of words is now put. Rather, there are three important but distinctive traditions of theory in which the term republic appears—*cosmos republicanism, civic humanism,* and *negarchical republicanism.* These traditions cannot be easily united or synthesized. Cosmos republicanism is a natural law tradition that sees the cosmos, political orders, and the individual soul as being ordered in a harmonious hierarchy. Civic humanism is a cluster of ideas about the importance of civic participation, virtue, and public zeal. It is still venerated by many political theorists in the twentieth century as the touchstone against which all forms of political association should be measured.

More relevant to the nuclear political question is negarchical republicanism. Elsewhere I have suggested that institutions in which devices such as balance, separation, union, mixture, and virtue serve to limit, check, and constrain power, particularly violent and concentrated power, be thought of as constituting a *negarchy.*[18] In general terms a negarchy is a set of power constraint institutions arranged to prevent simultaneously the emergence of a hierarchical or imperial system and anarchy. Whereas *real*-statist institutions seek to mobilize and wield power, negarchical republican ones seek to constrain, bind, and paralyze both the instruments of violence and the actors that might employ them.

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Negarchical republics are not simply another way of internally governing states, but are an alternative to the state. *Real*-states and negarchical republics are distinctive and competing regulators or controllers of violence, but the value and feasibility of either institutional type varies with the material context. Both entail strategies to regulate the instruments of violence (arms control) and the authority of those who might wield them (leader control).

This way of thinking about republics and power constraint is more forgotten than new. In the eighteenth century, when Europeans began to realize that their political system was something more than a universal state or empire decaying or emerging, it was customary to refer to Europe as a "republic." When Montesquieu, Voltaire, Vattel, Burke, and dozens of other lesser known figures[19] spoke this way, they did not, of course, mean to say that Europe was a self-governing city-state or a democracy, but rather that it was constituted by a set of power constraint practices and institutions. The best known legacy of this macrorepublicanism was the balance of power, both in the sense of an equilibrium of power capable of frustrating hegemonic aspirations and as the practice of counteracting or "balancing" powerful predatory states. But arguably even more central to this European republican system was the separation of power, the division of Europe into separate units, a central reality which was perceived to be mainly the product of Europe's extraordinarily fragmented topography.

Even more self-consciously, the US federal Constitution of 1787 set up a republican negarchy. Its creation was animated by the explicit aim of avoiding what Hamilton and Madison called the Europeanization of American politics that would have been likely had the several American states persisted in anarchy and come themselves to be *real*-states by their competitive interaction.[20] In an effort to improve upon European practice, the American Union built power constraint institutions into its general architecture. By guaranteeing the citizen militia and the right to bear arms, the ultimate military sanction was kept out of the hands of the central government. In this union the several American states were not eliminated, but circumscribed and preserved as a bulwark against usurpation of power by the central government. At the center of this system was a government constituted by numerous checks and balances, carefully designed to prevent its consolidation and auton-

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omy. In part this order was possible because American geopolitical isolation—in effect the physical separation of power—made a strong central state to balance against outside threats almost unnecessary. In the wake of the industrial revolution, this geopolitical separation declined, bringing competitive pressures that gradually led Americans to construct their own approximation of a *real*-state.

Several republican power control approaches and devices, most notably the interstate separation and balance of power and the internal constraints on executive and military war-making authority, have been incorporated both within the units of the state system and between them. These successful republican violence controls, historically instituted despite the resistance of statists, mark important exceptions to *real*-statist approaches, although they are rarely recognized for what they are (in part because of the definitional elasticity about what a state is). There is, in short, far more negarchical republicanism in actual security practice than contemporary Realists, steeped in the rhetoric of statist supremacy, recognize or acknowledge.

THE FRAGMENTARY NUCLEAR REPUBLICAN UNION

These general and historical observations on power constraint institutions and practices offer the key to the puzzle of nonstatist nuclear governance. Negarchical republican tendencies characterize both the first steps of adjustment visible in world politics and the more robust systems of nuclear control needed to close the gap between security objectives and nuclear realities.

Prior to the nuclear era, peoples seeking security had to concentrate power inside their state apparatus and then use it to sustain the balance of power in the interstate system. Alliances or unions between states were formed to aggregate sufficient power to maintain the balance, but were inevitably shifting and fleeting in character. Balancing and alliances were the main forms of statecraft because the fundamental separation or division of the units was relatively robust.

In the nuclear era, however, different power constraint practices have proven necessary. The volume and velocity of violence have reached such extremes that achieving separation is now more problematic and needs more attention than achieving balance. Alliances

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also take a more permanent and intrusive form. Faced with a threat from permanent material forces rather than shifting predatory states, nuclear security alliances are, appropriately, perpetual unions of sorts. And the content of these unions is much more intrusive, for their object is not the constraint of a rogue predatory state, but the internal mutual constraint of all nuclear armed countries. Thus emerges the apparent paradox of security governance appropriate to the nuclear era: achieving adequate *separation* requires fuller *union*. Only by forming fuller, more lasting, and more intrusive unions can the separation of nuclear capability from interstate conflict be achieved.

In several important respects the governance of nuclear weapons has begun to take on such a negarchical republican character. The START I and START II treaties commit the United States and the Soviet Union and its successor states to a major reduction in nuclear armaments and to significant qualitative changes in their nuclear forces. Equally important, these treaties establish an elaborate system of on-site inspections and monitoring that have no historical precedents in their degree of intrusiveness. A key objective of these treaties has been to reduce the hair-trigger postures that both sides had gradually come to assume during the Cold War. A central fear has been that these nuclear forces could spiral out of control, or be subject to some major accident because of their heightened state of readiness.[21] Although typically couched in the language of complex systems theory, the basic insight here would be familiar to Montesquieu and Madison: quick decision-making is inherently bad because the number of actors involved must be low, and the extent of deliberations is greatly truncated.

A second important feature of the state's relation to nuclear weapons is the failure of nuclear proliferation to occur more extensively. In the 1950s and 1960s many observers projected that there would be dozens of nuclear armed states by the 1990s.[22] These projections assumed that states that could build nuclear weapons would do so, in order to gain or maintain a relative advantage against their neighbors. Instead, most potential nuclear states, notably Germany and Japan, have eschewed nuclear acquisition and joined the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and regime. And three states, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, that were actively seeking and nearing nuclear capability have reversed course by disman-

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tling their programs and joining the NPT.[23] While other states that feel highly isolated and vulnerable (most notably Israel, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) have active nuclear efforts, the great majority of potential nuclear powers have avoided acquiring them. In effect, most states have sought to secure themselves by decoupling or separating themselves from the world of nuclear threat and counter threat.

Another important instance of the spread of a new orientation to nuclear security is the extraordinary decision of Ukraine to sign the NPT and START accords and to completely dismantle the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union: this despite fears of Russian encroachment, the pointed advice of many Western Realists to retain nuclear weapons to balance against Russia,[24] and the unwillingness of the United States to extend either NATO's or its own nuclear umbrella. A factor in this move was that Ukraine was still reeling from the Chernobyl catastrophe, and so had firsthand knowledge of the perils of nuclear possession. In making this surprising deviation from the traditional *real*-state script, Ukraine was signaling its willingness to base its nuclear security upon the institutions and practices of the nascent nuclear republican union.

In sum, a new, nonstatist security practice has begun to emerge. Responding to nuclear security imperatives, states as security-providing institutions have been paralyzed and are increasingly displaced, complemented, and enveloped by larger, less centered, and less sovereign institutions whose logic is negarchical republican. These are crucial first steps away from a system of *real*-states in anarchy and toward a republican negarchy. Yet these positive steps remain incomplete, coexisting uneasily with *real*-state doctrines and force structures that are continuing sources of insecurity and evidence of continuing institutional maladjustment.

COMPLETING THE NUCLEAR REVOLUTION

The *real*-state has waned and fragments of a nuclear republican union have emerged, but the republicanization of nuclear governance remains incomplete. What might be done to complete the nuclear revolution in security institutions? Space does not permit a full discussion of alternative institutional architectures, but four key measures deserve attention.

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First, this way of thinking about nuclear security suggests new ways in which to configure nuclear destructive capability. Contemporary thinking about alternative nuclear force structures reaches a stone wall with a "minimum deterrent," a situation in which at least several hundred nuclear explosives are poised for immediate use. Beyond this minimum deterrent is generally thought to be a deterrence-less situation of disarmament, or disarmament combined with a supranational peacekeeping organization.[25] There is, however, a second set of alternatives, which might be called a *recessed deterrent.* Nuclear capability is recessed when either the carefully maintained and constrained capability to produce nuclear weapons has replaced actual nuclear weapons or when small numbers of existing nuclear weapons have been embedded in institutional control systems that involve vetoes by separated authorities. Moving toward a recessed deterrent force and command structure extends the logic of power paralysis at work in deterrence and interstate arms control, while avoiding the creation of a new center of power above states.

Closely related to the further recession of nuclear force structures is the reconfiguration of the authorities for using nuclear weapons. More out of necessity than choice, current nuclear control arrangements are so highly concentrated as to be despotic in character.[26] Even the American Constitutional arrangement, so intrinsically hostile to the centralized and autonomous control of violence, has been corrupted by the extraordinary pressures for speedy decision-making. A central appeal of a recessed deterrent force structure is that it permits the application of further checks and balances upon the decision to use nuclear weapons.

Third, multiple actor command systems need to be explored. An essential assumption of the American Constitution was that the war-making power should never be concentrated in the hands of one individual or one body, but rather shared by separate bodies with veto powers. Can nuclear forces be configured in such a way that a system of checks and balances between different states could be recovered and widely employed? This question has immediate practical importance as Ukraine and Kazakhstan seek to maintain a voice in Russian nuclear control, and as the Europeans begin to think about a command structure that brings Germany into the nuclear decision-making process without an independent German nuclear force.

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Fourth, and finally, are mechanisms for nuclear education and remembrance. During the Cold War, "nuclear learning" occurred as publics and leaders gradually came to understand the consequences of nuclear use and the un-usability of nuclear weapons.[27] But this lesson remains insufficiently institutionalized. With the waning of the Cold War arms race and the intensely politicized nuclear threat, there is a danger that these lessons may be forgotten. Given the importance and permanence of the nuclear threat, the lessons of the nuclear age should be more authoritatively encoded in the basic documents, ceremonies, offices, and educational systems of all nuclear and potentially nuclear societies.

These and related measures would strengthen the nascent system of nuclear containment and state constraint and would be a type of negarchical republic, employing balance, separation, union, and mixture to constrain violence capability without creating a centralized state. The creation of such a nuclear republican union is neither an idealistic nor a utopian enterprise, but rather is driven by the same fundamental security imperatives that led to the creation of *real*-states. And like the balance of power, such an order aims to preserve plurality in the nuclear world of tightly coupled security interdependence.

While the *real*-state is inevitably dysfunctional in a nuclear world, the emergence of republican nuclear governance institutions is not inevitable, but is imperative for security values. The security materialism of nuclear one worldism maps constraints and opportunities and provides a metric for assessing the functionality of alternative security orders, but it provides no guarantee that catastrophe will be avoided. The actual emergence of more full-bodied republican nuclear governance is not an automatic process, but entails an at least partially self-conscious process of institution and organization building. Just as state-building has involved a distinctive set of practices, norms, and designs, so too does republic-building. Contemporary statist Realists may seek to study "what is" rather than what could or should be, but their classical predecessors, including Machiavelli, Botero, and Hobbes, did not. The origins of the modern state and of statist Realism involved a moment of practical and theoretical creativity that positive social science alone cannot replicate. Unless contemporary Realists allow themselves the same conceptual latitude that the classical Realists exercised, Realism's po-

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tentially vital contribution to security theory and practice in the new circumstances of the nuclear era could be aborted.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion and summation, I suggest two analogies for the fate of the state in the nuclear era. Despite the immensely complicated technical dimensions of nuclear weapons, simple metaphors and analogies are vital for capturing the most essential features of this strange new world in which we are condemned to live.

A traditional statist metaphor, deployed by Hobbes and other foundational theorists of the *real*-state, is the "body politic." The state, like the human body, is functionally differentiated into different organs and is alone and perishable in a potentially hostile world. This metaphor provided statists with a basic schema for capturing the essentials of their worldview. Like the arms of a human body, the arms of the state are instruments of security, varying in strength and swinging free in violent strife.

Between 1870 and 1970, between the ages of Bismark and Kissinger, the armed violence capability of the leading states increased by a factor of some nine billion. A body with arms swollen to such a degree is effectively a different organism, and the disposition of such hypertrophic limbs, transformed from instrumental appendages into horrifying monstrosities, has an altogether different meaning for the security of the body politic. So grotesquely endowed, the body politic must now fear above all the strength of its own arms and must strive to ensure by whatever means necessary their lassitude and paralysis. In this situation, former adversaries become necessary allies in the quest for stability, and security depends upon binding arms and containing conflicts.

A second analogy also helps capture the overall argument marrying the nuclear one worldist diagnosis to the republican institutional outcome. As Arnold Wolfers suggested, realpolitik theorists of states liken them to "billiard balls" knocking each other about, and only weakly constrained by the "cobwebs" of interstate norms.[28] The invention of nuclear explosives has turned billiard balls into "eggs," and the continuing quest for security drives fragile states to create cushioning and protective structures not unlike "egg cartons." The

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"hard shelled" billiard balls of prenuclear times knocked each other about for political and security gain, but collision has become suicidal for the inescapably vulnerable eggs of the nuclear world. Where the billiard ball states crashed through the weak webs of international norms and institutions, the fragile nuclear egg states sit paralyzed while an egg carton, a system of mutually protective norms and institutions, is created around them. Materialism illuminates the transformation of billiard balls into eggs, republicanism the logic of egg cartons. With the emergence of a protective republican union, the separate units of the world political system do not disappear, nor are they absorbed into one superstate. And the emerging protective egg carton—the nuclear republican security union—is not a state and it does not transform states back into billiard balls. Unfortunately, contemporary thinking about states remains too much in the billiard ball era, and has only begun to construct and grasp the logic of egg cartons.

ENDNOTES

[1]Realism as a tradition of theorizing about security and power in world politics is best capitalized to distinguish it from the more general ordinary language sense of realism as an effort to grasp and deal with what actually is real, something which the critics of Realism also claim to embody.

[2]Colin Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Russak, 1977) and Colin Gray, "The Case for a Theory of Victory," *International Security* 4 (1) (Summer 1979): 54–87.

[3]Bernard Brodie, ed., *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); and Kenneth Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84 (3) (September 1990): 731–44.

[4]Hans J. Morgenthau, "Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy," *American Political Science Review* 58 (March 1964): 35. For Morgenthau's nuclear one worldism, see James Speer, "Hans Morgenthau and the World State," *World Politics* 20 (2) (January 1968); and Richard Rosecrance, "The One World of Hans Morgenthau," *Social Research* 48 (4) (Winter 1981).

[5]John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

[6]A good index of this disappearance is that no "nuclear one world" arguments appear in recent synoptic overviews of "security studies." See Joseph Nye Jr. and

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Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security* 12 (4) (Spring 1988); and Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35 (2) (June 1991): 211–39.

[7]For nuclear one world ideology and the end of the Cold War, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security* 16 (3) (Winter 1991/1992): 74–118; and Stephen Shenfeld, *The Nuclear Predicament: Exploration in Soviet Ideology,* Chatham House Papers No. 37 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).

[8]Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).

[9]James Rosenau, "The State in an Era of Cascading Politics: Wavering Concept, Widening Competence, Withering Colossus, or Weathering Change?," in James Caporaso, ed., *The Elusive State* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1989), 7–16.

[10]David Gauthier, *The Logic of Leviathan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), app., 206–12.

[11]Leopold von Ranke, "The Great Powers," in Theodore H. von Laue, *Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950).

[12]See, for example, Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); and Jack Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975* (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1983).

[13]John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[14]Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter Evans et al., eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169–91.

[15]John Barton, "The Proscription of Nuclear Weapons: A Third Nuclear Regime," in D. Gompert, M. Mandelbaum, R. Garwin, and J. Barton, *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), 151–208; Leonard Beaton, *The Reform of Power* (New York: Viking Press, 1972); and Jonathan Schell, *The Abolition* (New York: Knopf, 1984).

[16]John Adams, *Works,* vol. X (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1856), 378.

[17]Ian Shapiro notes that of the 170 countries existing in 1987, 113 contain the term "republic" or one of its cognates in their formal names. See Ian Shapiro, "History as a Source of Republican Alternatives," in *Political Criticism* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), 184, n. 17.

[18]Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union, ca.1787–1861," *International Organization* (Spring 1995): 1–55.

[19]For an extensive but still partial listing, see F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 107–19; and Edward

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Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), 120–35.

[20]Clinton Rossiter, ed., *The Federalist Papers* (New York: New American Library, 1961).

[21]Bruce Blair, *The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[22]Albert Wohlstetter et al., *Swords from Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

[23]John Redick, Julio Carasales, and Paulo Wrobel, "Nuclear Rapproachement: Argentina, Brazil, and the Nonproliferation Regime," *The Washington Quarterly* 18 (1) (Winter 1995); and J. W. Villers, Rojar Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (November/December 1993).

[24]John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3) (Summer 1993): 50–66.

[25]Representative of this view are Charles Glaser, *Analyzing Nuclear Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) and David W. Tarr, *Nuclear Deterrence and International Security: Alternative Nuclear Regimes* (New York: Longman, 1991).

[26]For a discussion of these deformations and possible remedies, see Peter Raven-Hansen, *First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who Decides?* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987).

[27]Joseph Nye Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41 (3) (Summer 1987): 271–402.

[28]In the "billiard-ball model," states "represent a closed, impermeable and sovereign unit, completely separated from all other states." Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 3–24. This image is similar to John Herz's "hard-shelled" versus "permeable" units. See John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

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